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DEMOCRATISATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE

PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS IN A POST-NATIONAL COMMUNITY

PH.D. THESIS

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SUMMARY

In this thesis I attempt to show the different interpretations and meanings around scientific citizenship. In the first section, the ‘Meeting of Minds. European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science’ project is described and analysed in depth. This project is meant to involve citizens in the debates on the possible political, ethical, legislative and economic implications of developments in brain science. Furthermore, in relation to this project and its connections to European policy debates the thesis describes three discursive layers: the academic, the official and the citizens’ layer. In these layers one can find different ways to express the meaning of participation in a ‘postnational technological society’. The analysis of these different layers not only delineates the different manners through which involvement is possible in Europe but also shows connections between discursive fields and frames.

Keywords:

scientific citizenship, deliberative democracy, public participation, science in society, participatory technology assessment

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANT	–	<i>Actor-Network-Theory</i>
ADA	–	<i>Argumentative Discourse Analysis</i>
CC	–	<i>Consensus Conference</i>
CDA	–	<i>Critical Discourse Analysis</i>
MoM	–	<i>Meeting of Minds – European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science</i>
PTA	–	<i>Participatory Technology Assessment</i>
STS	–	<i>Science and Technology Studies</i>
TA	–	<i>Technology Assessment</i>
Wp.	–	<i>Webpage (in references)</i>

INTRODUCTION

i. The theme of the thesis

The main purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyse a special kind of citizenship model which I call post-national scientific citizenship. This model is strongly related to a recent initiative of involving citizens in European policy-making in a scientific issue, namely, the ‘Meeting of Minds – European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science’. For creating a context both for this initiative and for this citizenship model, this initiative will be investigated and discussed alongside with the theoretical, policy and social environment in which it is embedded. The thesis, therefore, is neither empirical nor theoretical in itself but attempts to unravel interrelated practices, discourses and meanings. All of these levels will be represented in the thesis with a clear focus on the topic of citizenship which will hopefully act as an adhesive substance between diverse fields of knowledge and of social reality.

In contemporary Europe *citizenship* reappears on the agenda due to various social, economic and political processes such as globalisation, growing cultural plurality and development of science and technology, just to mention the most important ones.

Globalisation, for example, while in many aspects undermines the economic and political manoeuvring capacity of nation states, also challenges the traditional relationship between nation state and its citizens. According to Habermas (Habermas, 2001), this process leads inescapably to the emergence of transnational political units such as the European Union. However, the immanent coherence of these transnational political units is very fragile and therefore citizenship is often considered as being “an avenue for the social integration of Europe” (Giesen&Eder, 2001).¹

¹ Recently the Dutch ‘nee’ and the French ‘non’ demonstrated to the leaders of the EU that the voice of the citizens should be taken into account in advance of significant changes in the European political structure.

While the question of what kind of citizenship can integrate the tenants of such a diverse territorial and cultural area like Europe is still on the minds of European politicians, due to modern migration traditional European *nation*-states themselves become inwardly culturally diversified. As a result, the traditional link between cultural-linguistic community and political community tends to break. This calls for the reconsideration of roles, rights and meanings attached to citizenship.

Last but not least, in the second part of the last century, due to many negative effects of the development of science and technology, these spheres have lost their distinctive positions and, among many other spheres such as economy or culture, also became problematic elements of our societies. While the application of scientific results, various devices and technologies have become more and more part of citizens' life, they have also become aware of their downsides.

Phenomena such as the destruction of our environment, the incomprehensible hazard of nuclear and biological weapons or the role that info-communication technologies play in trafficking, prostitution and terrorism all contributed to the public's declining trust in science and technology. I would argue that the straightforward relationship between science and society, that is, the image of science as a common good is no longer generally true.

It is not to say that the public has become techno-phobic but that science and technology cannot negate their political aspects anymore. Science and technology have not only altered what well-being means in a late modern society but they have also changed the boundaries, the inner structure and the operational logic of political communities. Furthermore, debates on science and technology are becoming a part of political life and therefore the political subject, that is, the citizen of the late modern societies has to be aware not only of the changes in narrowly defined politics but also developments of

science and technology (Winner 1993, Feenberg 1999, Bijker 1995, 2006). As Elam and Bertilsson put it about these issues:

“In a globalizing world, where states continue to struggle for their existence in the absence of clear-cut enemies, innovation and technological competition are gaining recognition as perhaps the most important forces shaping the creative destruction of sovereign powers. When the future of ‘our’ society is seen to depend upon science and technology, it is only to be expected that interests will arise wishing to redefine citizenship in more ‘scientific’ terms (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003, p. 247).”

Accordingly, this thesis aims to describe and understand a citizenship model which redefines citizenship in more ‘scientific’ terms in a globalising world, namely, the ‘post-national citizenship’.

ii. The theoretical background

It is important to address the theoretical foundations for such investigations at the beginning of the ‘journey’. Instead of drawing on one particular school of thought, this thesis draws on several different strands of thinking. This investigation attempts to be interdisciplinary in nature standing at the crossroads leading to the domains of Sociology, Political Science, Citizenship Studies and Science and Technology Studies. As a consequence, it also runs the risk that neither field will consider this thesis as its own child.

As I am a sociologist and this thesis is created under the auspices of a sociology PhD programme, if I really have to identify the theoretical background I would say that the meta-framework is sociology in which I operated with different theories. I would only like to express my hope that the argumentation shifts smoothly from one theoretical domain to another without any significant ruptures. If so, that would mean that my aim to weave an interdisciplinary ‘seamless web’ of ideas succeeded. I shall very briefly present the role the different disciplines played in the development of the train of thought.

As I have mentioned above, I have used Sociology as a general framework for this whole theoretical journey called thesis. The role of sociology in this thesis would be a general sensitivity for different identities, practices and strategies which are used by the actors in this story whether they are institutions like the EU or individuals like citizens.

From the vast domain of 'Political Science', I am particularly interested in deliberative democratic theory since this is the approach which serves as a foundation for new initiatives of public participation such as the MoM project. Deliberative Democracy Theory attempts to develop new forms of participation which are meaningful and direct in nature. This approach contributed significantly in the mapping of the theoretical milieu from which the idea of Meeting of Minds stems.

As the central theme of the thesis is 'scientific citizenship', the connection to citizenship studies is obvious. The field of 'Citizenship Studies' is one of the recently emerging interdisciplinary accounts which has a strong focus on one particular aspect of social reality. This field attempts to understand the new layers and aspects of citizenship in connection with globalisation, feminism, social movements or economic degradation. These challenges ask for a kind of new political subject, or as the advocates of this approach argue. In line with this, I shall argue in this thesis that the pace of development in the sphere of science and technology also request a new kind of political actor.

Science and Technology Studies (hereinafter STS for short) is also a fairly recent strand of research attempt to understand how science, technology and society co-construct each other in a complex and interrelated way. From the vast array of approaches in this field I particularly draw on Actor-Network-Theory (hereinafter ANT for short). ANT has a robust analysing capacity for mechanisms composed by technologies as well as human actors. Therefore, I used it in order to understand the setting of MoM in a new and inventive way.

Although, these approaches are quite different we can see that agency and identity are a common challenge for all of them. This is the reason why they can be used to understand recent policies and developments in connection with participation, science and technology. All in all, the changing concept of citizenship and particularly of ‘scientific citizenship’ will be the common thread which keeps these diverse fields together.

iii. The structure of the thesis

As it has been indicated above, the topic of this thesis has come from a recent initiative which aims to involve European citizens in a deliberative process on brain science. Therefore, I did my empirical research about an initiative which is called ‘Meeting of Minds – European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science’ (hereinafter MoM for short).

However, this thesis will attempt to investigate not only this initiative but also the theoretical, policy and social environment in which it is embedded. According to Haajer, the real challenge of his ADA (Argumentative Discourse Analysis) method is to find ways of combining analysis of the discursive production of reality with analysis of socio-political practices from which social constructs emerge and in which actors are engaged (Haajer, 2002, p. 62). In order to meet this challenge one should base his analysis on three interrelated elements: *practices, discourses and meanings*. As Haajer puts it:

“The allocation of meaning in a given context is thus analysed in terms of particular forms of discourse within the context of the particular practices in which the discourse is produced. Hence ADA is not simply about analysing arguments – it is much more about analysing politics as a play of ‘positioning’ at particular ‘sites’ of discursive production (Haajer, 2002, p. 62).”

Following this line of thought, this thesis on the one hand describes a special type of socio-political practice in which actors are engaged, namely, the MoM. On the other hand, it also discloses meanings in connection with interrelated discourses about the very actors

involved, that is, the citizens. In order to show the different aspects, discursive layers² and meanings of the topic, this essay consists of five main parts.

The *first chapter* introduces the methodological background of the research project this paper is based on. I used diverse methodologies in order to describe the various characteristics of the MoM project and of three discursive layers (see below). So, in this chapter there is a detailed description of the methods used and a brief section on my methodological position and value commitments.

The *second chapter* is mainly empirical in its nature as it aims to present the structure and the goals of the MoM project. This chapter has two main sections. On the one hand, it introduces the participatory process in general and focuses on MoM in connection with them. After this descriptive part the chapter will move on to an analysis using the concept of 'laboratisation' in order to investigate the process as a special kind of laboratory. This perspective will raise many questions about citizenship models and policy intentions. By attempting to disclose the theoretical, policy and social environment in which a process like the MoM came forth, the questions raised in this chapter will be answered or at least cleared in a way which allows further investigations. Consequently, the following chapters will give a more detailed description and analysis of this model of citizenship outlining its theoretical, policy and citizen perspectives.

The *third chapter* is to disclose the theoretical space around citizenship in connection with science and Europe. The introduction to this academic discursive layer is essential because the models developed here are more than just futile ideas of highbrow scientists. These citizenship models based on different models of political thought also deeply

² It is important to mention that instead of just using the term 'discourse' I prefer to use the concept 'discursive layer' because it refers to the phenomenon of tectonically moving layers in the litho-sphere under our feet. Similarly, three discursive layers of citizenship are not distant, loosely connected, independent strata which refer to the same concept, but are constantly moving, merging and dividing layers of the same discursive field. However, I do not intend to write a historical paper, analysing what the

influence how policy makers construct political subjects or at least strive to impose certain social identities on a political community.

The *fourth chapter* will discuss the ‘official discursive layer’, that is, the different documents published in the last few years by the European Commission in connection with science and citizens. As the reader will be able to see, these documents can be clearly related to the MoM project. The chapter will not only analyse the identity constructions embedded in these texts but will also attempt to show connections between the academic and the policy discursive layer.

In the *fifth chapter* the discursive layer of the citizens will be described and discussed. Here, the focus will come back to Meeting of Minds to investigate how citizens understand themselves in terms of their role in the project. Moreover, it will also be possible to trace different connections and visions of Europe. Since interviews were conducted with both Hungarian and Dutch participants, the question of how participants from different political cultures could find their place in the process will be touched upon.

In this way, the analysis of the citizenship discursive layer is intended to complete the collection of samples from various discursive layers. This collection attempts to represent all the important perspectives around citizenship, science and Europe. It might be argued that both European policy documents and the MoM project favour a special kind of identity position, namely, post-national citizenship. In the conclusion, both the viability and the minimal requirements for such a subject position will be discussed in depth.

In this fashion, this essay aims to be academic and political at the same time. It is academic in its nature because it discusses theoretical backgrounds, relationships and conflicts between theories. However, it is also political in the sense that it aims to

‘composition’ of the different layers can say about events of the past. Instead, I shall trace recent ‘tectonical’ movements in terms of citizenship models.

demonstrate how these relationships, conflicts and value-clashes between the very same theories can serve as a basis for diverse policies.

1. METHODOLOGIES

In this thesis, several different methodologies were used to unravel the interrelationships between citizenship, science and Europe. So, first of all, I will introduce the methodologies used to collect and interpret the data in connection with the structure of this paper. It will be followed by a detailed introduction of various methodological trends³ together with the material analysed. The last section will briefly touch upon the basic underlying values and starting points on which the research project is based.

1.1. Methodologies and Structure

According to Bowden, there are two distinct usages of the concept ‘method’ (Bowden, 1995, p. 65). The first approach refers to *data collection*. This usage of the term mainly focuses on finding the appropriate tool for the chosen problem from the researcher’s methodological toolbox. The second concept is not so much about collecting data as about the method of explanation of the data that has been collected. In line with Bowden’s ideas, I shall present each part of the thesis as a combination of methodologies of data collection and explanation.

³ In this section, I shall not introduce all the different kinds of methodologies used in this thesis but just those which in my opinion require special explanation. Therefore, I will not introduce interviewing or comparative analysis of theories, in other words, literature review but focus on the more sophisticated research methodologies.

Figure 1. Methodologies Used

METHODOLOGIES USED		
<i>Parts of Thesis</i>	<i>Data Collection</i>	<i>Data Explanation</i>
1. Meeting of Minds Part	Participatory fieldwork	Actor-Network-Theory
2. Theoretical Discourse Part	Library research	Comparative Analysis of Theories
3. Official Discourse Part	Library research / Online research / Interviewing	Discursive Policy Analysis
4. Citizens' Discourse Part	Interviewing	Discursive Interview Analysis

In the first part of the thesis, I shall write about and analyse the MoM initiative. For this part, I collected my data as a participating observer as I was following up the process from the beginning to its end. As far as the explanation of data is concerned, I am using Actor-Network-Theory to make sense of my recorded notes and documents collected on the mechanisms. Before the analysis concerned is given, I shall give a detailed review of this approach in the first part.

In the second part, I shall present the different theoretical strands in relation to scientific and European citizenship. As it is usually the case with theoretical parts, I have collected the necessary 'data' at the library reading through the literature concerned. On the other hand, my methodology of explanation is *comparative analysis of theories* since I will compare and combine theories from different academic fields.

For the third part, I have collected my data through library research, online research and by conducting an interview with one of the organisers of the MoM project. On the other hand, my explanatory methodology in unravelling the 'official layer' is *discursive policy analysis*.

In the fourth part, which is the ‘citizens’ discourse layer’, I have collected my data by conducting interviews with the Hungarian and Dutch participants of the project. For making sense of the findings I use discursive interview analysis. I shall demonstrate the various interpretative repertoires which appear in the interviews made with the participants. When analysing the answers of the citizens, I will attempt to display the dynamics of different concepts and the variety of discursive thematisation on participation and European-ness in their responses.

1.2. Fieldwork

It is not easy to describe fieldwork⁴ nor is it easy to find exact guidelines on how it should be done. Hammersley and Atkinson when writing about ‘ethnography’ emphasise that the term should be understood in a liberal way. In its most characteristic form it means that the researcher is participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily life for an extended period of time. During this period the researcher is watching what happens, listening to what is said, is asking questions. His or her attitude towards the field should be what I call ‘*everything comes*’, in other words, collecting whatever data is available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Mesman & Mol, 1996). As McCall and Simmons describe it in relation to the participant-observer role:

„...participant observation is not a single method but rather a characteristic style of research which makes use of a number of methods and techniques - observation, informant interviewing, document analysis, respondent interviewing and participation with self-analysis (McCall & Simmons quoted by Smith, 1997 Wp).”

As Hammersley and Atkinson point out, ethnography is one of the most basic forms of social research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pp. 1-2). It bears a close resemblance to the routine ways in which people makes sense of the world in everyday life. In the early

⁴ Although I know that there are differences between the meanings of the terms ‘ethnography’ and ‘fieldwork’ here I will use them as synonyms for the sake of simplicity.

days of fieldwork, the conduct of an ethnographer often differs very little from that of any layperson faced with a practical need to understand a particular social setting. Hammersley and Atkinson compare the position of the researcher to the novice or recruit who finds him- or herself in relatively strange surroundings. The novices act like social scientists: making observations and drawing inferences, asking informants, constructing hypotheses, and acting on them (ibid. pp. 99-109). However, the...

“...crucial difference between the ‘lay’ novice and the ethnographer in the field is that the latter attempts to maintain a self-conscious awareness of what is learned, how it has been learned, and the social transactions that inform the production of such knowledge (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 101).”

Generally a series of potential roles are open to the researcher doing fieldwork. Walsh in his paper on *Doing ethnography* quotes Junker who identifies four different social roles for the fieldwork (Walsh, 2004, pp. 221-223). These are complete participant, participant as observer, observer as participant and complete observer. I shall not discuss these roles here in detail since their names already imply their meaning. It may be worth mentioning, however, that it is no use making decisions about the sort of role to be adopted in a setting because it will depend on the purposes of the research and the nature of the setting. Fortunately, one does not have to stick to one kind of role but shifts in the researcher’s position can be made all through the fieldwork. Using the words of Hammersley and Atkinson:

“Different roles within a setting can be exploited, then, in order to get access to different kinds of data, as well as to acquire some sense of the various kinds of bias characteristic of each (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 109).”

In a similar fashion, my role as a researcher shifted during my fieldwork as well. The structure and process of the Meeting of Minds, about which I was doing research, kept changing in the course of the project, and so did my position as a researcher. At the beginning, I was an ‘observer as participant’ independent from the process itself. Later, I shifted to a ‘participant as observer’ position as I became more and more involved in the

project documenting the arguments put forward by citizens in order to help them follow the discussion. This involvement helped to get the information needed for the research and helped me get into places to which I would have no access as an observer just as a staff member. It also may be worth mentioning that this engagement with the project made it difficult to keep my distance from the data collected and sometimes even made it impossible to make notes because I was too busy during the actual fieldwork as a staff member. However, I attempted to distance myself from the data collected during the fieldwork and to handle them with care and discretion as far as sensitive information is concerned.

MATERIALS ANALYSED

I did fieldwork on five long weekends on which the Meeting of Minds project took place (Figure 3). In the course of the fieldwork I made notes and collected project material such as

- staff programmes of the meetings
- internal evaluation documents
- comments of the staff on the project
- project working documents summarizing the views of the citizens
- introductory document for the citizens
- the webpage of the project (MoM2005).

I also extensively used the reports (MoM 2005B, 2005C, 2006) which present and describe the events like the First and the Second European Convention, the milestones of the MoM project.

1.3. On Discourse

In this thesis I will very often use the expressions *discourse*, *discursive layer* and *discursive field*. My methodology is not based on only one understanding of discourse but on several different approaches of Discourse Analysis (DA), which I will discuss in detail below.

Discourse has very different meanings and interpretations in the different schools of thought and, therefore, I will not attempt to give discourse a straightforward definition, but rather I shall emphasise those aspects of the concept which are significant, as far as research methodology is concerned. However, I hope that at the end of this section the reader is going to acquire a certain understanding on what discourse is.

From the different trends and accounts, I mainly draw on Foucauldian social theory and on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) when using the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive’. The main aspects of the concept discourse are its *inner order*, its *co-constructive* relationship with society and culture, the characteristic that it is *beyond the* control of the *individual*, consequently it is *historical and contextual*, and it exerts its effects on *different levels* of social reality. I shall reflect briefly on those aspects.

According to the schools of thought mentioned above, the expression ‘*discourse*’ is much broader than if one just speaks about one’s viewpoints or opinions. The discourse is a *semantic field* in which the various meanings are constantly constructed by the *inner order* of the discourse. This inner order is crystallised by mutual relationships between meanings. A discourse therefore can be seen as a complex network of interconnected meanings in which each discursive element is mutually stabilising the others. As a consequence, no discursive element can be understood separately from the others and from the *context* in general. The focal point of discursive theory is not the text per se, but rather:

“Practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things; it is this ‘more’ that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this ‘more’ we must reveal and describe. (Foucault, quoted by Jeppesen, 2006, p. 5.)”

Yet this ‘more’ is not happening at the level of the individual subject but at a higher level. The ‘practices which systematically form the objects’ are social practices and cannot be controlled by the free will of the subject (Jeppesen, 2006, p. 5.). Meaning is constructed in *historically specific contexts*, by reciprocally constitutive elements of meaning. Because of the

theory's focus on meanings and how these meanings form the objects in the social world, discursive theory is often dismissed as post-modern rubbish which reduces reality merely to language games (Wetherell, 2001A). In contrast with this view Discourse Theory does not negate reality, just stresses the fact that our understanding of reality (as human subjects) is always discursive since we comprehend the world by using language. As Jeppesen puts it:

“The perception of ‘reality’ as being discursively constructed does not however entail denying the existence of a world of objects. For example, a horse might be discursively constructed as a pet, food or perhaps a means of transportation. This does not mean that the relation between signs and what they signify is completely arbitrary as one might be led to believe, and everything cannot be said at every point in time and context. Consequently discourses are not to be perceived as unfolding manifestations of the knowing, speaking subject. (...) Rather, discourses are situated or embedded in social practices and are always contextually bounded, and therefore never constructed on their own (Jeppesen, 2006, pp. 5-6).”

In line with the Foucauldian theory, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) also conceives discourse as practice, and stresses the importance of the connection between discourse and social and historical context.

Discourse is also ‘*historical*’ which means that it has acquired its characteristics through time so for the individual it represents a certain inertia and obduracy. Moreover, because of its historical aspect, discourse cannot be understood without considering the context. Furthermore, both Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak – two outstanding figures of the CDA school – stress the interdiscursive nature of discourses. This term means that a given discourse is always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as to those which are produced synchronically or subsequently (Wodak 2001, Fairclough, 1999). I will discuss this aspect in the following section in depth.

Another significant assumption of these theories is ‘*co-constructivity*’ which means that there is no straightforward, one-way relationship between the discourse and the social worlds, in other words, discourse constitutes society and culture as well as being constituted by

them.⁵ According to Fairclough's account⁶, there are three dimensions of this socially constitutive, constructive effect of discourse (Jolliffe, 1997, Wp).

Firstly, he argues that discourse helps to construct the "social identities" and "subject positions". Secondly, discourse also plays a part in giving form to social relationships between people. Thirdly, discourses also serve as a basis for systems of knowledge and belief. Fairclough argues that these three effects correspond to three functions of language and dimensions of meaning, that is, the 'identity,' 'relational,' and 'ideational' functions of language (Jolliffe, 1997, Wp).⁷

Discourse Analysis

In line with the above mentioned arguments on the concept of discourse, Discourse Analysis (DA) studies practices of producing knowledge and meanings in concrete contexts and institutions⁸. Talja argues that discourse analysis "systematizes different ways of talking in order to make visible the perspectives and starting points on the basis of which knowledge and meanings are produced in a particular historical moment (Talja, 1999, p. 2.)". DA focuses on how discourses produce and transform social reality, that is,

⁵ As Wodak puts it: „CDA assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: the situation, institutions and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence social and political reality (Wodak, quoted by Jeppesen 2006, p. 6).”

⁶ Here I will use draw on Jolliffe's (Jolliffe, 1997) interpretation of Fairclough's approach. In his paper, Jolliffe introduced the ideas elaborated in Fairclough's book *Discourse and Social Change* (Fairclough, 1992). In the following paragraphs thus I will refer to Jolliffe's paper although I am going to present Fairclough's ideas.

⁷ Fairclough provides the example of the social scene of schools to clarify these different aspects. So, the 'speech of the classroom' contributes to construct not only the identities of 'teachers' and 'pupils' but also a social relationship in which the teachers organize the pupils' activities and assess them. At an ideological level, this complex relationship between the ones who are in a position to judge others (teachers) and those who are the subject of assessment and evaluation (students) generally reproduces a society's systems of knowledge and belief about the nature of schooling, but it is also open to transformations which may partly originate in discourse (Jolliffe, 1997, Wp).

⁸ It has to be mentioned that the meaning of the term 'DA' is much broader that I am using here (Gering, 2005). However, I shall use here this narrower definition of the term and in the following section I draw on this approach and introduce the main aspects of the analytical implications of it.

how it unfolds the practical consequences of approaching a particular phenomenon – like citizenship (K.G.) – in different ways (p. 2).

Talja also argues that the approach of DA is not at all new and unfamiliar because there were methods way before its emergence to analyse the written and oral utterances of other people. DA thus has a close connection to rhetorics, a traditional research approach, which was the established form of critical analysis from the ancient world to the 18th century (Talja, 1999, p. 15). Using Talja's own words:

„Rhetorics examined the way in which texts are weaved together in order to achieve particular effects. No difference was made between talk and writing, or philosophy and fiction, as objects of study. All texts were analyzed in the same way as forms of social action, power, and public persuasion (Talja, 1999, p. 15).”

One special branch of DA particularly stresses the importance of analysing the ‘forms of social action, power, and public persuasion’. This approach is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which has an especially strong commitment to disclose embedded power relations and ideologies. Beyond the basic framework of discourse analysis, three additional assumptions are made by CDA to achieve this goal (Porter, 2005, Wp.).

Firstly, because discourses tend to support social institutions, there is usually a correspondence between them: particular social, political, and economic regimes are associated with particular types and orders of discourse.

Secondly, discourses contribute to the reproduction and stabilisation of power relations, where power is meant as asymmetrical subject position in discursive situations and, in connection with this, also as unequal capacity to participate in the production, distribution, and consumption of texts in specific contexts.

Third, discourses and texts are not at all merely transparent and unambiguous means of mediating ideas between the ‘reader and the writer’ but have serious ideological effects:

they convey the ‘watermark’ of implicit doctrines and beliefs underpinning political, economic, or other systems. Given these assumptions, the main questions of CDA are as follows: what type of subjects and objects benefit or lose out in connection with a focal discourse and what type of political, economic, and social regimes are reinforced in the course of the discursive activities involved (Porter, 2005 Wp., p. 3)?

1.4. Discursive Policy Analysis

From this lively and complex theoretical and methodological space called discourse studies I shall use Discursive Policy Analysis. This approach differs from other DA approaches more in its field of research than in terms of methodology. As its name shows, the main goal of this strand of DA is to disclose discourses underpinning policies. The reason for particular interests in policies is that policies are ways of putting forward an argument about what a particular situation (or what the world) is like, and what should be done about it (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 1). According to Gasper and Apthorpe, the most important aspects of policy discourses are, as follows:

„Policy discourse inevitably frames problems in a certain way, i.e. includes some aspects rather than others. This approach to discourse analysis might focus on the specific concepts, tropes and frames used in policies.

Policy discourse determines (and is determined by) a larger set of 'rules' about what is sayable and thinkable. (For example, it is thinkable that participation is a good thing, but it is less thinkable that participation is a bad thing.) This approach might focus more widely on the stories and narratives that sustain policies, and the explicit or implicit rules of validation.

Policy discourse is not 'just words' but has material effects, as a change in discourse will have an effect e.g. on the distribution of resources (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 1).”

In this thesis, I shall use one special approach of Discursive Policy Analysis developed by Véronique Mottier (Mottier, 2002, 2005). This approach puts a special emphasis on the analysis of identity constructions in policy texts and is therefore suitable to examine citizenship constructions in policy texts, which is of special importance as far as this thesis

is concerned. As it can be read both below and above, Discourse Analyses problematises the category of identity since it shows that different kinds of discourses valorise, prefer and even enforce definite social positions and social identities. This, of course, also means that identity is not a pre-existing entity but is both challenged and shaped by political actors, at local as well as global levels (Mottier, 2002, p. 59). Therefore,

“Discourse Analysis could (...) be seen as a quest to translate constructionist theoretical insights into more methodologically grounded framework of analysis. However, adopting a discourse approach to identity construction does not imply that only symbolic constructions are deemed relevant. Identities – ethnic, national or other – are produced, reproduced and transformed through institutional practices (including) state policies, political organisations and everyday interactions (Mottier, 2002, p. 59).”

Moreover, argues Mottier, the Foucauldian strands of Discourse Analysis emphasise that identity is not only constructed by relations of meaning but also within institutionalised relations of power. In line with this school of thought, discourses around national identity, sexuality, gender or race are not autonomous systems but operate in the context of the institutional supports and practices they rely upon (p. 59).

“From a top-down perspective, discourse analysts have explored the social and political identities that are being articulated and produced through specific public policies. They have looked at the different ways in which politics shapes identities, in particular identities associated with language, ethnicity, sexuality, or gender. For example, what types of boundaries around national identity are being constructed within specific immigration regulations? Or, what kinds of gender identities are being generated in retirement or unemployment policies? (Mottier, 2002, p. 60)”

In a similar fashion, one could also ask what kind of citizenship models are being used and generated in European policy documents. In order to do this, I shall use Mottier’s version of Discursive Analysis in this thesis. The focus will be on how citizens and citizenship models are constructed ‘from above’ in connection with European science and technology in general and with the Meeting of Minds process in particular.

MATERIALS ANALYSED

I will use Discursive Policy Analysis to analyse the following documents:

- ‘White Paper of Governance’(Commission of the European Communities, 2001)
- ‘Science, Society and the Citizen of Europe’(2000A)
- ‘Science and Society Action Plan’(European Commission, 2002).

I shall also examine the rhetoric of the organisers of the project, based on the information available on the

- Website of the project
- Interview which I made with one of the main organisers, namely, Rinie van Est

I attempted to choose the right material for the analysis of the official discourse. The underlying reason of the selection was that these are the most important official documents which partly or entirely focus on the relationship between the political subject of Europe and science and technology. The model of relationship can be analysed by DA and the thematical connections with the academic discourse can be clearly displayed.

Although, I did not use Discourse Analysis in disclosing the main trends of the academic discourse, I presented the ideas and models in a way that allows to show the possible connections between the academic and the official discourse.

1.5. Discursive Interview Analysis

In the thesis, I will also analyse interviews using Discursive Interview Analysis to make sense of the data collected. I will draw on Sanna Talja’s approach in which discursive interview analysis is not about finding accurate definitions of ‘the truth’ or a single reality, but rather seeks to uncover reality from the viewpoint of the person delivering the text (Talja, 1999).

In Talja’s method of qualitative analysis the principal unit of analysis is not the individual but cultural regularities in participants’ accounts. She calls these regularities ‘interpretative

repertoires' based on the work of Wetherell and Potter (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). The identification and analysis of these repertoires does not aim at capturing participants' authentic intentions, meanings, or experiences but interview data are understood and analysed at a macro-sociological level, as social texts. As Talja puts it, it "concentrates on the analysis of knowledge formations, which organize institutional practices and societal reality on a large scale (Talja, 1999, p. 2.)."

Talja uses her version of interview analyses to explore the different ways library users define and conceptualise the function of library especially the musical collection of the institutions concerned. In the course of her research, she identified three different repertoires in the library users discourse as far as music collection is concerned (Cranfield, 2002). These three are the following:

1. The common culture repertoire
2. The consumer culture repertoire
3. The mosaic culture repertoire

As a conclusion, she argues that the way library users define and conceptualise selection principles does not differ dramatically from the way library selection policy has been formulated over the years. Seemingly, these three cultural repertoires might give the impression that they are totally different, yet they are tenants of the same contradictory space and related to different situations in library practice. While the common cultural repertoire is often used in an attempt to secure better financial support for libraries, the consumer culture repertoire is used to defend the library's choice of materials for minority audiences. And lastly the mosaic culture repertoire is related to broader discussions of citizens' cultural interests (Cranfield, 2002 Wp.). In the interview situation, it is not unusual that the same person uses different repertoires as a point of reference. According to Talja, it is not to be seen as a mistake but as a shifting of contexts and institutional practices:

“In discourse analysis, this kind of variability and inconsistency in explanations is not seen as a potential source of error when trying to make coherent sense of participants’ views. Interview talk is the resourceful, context-dependent application of common interpretative resources. The variability of interpretations does not mean that there is no regularity at all in participants’ discourse; it only signifies that regularity cannot be pinned at the level of the individual speaker. (...) There are considerable similarities in ways of making sense of the library as an institution (...), but all interpretations and arguments are not equally logical and acceptable in a particular speech situation. In similar conversational contexts, similar arguments tend to be used (Talja, 1999, p. 7).”

Interviews as social texts

As we could see above, the starting point of Talja’s interview analysis is that meanings, values, and ethical principles are not individual creations, but entities that people create together in communication and social action. She emphasises that in the process of communication language is not just a tool to be taken up and put down at will. Language plays a very significant role in every aspect of communication since it manifests itself at the very level of the subject’s self-understanding considering the fact that words are present in every act of interpretation (Talja, 1999).

This is also in line with the understanding of the subject’s self by Wetherell (Wetherell, 2001B). A new trend has connected discourse theory and psychology which called forth a radical change in the understanding of the self. According to the traditional approach of psychology, the ‘self’ exists independently from language and speech. A typical example of this idealtype is Rodin’s *Le Penseur* who is sitting and thinking in a solitary manner. This approach has been changed by a new approach emphasising the discursive nature of the individual.⁹ Moreover, it also stresses that speech, language and thinking are inseparable entities and our feelings, thoughts and beliefs are not autonomous but formed as parts of a discourse (Géring, Draft). Even though, in this approach the individual and the self are at the forefront, the dominance of language is also emphasised:

⁹ „‘Le Penseur’ may be alone with his thoughts but those thoughts bear the marks of social contexts and historical struggles over meaning. Mind and selves are constructed from cultural, social and communal resources.” (Wetherell, 2001B, p. 187)

“Language’s own talk is, however, supreme in its power compared to individual speakers’ views, since pre-existing conceptualizations and ways of classifying phenomena have to be used even by speakers whose conscious intention it is to oppose them. Individuals are not able to modify the resources of interpretation freely, since they are limited by the episteme of a specific cultural and historical phase. However, discourses, like individual subjects, are variable, conflicting, and continuously changing and developing (Talja, 1999, p. 12)”

In this way, participants’ accounts, or verbal expressions, are not perceived as descriptions of actual processes, behaviour, or mental events. Talja emphasises that interview talk is by nature a cultural and collective phenomenon. The meaning of an answer largely depends on the local and broader discursive system, a surrounding context in which the written and oral utterances are embedded (ibid. p. 3). The aim of the research therefore is not to disclose what people really think but to unfold and identify the hidden forms and patterns through which they arrange their perception of the world and according to which they formulate their answers. A way to do this is identifying *interpretative repertoires* in the answers concerned.

Talja draws on Wetherell and Potter (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) who define interpretative repertoires as “bounded language units” constituted out of a restricted range of terms used in a specific stylistic and grammatical fashion (p. 8). One can find these ‘language units’ by recognising one or more key metaphors and certain tropes or figures of speech.¹⁰

Nevertheless, Talja argues that interpretative repertoires cannot be “bounded language units” consisting only of a restricted range of terms pointing out that the same terms are used in different discourses, in which their meanings are constituted differently. The interpretation of the common concepts in a discourse corresponds to the viewpoint on which the discourse is based. So, Talja argues, this difference has to be captured instead

¹⁰ Talja quotes the following examples to figures and tropes of speech: “cradle of counter culture,” and “reach for higher destinations”. (Talja, 1999, p. 8)

of trying to assign terms and expressions to a restrained discursive space or language unit (ibid. p. 8-9.).¹¹

The Analysis of Interpretative Repertoires

Interviews are understood as social texts and not as individual utterances, in other words, they are understood as meanings and models of the facets of the social world are understood as social and discursive constructions on which individuals draw when they are formulating their answers. As Talja puts it, the “analysis of interpretative repertoires is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle (p. 8)” because interviews are not interpreted as stories having a clear and distinguishable line and meaning. On the contrary, the researcher has to take into consideration all the accounts produced by the participants and analyse significant patterns of consistency and variation in them. In order to do that the researcher has to pursue three phases of disclosing the pattern of repertoires:

1. *phase*: analysing inconsistencies and internal contradictions in the answers of one participant.
2. *phase*: identifying *regular patterns in the variability of accounts*: repeatedly occurring descriptions, explanations, and arguments, in different participants’ talk
3. *phase*: identifying the basic assumptions and starting points which underlie a particular way of talking about a phenomenon (Talja, 1999, p. 8).

¹¹ „Thus, the different starting points of discourses are discernible from the way common concepts are understood and defined. Terms that have been linked together on the basis of a particular background assumption, lose their link on the basis of a different assumption, and are linked to other words. Discourses are also classification practices: analyzing discourses involves analyzing the selection, linkage, and ordering of terms. Words are articulated with other words differently in discourses, and they implicate different ideas and ideologies (Talja, 1999, p. 9).”

As it can be seen in this sequence of phases, the aim of the discursive interview analysis is not just identifying certain patterns but also understanding why such patterns exist in a particular historical situation. I will use this method in this paper to analyse the citizens' discourse on participation and European identity, which are 'hot' issues both in official and academic arenas. In this fashion, my aim with respect to the analysis concerned is pretty much in line with Talja's approach. Using Talja's own words:

"...the aim of discourse analysis is not only to identify interpretative repertoires, but to point out the power and influence of particular narratives, and to analyze their potential societal and institutional functions and effects. This is not to say that discourse analysts should argue that some discourses are inherently more truthful and valuable than others. The uses and effects of discourses are context-dependent. However, it is a central feature of discourses, knowledge formations, that they organize social reality at a large scale. The aim of discourse analysis is to make it possible for the readers to weigh the practical consequences of different discourses, and to show the problems and possibilities created by their existence (Talja, 1999, p. 15)."

MATERIALS ANALYSED

I undertook 25 interviews with Hungarian and Dutch participants of the Meeting of Minds project. 16 interviews were conducted throughout the first Hungarian national meeting (7-8. 05. 2005) with Hungarian participants and 9 interviews were conducted with the Dutch at the first European convention (3-5.06.2005.). The reason why fewer interviews were made with Dutch participants is that I was also doing fieldwork as a participatory observer at the first European Convention and I had to share my attention between two tasks. Moreover, I used English for interviewing the Dutch and considering the fact that it was neither their native language nor mine, carrying out interviews was less smooth than it was with the Hungarians. However, in my opinion this difference between the number of Dutch and Hungarian citizens does not cause bias because of interview analysis focus on qualitative and not on quantitative aspects.

All interviews were carried out in a semi-structured way. In the course of doing interviews, I did not try to squeeze out information from my interviewees but attempted to gently direct the discussion to get answers to my questions formulated in advance. The questions were, as follows.

- How do you evaluate your own part in this project?
- What do you think the organisers expect from you as a citizen?
- In what capacity do you think you are involved in this project, as a Dutch/Hungarian citizen or as a European citizen?
- What do you think is the relation between the European and the Dutch/Hungarian citizenship?

The purpose of asking the first two questions was to gain information about the citizens' views on scientific citizenship. Using this exact term, however, would have been confusing, as it is not commonly used in everyday life-contexts. Therefore, I asked sub-questions steering the interviews in the direction of the issue of changing concepts of citizenship in relation to science and technology in general and the Meeting of Minds project in particular. Asking questions about the relationship between European and national citizenship was less problematic in that sense.

1.6. Value-commitments and the position of the researcher

In this section, I shall highlight certain positions which researchers can occupy when conducting a project. These positions are not to be understood as fixed and rigid standpoints but as two extreme poles of continuums. These issues are important to clarify before commencing the actual discussion of the topic in question because they bear a direct relation to the methodologies used, the style of writing and the conclusions drawn at the end. Therefore, in the following section there will be a brief discussion on objectivity versus situated knowledge, political neutrality versus commitment. In my opinion, choosing between these positions is always value-laden and cannot be judged or criticised from an objective position just as different worldviews cannot be measured against each other (Rorty, 1994). The aim here is not to outline and examine the existing trends but to indicate and reflect on the position of my ‘researcher identity’. This reflexivity guarantees that my value and political commitments are clear and transparent at least as far as I am aware of them.

Objectivity versus Situated knowledge

First of all, one of the most important questions is the matter of objectivity versus situated knowledge. In this continuum, proponents of objectivity argue that reality, the world outside exists independently of us, independently of our knowledge and our tools of research. This reality is to be discovered in the examination of that ‘outside’. In this fashion, methods are mere instruments designed to identify and analyse the obdurate character of the empirical world (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 1-22.).

In contrast with this, advocates of the ‘situated knowledge’ account emphasise that there is no reality existing independently from our knowledge. Therefore, we cannot reach an objective view on things outside because there are always intermediaries between like language, preliminary knowledge and research tools (Kuhn, 2000; Feyerabend, 1999;

Collins&Pinch, 1999).¹² The way in which we approach phenomena always reflects our understanding and our values. However, as its name shows, the outcome is not going to be total relativity but situated knowledge. It is not universal but situated and only ‘true’ in given contexts, in other words, situations (Haraway, 1999; Latour 1987, 1999; Callon, 1986).

This thesis does not attempt to produce universal knowledge, it especially does not focus on the things in themselves but on the knowledge created by actors about a model of the social and political subject, that is, citizenship. As the reader could read above, the choice of methodologies also reflects this standpoint and aims to grasp and analyse how situated knowledge is connected and produced in different contexts. I think a thesis about different kinds of situated knowledge cannot be objective but at least can show how actors struggle to establish and stabilise one kind of approach as objective and universal.

Neutrality versus Political commitment

In this continuum, one extreme pole is neutrality where the research project and the researcher should always be independent from the surrounding political and economic contexts and forces. This independence guarantees that the knowledge produced is not biased or not just those aspects are stressed of a particular phenomenon which are important for political purposes. Usually, these researchers do not reject every kind of application of their results, but rather insist on the idea that research and political aspects should be kept separately (Wetherell, 2001B).

On the other pole, there are those who argue that research is always affected by values, and always has political consequences which means that researchers ought to take responsibility for their value commitments and for the effects of their work. It is also

¹² Latour negates the very distinction between the world outside and the understanding and cognitive subject (Latour, 1999A, B; Kutrowátz, 2005).

suggested that social scientific research has little impact and value in itself and in order to give value and importance to it, it should be concerned not simply with understanding the world but with applying its findings to bring about change (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 15; Wetherell, 2001B).

In this thesis, the very topic is political since it is closely connected to a deliberative project, that is, the Meeting of Minds. Personally, I am one of the proponents of deliberative processes and the democratisation of policy-making, especially policy-making in science and technology. This commitment can be clearly traced in the choice of the topic, the literature processed and in the train of thought. However, I will attempt to keep a distance from the topic and project described and analysed and not to be biased by my values in the course of the actual analysis. The conclusion of this paper is going to be more political in nature and contains lessons drawn from the analytic parts which can be regarded as policy recommendations as well.

2. DELIBERATION AND LABORATORY. THE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF MEETING OF MINDS

The following chapter deals with a European level initiative – Meeting of Minds European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science – which engaged citizens in the discussion of scientific and technological issues by using the theory of deliberative democracy and participatory methodology. In order to present a full picture of the programme concerned, the section does not only describe the structure of MoM but also carries out its analysis by using Actor-Network-Theory’s concept of labourisation (hereinafter ANT for short). Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows:

The first sub-chapter gives a theoretical introduction to the characteristics of deliberative democracy. Special attention is paid to a particular type of participatory method, that is, to *Participatory Technology Assessment* (hereinafter PTA for short), which if not in its tools then definitely in its topic is significantly different from other participatory mechanisms. The discussion also touches upon the differences between traditional technology assessment and participatory technology assessment and explores the scientific-technological approaches underpinning them.

In the second sub-chapter the structure of the Consensus Conference and the Meeting of Minds are compared to illustrate how this new, European initiative transcends the approach of traditional participative mechanisms. Traditional participatory mechanisms, like the Consensus Conference, usually take place at a national level, whereas the Meeting of Minds took place at an international level. Thus, the programme can be considered unique not only in terms of its special subject, namely brain science, but with respect to its international level. Meeting of Minds was the first participatory technology assessment process which involved citizens in a deliberative process with diverse cultural and language backgrounds.

In the *third part* of this section, there is an overview of the concept of laboratisation developed by the scholars of ANT with a view to providing a framework for the interpretation of the process. On the one hand, as it will be apparent, the deliberative process is partly based on Habermas' theory.¹³ On the other hand, the initiative can also be conceived as a huge *laboratory* in which through successive mechanisms the opinions of the participants were being distilled to an increasing degree of purity and coherence.

The two main questions of the analysis is how it is possible to keep the conditions of the deliberation constant, as well as what kind of constellation of tools, technologies, people, and guidelines are required on setting the scene for creating a discussion situation which could be more or less characterised by the habermasian uncoerced and undistorted communication principle.

2.1. Characteristics of participatory mechanisms

Participatory methodology has several different forms and mechanisms which may differ from each other in terms of the level of decision-making, the topic and the actors involved.

Generally speaking, all participatory mechanisms are comprised of three different – mutually complementary – aspects. These three are the *research*, the *educational* and the

¹³ There are several articles, accessible through Internet, on the connection between the theory of democracy and the participatory methodology. Here, I will only use one of the passages concerned from Abels:

„Given the strong claim about the democratic nature of pTA it is astonishing that the link between pTA concepts and theories of democracy is so far rather weak. Recently, some scholars have explicitly taken up democratic theory (...). However, they restrict themselves basically to just one strand of democratic theory: that is deliberative theory which is in principal well-equipped to deal with problems of knowledge and complexity. Most proponents refer to the strong tradition in deliberative democracy that is founded on Habermas's theory of discourse ethics and the principle of argumentation. According to Habermas, in an ideal discourse it is only the 'unforced force of the better argument' that prevails. Habermas attempts to draw the perspective of real-life argumentation into the deliberation of a norm by admitting all affected as participants; he stresses the need for practical, participatory discourse. The discourse has to be free of

political dimensions.¹⁴ It can also be said that the various participatory methods differ from each other because of the different emphasis they put on these different dimensions, respectively. Transcending the social science research and the educational aspects, these methods become political due to the fact that citizens can also develop recommendations that, in turn, are taken into consideration by their political representatives.¹⁵

So, participatory mechanisms are social science *research* tools in the sense that they are meant to reveal opinions, hopes and fears about a given subject. They achieve these aims by helping participants to get informed about the topic concerned. They grant access to the necessary *knowledge* which is a precondition for laymen to form their own opinions on a complex issue. However, at the end of this learning negotiating and deliberative process participants develop recommendations which are then submitted to the decision-makers concerned with the particular issue. In this manner, they participate in shaping *public policy*, as they ‘make their voice heard’ in those political arenas as well which are normally inaccessible to the man in the street. Thus, in this sense, participatory methods simultaneously have a research, an educational as well as a political dimension.

Apart from these three major dimensions, participatory processes have several other typical features which could be identified through their aims. The main aims of participatory methods are as follows:

- *Facilitating dialogues* between citizens, experts and politicians;
- *Preparing for decision-making* on complex issues and the presentation of the citizens’ viewpoint;

domination and the outcome is the result of reasonable public discourse procedure (Abels, 2004, Wp., p. 5).”

¹⁴ Although with different terminology, there is a similar approach to participatory methodology: See. (Várkonyi, 2006. Lecture)

¹⁵ And therein lays a shortcoming of the method as what is there to ensure that politicians will take citizens’ recommendations into account? However, if it does not happen, the processes actually remain just expensive and complicated ‘opinion polls’.

- Encouraging *social learning*;
- Enhancing the role of *civic society*;
- *Propagating new citizen models* based on political participation and public debate;
- *Supporting governance* instead of government, which means not one, independent political centre should have the authority to make decisions but rather decisions should result from negotiations between various political actors and stakeholders;
- And last but not least, participatory processes mean *feedback* for politicians, scientists and experts on whether the direction they are taking is gaining the support of society.

Several papers have been published to introduce the specific features of various mechanisms (Andersen & Jæger 1999; Danish Board of Technology, 2006; EUROPTA, 2000). In the following only one of the participatory methods will be shown, the Consensus Conference, which was the first and most widespread form of participatory methodology. I shall also compare this method to the structure of the Meeting of Minds project, which was a technological assessment process.

The Approach of Technological Assessment

The question might arise as to why participatory mechanisms are required to assess technologies which a layperson knows nothing about in any depth. Why should not the discussion of technical issues be left to those who are really knowledgeable on the subject, i.e. the experts? How can non-professional people contribute to an engineering-technological process?

One of the evident answers to the questions above would be that scientific and technological progresses exert such profound influence on society that ethical and political disputes should be induced about their role in and their influence on our life.

Society is increasingly faced with the sort of challenges, dilemmas and situations which have been created by various technical devices and scientific inventions. The borderline which so far has seemed to separate the production of science and technology from social processes is getting increasingly blurred.

However, the reverse is true as well, or to put it more clearly, social processes also exert an effect on the development of science and technology, in addition to the conditions of the technological framework and/or the internal theoretical changes of science, as a narrow technocratic perspective might suggest. In other words, it is the science and technology itself that contain the social elements which internally determine their development and operation. The social dimension is not something external in relation to the spheres of science and technology but rather it is their integral and inseparable part.

Feenberg (Feenberg, 1992) demonstrates this by giving the example of 19th-century changes in the boilers of steamships. He claims that in disputes on technical specifications, ethical issues are very often opposed on the grounds of efficiency. The history of steam engines is also related to this claim: when politicians wanted to increase the safety of boilers of steam engines, thus changing their technical specifications, shipping companies began to protest, saying that the changes would decrease both their technical and economic efficiency.¹⁶ After the social debate on safety was closed, argues Feenberg, the issue of socially acceptable safety standards was converted into the technical specifications of the boiler. The level of safety became part of the horizon of both the technological and social realities. Thus, after the dispute had been closed, issues

¹⁶ „The accident rate fell dramatically once technical improvements were mandated. Legislation would hardly have been necessary to achieve this outcome had it been technically determined. But in fact boiler design was relative to a social judgment about safety. That judgement could have been made on strictly market grounds, as the shippers wished, or politically, with differing technical results. In either case, those results constitute a proper boiler. What a boiler 'is' was thus defined through a long process of political struggle culminating finally in uniform codes issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (Feenberg, 1992, Wp.).”

Beck follows a similar line of argument, writing that there is often a central core 'for 'good life' included in the arguments on technical specifications. (Beck, 2003)

on safety became part of the socio-technical background, beyond the discussions on assessing efficiency. Feenberg argues that:

“Such fetishism of efficiency ignores our ordinary understanding of the concept which alone is relevant to social decision-making. In that everyday sense, efficiency concerns the narrow range of values that economic actors routinely affect by their decisions. Unproblematic aspects of technology are not included. In theory one can decompose any technical object and account for each of its elements in terms of the goals it meets, whether it be safety, speed, reliability, etc., but in practice no one is interested in opening the ‘black box’ to see what is inside.

For example, once the boiler code is established, such things as the thickness of a wall or the design of a safety valve appear as essential to the object. The cost of these features is not broken out as the specific “price” of safety and compared unfavorably with a more efficient but less secure version of the technology. Violating the code in order to lower costs is a crime, not a trade-off. And since all further progress takes place on the basis of the new safety standard, soon no one looks back to the good old days of cheaper, insecure designs (Feenberg, 1992, Wp.).”

If on the above grounds the complex interdependence of technology, science and society are accepted then it can also be seen that decisions on technological systems, the direction and boundaries of scientific research cannot be separated from political decisions. The technical specifications of an incinerator or a radar system close to a village, the technical specifications and the site of a bridge under construction, the research using foetuses for scientific purposes are all examples which cannot be considered and understood separately from the social-cultural context they are part of and which exert an influence on them.

Having adopted this train of thought, there are many (Feenberg, 1992: Wp.; Callon, 1987; Pinch & Bijker, 1984) who argue that the development of science and technology is not an autonomous process, i.e. not a process moving in a predetermined direction, independent of society and its effects but on the contrary the direction of its progress can be shaped and influenced.

This difference in approach is reflected in the difference between traditional and participatory technological assessments as well. The methodology of the *traditional technological assessment* is based on the presupposition that technological and scientific development cannot be steered or influenced in any way. It is not possible to regulate these areas since they are autarchic systems following their own inherent rules. In accordance with this view, the assessments of technologies were conducted by experts without the participation of any stakeholders or citizen groups, and the aim of the reports prepared by them was primarily to make forecasts about the impacts of various technologies and to prepare decision-makers for potential negative side-effects or disasters.

In contrast to the practice described above, the proponents of *participatory technological assessment* believe that the development of science and technology cannot only be foreseen but shaped as well. If the technical specifications of an incinerator and its distance from the living area of the local community is also a social-political issue then making a decision based on merely technical points, without any kind of stakeholders' involvement is no longer possible on moral grounds. In addition to that, it can be claimed that there are no 'purely' technical points, but rather different social and technological scenarios determining the newly-made decisions, which incur different costs and bring different benefits to different social actors and different social groups respectively.

Proponents of PTA argue that ideally, decisions on scientific and technological issues are not made without involving those concerned. This argument led to the view that deliberative processes on science and technology should be opened up, and opportunity should be granted to non-professionals to participate in debates and represent their own opinions in a constructive way.

Having considered the theoretical background of PTA, the next step in our discussion is to examine the main components in a technological assessment mechanism. Although

there is no such method in itself as technological assessment, since it is a summary of various methods, still all processes – be they the traditional or the participatory version – include the following components (ITA, 2006)¹⁷:

- *Problem* definition
- Description of the given *technology*
- Prediction of *future technology development*
- Description of the society and persons affected
- Prediction of possible *social developments* alternatives
- Identification, analysis and evaluation of *consequences*
- Analysis of different *regulatory options*
- *Communication and dissemination* of the results in a generally accessible form

As it is apparent, one of the main characteristics of technological assessment is the definition and forecast of technological and social development alternatives. Nevertheless, the *participatory version* puts great emphasis on the involvement of the groups concerned and the dialogue between experts, politicians and citizens. Several participatory methods – like the Scenario Workshop for instance – aim to have the various actors cooperate in developing a scenario in order to solve a given problem or a draft of law for the statutory regulation of a technological (genetic engineering) or scientific (stem-cell research) development. In the case of PTA, as it has already been indicated, the emphasis is shifted from the problem of forecasting to stakeholder engagement and to technological and/or scientific regulation. That is what happened in the MoM project, a participatory technological assessment process which took place in 2005-2006.

It may be worth mentioning that in my opinion, PTA is a part of the bigger category of participatory methods and initiatives. PTA, therefore, is not a method as such but an

¹⁷ ITA's components of technology assessment based on the web-site of the Austrian Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA, 2006)

approach applying participatory processes so as to involve citizens in debates on science and technology. In the following section I will present and compare the Consensus Conference and the method of MoM but they will both be represented as special arrangements of the PTA approach.

2.2. Introduction to the Project

Meeting of Minds was a two-year-long pilot project. The primary aim of the project was to involve citizens in a process, in the course of which they had the opportunity to publicly discuss questions arising in connection with the area of brain science with scientists, legal experts, ethical thinkers and with representatives of European decision-making bodies.

The official web-page of the project presents a list of arguments explaining why it was specifically in the area of brain science that it became necessary to set up the conditions for a public, supranational discussion. Although brain science is not in the centre of attention as much as gene- or nano-technology, still it will be acquiring an increasingly great social significance over the following years. There are a number of interrelated reasons for this which are as follows (MoM, 2005A).

On the one hand, the scientific community specialising in brain science – thanks to new image and information-processing technology and methods – is standing on the threshold of being able to understand the operation of the brain in a new, revolutionary, efficient and scientific way.

On the other hand, in the last decades life expectancy has significantly increased in European countries. It also means that these societies are ageing, i.e. health care systems will have to cope with more and more neuro-degenerative diseases like Parkinson's- and Alzheimer-disease. Also, several other depressing scientific reports have been published

recently on the psychological condition of the European population. Due to these facts it is safe to suppose that in the near future there will be a burning need for curing or at least alleviating brain diseases.

Since the topic can be regarded as universal, as a Dutch citizen put it, „everybody has a brain”, it seemed to be ideally suited to lend itself to a project in the centre of which there was a 126-strong civic panel. Citizens of nine countries constituted the European panel, with fourteen people being delegated from every country.

The topics for disputes and discussions were what effects the present and future achievements in brain science exert on our everyday life as well as on the whole of society. The outcome of these discussions was a compilation of citizens' recommendations which the members of the national panels drew up concerning areas, issues and topics they regarded important. The national reports were prepared by the panels of all the nine countries, then they drew up a joint final report for the European decision-makers.

The Meeting of Minds project has outstanding significance for two reasons. Firstly, it was the first technological assessment process which took place in Hungary (too), with the participation of Hungarian citizens. Unlike North-European nations, the citizens of former socialist countries are far less accustomed to forming and putting forth opinions on public issues and to discussing them with strangers. The process was significant for another reason as well, namely, it was also interesting to observe how the Hungarian panel reacted to such a situation, how they managed to 'hold their own' in the international arena.

Secondly, this was the first participatory process at a European level. Participatory mechanisms usually take place at local or national levels. So, this was the first initiative, the outcome of which looked rather uncertain at its commencement, to go beyond


national, linguistic and cultural boundaries. Therefore, this project can be conceived as a pilot project of further initiatives aiming to involve European citizens. There is a participatory project in progress of an even larger scope called European Citizens' Consultation on Europe's Future.¹⁸ Moreover, even more deliberative programmes are to be expected under the 7th Framework of the European Union.

As it is, the programme was innovative and experimental in both senses. It was also innovative in its structure, since it was conducted both at national levels and in the European arena.

The structure of the process

First, it might be useful to give a short overview of the structure of the Consensus Conference in order to demonstrate in what sense the Meeting of Minds programme was special. The Consensus Conference is one of the oldest and most frequently used participatory techniques, so the structure of its mechanism should be compared to the structure of the international initiative, Meeting of Minds.

Figure 2. The Structure of the Consensus Conference



¹⁸ The website of the project is: www.european-citizens-consultations.eu

First of all, the Consensus Conference can be regarded as a public meeting based on a dialogue about a previously defined problem concerning society as a whole or about the issue of regulation conducted among citizens, the civic organisations concerned, experts and politicians. On the other hand, the whole process is seen as part of the Consensus Conference, in the course of which citizens also prepare for the public meeting itself. During the preparation period they identify issues they are interested in, formulate questions and gather information on the particular topic. The overall process will be outlined in the next passage (Andersen & Jæger, 1999).

The first step in organising the conference is the selection of the citizens' panel. While taking into consideration the gender, age, social position and place of residence, a representative group is formed, then later it becomes an active panel with its engaged members debating on the dilemmas and pertinent questions of a particular issue, at least that is what the organisers hope for. Organisers also need to set up an expert panel. When selecting the experts, project organisers aim to ensure that all views, all important opinions should be represented in the discussion process.

As *Figure 2* illustrates, the process itself has three main phases: the *introductory meeting*, the *preparatory meeting* and the *conference*. The first two meetings can be seen as preparatory meetings for the events of the conference. In the course of the *introductory meeting* citizens discuss some information material handed out in advance and aspiring to objectivity as much as possible to familiarise themselves with the topic, the aims and the structure of the process. The main consideration on this meeting is not immersing themselves in the topic but rather getting sensitised to social issues arising in connection with it. In the course of this phase, the members of the panel are presented with the topic and perceive how the problem is connected to the dimension which is the most obvious and easiest for them to interpret, i.e. their own everyday life. This connection with the tangible reality is supposed to be enhanced through the information material. For instance, the preparatory

material of the Meeting of Minds contained various personalised case studies, as shown by the following extract:

“The story

Happy? I am incredibly happy! I passed my exams. Not simply passed. I got a first with distinction! Now I am sure to get my scholarship for next year. The other candidates are miles behind me. And yet something is bothering me. I had a very difficult time during the exam period. I had problems concentrating and was often tired – very tired. I resorted to taking pills. The medication allowed me to continue studying, sometimes for the entire night. I was able to absorb the material better than I ever could before. No-one noticed a thing, neither the professors nor my friends. I feel a bit like a top athlete who has taken performance-enhancing drugs. I am standing on the winner’s podium, but in the back of mind, I am haunted by the thought: ‘I hope no one finds out that I have cheated.’

The facts

While it is perhaps not a direct aim to develop medication to improve ourselves, it is likely that drugs created to treat illness will also be able to enhance our natural abilities. Medication to treat Alzheimer’s disease is likely to improve considerably normal memory function as well. Stimulating medicines, now used to treat children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, also increase the ability of the ‘normal’ brain to concentrate (...). One’s emotional state can also be improved. The new generation of pharmaceutical drugs to treat depression also have an effect on people who do not suffer from depression: people who take them are less concerned with small everyday worries and live life more optimistically and with more confidence. Instead of being used for **therapy**, these drugs might one day be employed for **enhancing** the normal body, brain and psyche (Slob & Rondia & Raeymakers, 2005, Wp., p. 27-28).’

After a few weeks following the introductory meeting, it is time for a new phase of the process, *the preparatory meeting*, when the participants narrow down the topic to specific issues and areas they find interesting. They formulate questions for the expert panel about those specific areas which they are to ask them at the next meeting, the conference. It is worth noting that the experts are very often present even at this phase of the process, in order to help with formulating the relevant questions and to answer questions arising during the panel discussions.

The *conference* is a meeting open to the public, the media and the audience as well, based on the dialogue among the parties engaged in the particular topic, i.e. the experts and the members of the panel. The experts present their views on the basis of the questions and topics specified by the citizens beforehand, then their presentations are followed by a


discussion which allows the citizens to get a balanced view of the topic and form their own viewpoints. Afterwards, the part open to the public is finished, the participants withdraw in order to draw up their recommendations, which must be based on consensus. This closing report will be submitted to politicians and presented to the engaged parties following the conference.

Figure 3 shows the structure of the Meeting of Minds. It can be seen that the structure of its process is very similar to that of the Consensus Conference. Focussing on the differences, however, it is worth emphasising that the process was complemented with the dialogue of the national and the international levels.

The Meeting of Minds consisted of five meetings, whose three national phases were in essence identical to the attributes of the Consensus Conference mentioned above. However, there were European meetings wedged in between the national meetings, where the members of the panels discussed the problems raised by brain science not only with their own compatriots but with citizens from other countries as well.

It means that the introductory meeting was followed by a European Meeting, where citizens had simultaneous interpreting at their disposal helping them to discuss the issues they were interested in. Due to this facilitating environment, they were able to jointly elaborate the topics that served as a basis for the next step in the deliberative process.

Figure 3. The Structure of the Meeting of Minds (MoM, 2005A)



The subsequent two meetings were national meetings, not significantly different from the traditional method of the Consensus Conference. Accordingly, by the end of the second

national meeting, all the groups of the nine countries laid down their own recommendations, which they subsequently handed over to their own parliaments.

This was not the end of the process, however, as the participants met up again to discuss their recommendations at the European level as well and to draw up a common final report containing the recommendations of the European panel. This step made the process international and European as the final report is more than the summary of national recommendations. It was created by the members of the various nations together in a joint discussion process.

At the very end of the process the so-called Policy Advice Workshops were held, where the decision-makers and the professionals were informed about the recommendations and the methodology of the project.

Topics for the Meeting of Minds programme

At the end of the passage describing the project a short account is given of the topics defined by the citizens. The topics that provided the backbone of the discussion process were defined at the 1st European Meeting, where a large number of other problems and issues were raised. The topics were arranged in a common list and the participants voted for the ones that were considered to be the most important and interesting for them.

At the 2nd National Meeting and the 2nd European Meeting the six groups of topics the citizens judged to be the most important determined the direction the discussions was taking. The topics under discussion were as follows (MoM, 2006, p. 12):

- *Regulation and Control:*

In this case participants focus on identifying what areas would need to be regulated or rather where the boundaries of control are and as such what should be

regulated by society and what should be within the decision-making competence of the individual or family.

- *Normality vs. diversity:*

The main point of this topic was the question as to where one could say is the limit of normality. If the concept of normality is fixed and drug treatment is deemed to be necessary in the case of any deviance from it, there might be a risk that diversity used in a positive sense will be oppressed in our societies.

- *Public information:*

Citizens were discussing what can or could be thought to be an objective source of information, and what are the areas the general public should be informed about at all costs.

- *Equal Access to Treatment:*

The central issue was a little bit extended to the issue of health care as a whole and the question of social position when it affected equality in terms of access to medical treatment and also the question of how this situation can be alleviated.

- *Freedom of Choice*

The central issue here was the doctor-patient relationship, namely, how to ensure the access to the necessary information for the client so that he/she could make a free choice from among the possible treatments.

- *Pressure from Economic Interests:*

The title is self-explanatory. The discussions regarding this issue questioned the role of economic interests in setting the aims of research. There were heated debates especially about the differences in interests between the health industry, pharmaceutical companies and society as a whole.

Recommendations

The description of the Meeting of Minds project will only be complete if there is at least a short reference to the citizens' most important recommendations. It is worth noting, however, that the final report produced at the closing of the project is more than one hundred pages that presents in great detail the issues raised and the detailed recommendations broken down by topics. The description and analysis of this final report would deserve an independent study. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and, instead, there is a brief account given of the most important recommendations produced by the citizens:

The citizens considered the following issues important:

- Improvement of the ethical regulations of research.
- The acceptance of diversity instead of a narrow and excluding concept of 'normality' which is dependent on the historical situation and social position.
- Providing access to information on the latest achievements in brain science, dilemmas and ethical issues to the general public on an ongoing basis
- Supporting alternatives to drug treatments and prevention.
- Clarifying the question of resource allocation in health care, which is linked to the previous recommendation as very often alternative treatments are cheaper than expensive procedures promoted by powerful lobbies.
- Promoting the practice of informed agreement in the doctor-patient relationship.

In the following passage the theoretical framework of Habermas and the ANT are used to interpret the Meeting of Minds. Habermas's model of ideal speech situation is especially important in order to understand what kind of communication situation the organisers aimed to create. On the other hand, the labourisation concept of the ANT presents the

process and tools of creating and maintaining socio-technical situations. This theoretical framework will be used for the analysis of the Meeting of Minds.

2.3. The Meeting of Minds as a laboratory

In the next passage an approach attempting to grasp the complex interrelationships between science, technology and society will be described. This approach can be described by introducing the concept of *laboratisation* of ANT. The concept can be illustrated through three interrelated examples. It may be worth mentioning that the term *laboratisation* is only explicitly used in the first, the Pasteur example (Latour, 1983). Nevertheless, all three examples can be closely related to laboratories and the creation of ideal conditions in an ‘imperfect world’. So, while using Latour’s term ‘*laboratisation*’ (Latour, 1983) I both draw on his work and expand the concept so as to encompass all the important aspects needed for the analysis of the MoM process.

Firstly, Latour uses Pasteur as an example to illustrate how the complexity of reality is converted in a laboratory and how laboratory processes shift between micro and macro spheres. This approach is going to be especially significant in understanding how aspects of social reality are modelled in the MoM and how the project shifts between various levels of government (local, national and European).

Secondly, Latour in another example introduces the idea of mobilising the world by describing the work of soil scientists at Amazon Rainforest (Latour, 1999B). Latour is particularly interested in the question of how the things (soil samples) are translated into signs (sophisticated data and diagram) and eventually into a text in academic literature. The example is not only very interesting because Latour illustrates how scientists transform the chaotic features of the rainforest into an ordered and transparent laboratory but it also shows how local and context-dependent matter becomes universal immaterial knowledge. In a similar fashion, in the MoM process the way through which individual

viewpoints ‘aggregated into’ a European Final Report is full of ‘translations’. In other words, there were a set of mechanisms incorporated in the process which transformed and translated local, context-dependent and individual opinions to a European and collective set of ‘semi-official’ statements.

Thirdly, Callon (Callon, 1999A) gives an example of the construction of a clear market situation. The case study presented by him highlights what kinds of tools (human and non-human alike) are needed to ensure the ideal conditions for the process. Following this logic, the analysis examines what kind of tools might be required to fix the conditions of the ideal speech situation. There is another issue raised by Callon’s example and that is the issue of identity. In other words, this example suggests that the construction of the clear market situation presupposes a certain type of actor who is committed to his own interests and maximising his benefits. In the course of the analysis of the MoM, I will reflect on this issue, that is, what kind of identity construction is necessary for the project.

Habermas and the ‘ideal speech situation’

Before starting the actual discussion of labourisation, it is important to mention that the MoM process draws on Habermas’ idea of ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1998, Wp.). This concept itself is anchored in Habermas’ concept of lifeworld (Habermas, 1985). For Habermas, lifeworld is the scene of everyday communication among people in which and through which the members of society create their everyday social reality. People meet and discuss the issues they are interested or involved in. Accordingly, the basic logic of the lifeworld is the pursuit of mutual understanding between members of society. Actors do not try to dominate or to delude each other but strive to understand each other and reach consensus in contentious matters. However, even Habermas accepted that this type of human behaviour cannot be considered typical even though it had become more and more common and institutionalised in the course of history. This is the reason why later he strives to define this ideal speech situation in his later papers on language philosophy.

“Thus the rational acceptability of a statement ultimately rests on reasons in conjunction with specific features of the process of argumentation itself. The four most important features are: **(i)** that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; **(ii)** that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions; **(iii)** that the participants must mean what they say; and **(iv)** that communication must be freed from external and internal coercion so that the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ stances that participants adopt on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons.

If everyone who engages in argumentation must make at least these pragmatic presuppositions, then in virtue of (i) the public character of practical discourses and the inclusion of all concerned and (ii) the equal communicative rights of all participants, only reasons that give equal weight to the interests and evaluative orientations of everybody can influence the outcome of practical discourses; and because of the absence of (iii) deception and (iv) coercion, nothing but reasons can tip the balance in favor of the acceptance of a controversial norm. Finally, on the assumption that participants reciprocally impute an orientation to communicative agreement to one another, this ‘uncoerced’ acceptance can only occur ‘jointly’ or collectively (Habermas, 1998, Wp).”

In accordance with the excerpt above, it is possible to define the following preconditions of the ideal speech situation.

1. *Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.*
- 2a. *Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.*
- 2b. *Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.*
- 2c. *Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.*
3. *No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2).* (Georgetown, 2006, Wp.)

These conditions ensure that each individual participating in a discourse can ask for and is granted the opportunity to speak and can freely express him or herself. Under these conditions, according to Habermas, the best arguments which are formed in the course of communication will prevail instead of the power games behind the discourse.¹⁹ In the

¹⁹ Lakeland (Lakeland, 1993, Wp.) describes ideal speech situation in one of his articles as follows: „For Habermas, the attempt to communicate directly with other human beings rests on a set of mutual assumptions: there is something comprehensible to be heard; the speaker is sincere; the speaker seeks truth; the hearer will listen; and so on. Even someone who attempts to deceive another can only hope to do so because the hearer will assume the speaker is acting according to the rules of open communication. Thus, the communication community is oriented in principle towards the *ideal speech situation*, that is, a

analytical section I will show that the MoM project can be understood as a complex laboratory where the organisers strived to create and stabilise the conditions of the 'ideal speech'.

However, before moving on, it is important to reflect on the fact that both Habermas' ideal speech situation and the participatory processes based on it are widely criticised by various scholars. In the analytical section the main focus will be on the question of how the conditions of ideal speech situation are constructed by different means and less on the appropriateness of Habermas' idea.

However, I shall discuss the main critical points of Habermas' model here briefly. Since the debate between different theoretical standpoints is manifold and complex, I will but reflect on the main critical points of this concept here. Drawing on the works of Dahlberg, Dryzek, Mouffe and Young (Dahlberg, 2005; Dryzek, 2005; Mouffe, 2000, Wp.; Young, 2001), these main critical points are the exclusion of non-rationalist arguments from the discussion, the question of power in the discourse and the question of consensus

So, one of the most significant critical points of Habermas' concept is that it excludes aesthetic-affective modes of communication from the discourse and hence certain groups' voices. The ideal speech situation described above posits a reflexive, impartial, reasoned exchange of validity claims where only the better argument 'wins out'. This particular rationalist form of discourse encourages accuracy, logical expression of ideas, coherence, and a dispassionate contestation of opinion (Dahlberg, 2005). This is a style of

context of distortion-free discourse in which all have equal access to the conversation, and all seek consensus on norms for action. Though such an ideal speech situation may never exist, it operates regulatively to draw communication onward. And what is assumed about the importance of truthfulness and sincerity, and about the dignity of other speakers and hearers, makes communication, which is after all the fundamental structure of human sociality, intrinsically emancipatory. The pathologies of personal, communal, and political life become interpretable in terms of *systematically distorted communication*, and overcoming them becomes a matter of restoring the contexts in which communicative praxis can occur (Lakeland, 1993, Wp.)."

communication valorised within modern Western philosophy and academic style or, to put it more bluntly, it is a style of a 'gentlemen's club'. So, rationalist style is defined against and to the exclusion of other styles like aesthetic-affective styles which are considered non-rational, and in this way it can be called elitist since it prefers one style of communication over others (Dahlberg, 2005; Mouffe, 2000, 2002). Because this type of communication is characteristic of members of higher classes, preferring this mode of discussion creates an unbalance between people with differing social status (Young, 2001). As this unbalance both stems from and creates new inequalities of power relations, this criticism of exclusion can be clearly related to the second critical remark, the question of power.

The second main critical point usually associated with the 'ideal speech situation' is about the assumption that power can be separated from public discourse. Critics of Habermas argue that this image of power masks exclusion and domination. It seems that Habermas conceives the operation of power as negative, transparent and capable of being removed from communication. This conception of power presupposes that in the process of communication insincerity, manipulation, coercion, domination can be exposed and summarily removed and hence understanding achieved (Dahlberg, 2005). According to critics, this idea of power is naïve at best given that power cannot be fully identified and removed from discourse (Mouffe, 2000), and it acts positively (to constitute subjects) as well as negatively (to exclude others). This critical remark is related to the third one which stresses that because power is an inherent characteristic of public discourse, any attempt to reach consensus will always favour those who have more power.

So, thirdly, the critics of Habermas argue that the promotion of consensus as the purpose of deliberation marginalises voices that are not ready to agree. Mouffe for example criticises those democratic theories which do promote consensus without adequately considering confrontation between strong ideological positions. She argues that there can never be a true consensus in our 'imperfect' societies since power cannot be separated

from communication. As a consequence, distortions in everyday communication will lead to false consensus (Mouffe, 2000, 2002; Elam & Bertilsson, 2003).

“Consensus in a liberal democratic society is – and always will be – the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. The frontier that it establishes between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one, and for that reason it should remain contestable. To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to present the frontier as dictated by rationality and morality, is to naturalize what should be perceived as a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of ‘the people’ through a particular regime of inclusion-exclusion (Mouffe, quoted by Elam and Bertilsson, 2003, p. 244).”

According to Mouffe, the idea of political questions susceptible to being decided rationally, and in accordance with an impartial standpoint that is equally in the interest of all, speaks against the cultural logics of democratic politics. It abstracts ‘the political’ out of politics, leaving us in a realm of universal human equality that suggests that there could be a ‘democracy of mankind’, when in practice there can only ever be a ‘democracy for ‘a people’ (Mouffe, 2000; Elam and Bertilsson, 2003, p. 244). Mouffe does not reject the need for degrees of consensus in political life, yet she emphasises that this consensus will and also should always remain of a conflictual and contestable nature.

As the reader will be able to see, these issues will come back in the analytical section, especially the questions of power and of styles of communication. The role facilitators, interpreters and the whole setting played in the process showed that power (framing and channelling) the discussion is an inherent aspect of a situation. This is the case even if the process is intended to operate according to the preconditions of Habermas’ ideal speech situation. These preconditions cannot just emerge but need various means, tools and steering in order to work in a more or less appropriate manner.

As far as consensus is concerned, it is important to mention that the Steering Committee of the MoM decided against a process whose results would be based on consensus possibly for the very reasons outlined above. However, the final report has the appearance of a text based on consensus and there is no indication of dissent. The

analytical part below will also touch upon the question of how such a unity of opinions was achieved.

Laboratisation

ANT argues that science, technology and society are inseparable from the world surrounding us. They are inseparable to such an extent that they were constructed together and in the course of socio-technological changes they have been intertwined to such a degree that the elements of science, technology and society cannot be placed into their own little theoretical boxes, such as social, scientific or technical, even with the benefit of hindsight. This could be demonstrated by the concept of laboratisation.


Latour uses Pasteur's example to explain that although laboratory research is often seen as work in an ivory tower producing pure, scientific facts unaffected by society, social dimension is a part of this job from the very beginning (Latour, 1983; 1988). On the other hand, the laboratory is also the place where the very substance of society is modified and restructured.

Thus, society is part of the scientific research procedure conducted in the laboratory but society also undergoes modifications in line with the models developed in the laboratory, a process which is called laboratisation by Callon and Latour (Callon, 1999B; Latour, 1988). This duality, instead of simple causality explaining change in one element by dependence on the other, suggests a dynamic interaction between social and laboratory practices.

Latour expounds in his *Pasteurisation of France* how French animal husbandry was inflicted by a horrible epidemic, Anthrax in Pasteur's time. In order to bring the spreading of the disease under control, Pasteur created a network made up of farmers, microbes,

laboratory practices and farms. He solved the problem through a series of steps which are as follows:

Figure 4. Pasteur's way across levels



First of all, Pasteur left his sterile laboratory in Paris to join the unclean world of stockbreeders in the country. He spent his days with the stockbreeders so as to understand their life and everyday activities. Then, he took this knowledge and the samples taken at the key locations of the farms back to his laboratory. Due to his observation of the farmers' life, he managed to translate the activities on and operation of the farms into the language and practice of the laboratory.

Pasteur then got down to modelling the outbreak of the epidemic on a much smaller scale. The fact that he reduced the operation on the farms to micro processes „reversing the scale”, as Latour put it, had two advantages. On the one hand, laboratory practices made the formerly invisible pathogens visible and, in turn, this visibility made microbes'

reactions to changes in the various physical environments readable. On the other hand, it was possible to cause the outbreak of the epidemics on any number of occasions on this 'laboratory farm', which allowed researchers to manipulate time. In other words, time became their friend. While in real life, it would have taken an enormous amount of time for the epidemic to come to an end, within the walls of the laboratory it was possible to observe the whole process in a few days and register changes in petri dishes.

This modelling allowed Pasteur to identify the weak points of the microbes and find out how they could be weakened to the point where they became suitable for vaccination. French scientists, in turn, had to convert farms into laboratories, that is, they had to create those conditions in the stock-yard which allowed reversing the balance of forces in the laboratories. This meant that the technological procedure of vaccination could only be successful if the conditions in the stock-yard were the same as in the laboratory.

The conclusion to be drawn from this example, says Latour, is that scientific facts are in a sense not universal but rather resemble trains which cannot get off the tracks. Just as trains are inert if they are derailed, scientific facts are only true under certain specified conditions. If the hierarchy of forces prevailing in the laboratory are not guaranteed, then they are not „valid”, not universal and simply do not work. Using Latour own words:

“The specificity of science (...) is in the special construction of laboratories in a manner which *reverses the scale* of phenomena so as to make things *readable*, and then *accelerate the frequency of trials*, allowing many mistakes to be made and *registered*. (...)”

...there is no outside of laboratories. The best thing one can do is to extend to other places the 'hierarchy of forces' that was once favourable inside the laboratory [emphasis added by G.K.] (Latour, 1983, p. 165).”

The end of the story is that Pasteur managed to overcome the epidemic. To win this battle, stockbreeders had to be „tamed” so that the scientist could change the structure of farms according to the „reality-model” constructed in the laboratory. The victory over the Anthrax epidemic convinced politicians and the hygienic movement, which was started at

the time, to transfer the „idea” of laboratory to other spheres, which led to dramatic changes in social and political life. Pasteur and his microbes increased the population of France and made it healthier; allowed the colonisation of tropical countries, which until then was prevented by grave tropical diseases; and created new industries. France was pasteurised, says Latour. The microbiological laboratory is „one of the few places where the very composition of the social context has been metamorphosed (ibid. p. 158).”

This example clearly illustrates how a scientific practice became the technological process of vaccination and also how the laboratory shifts between the outside and the inside. Both science and technology include the relationships of certain forces and actors of the outside world. However, it can still be a model only because the world is too complex to be described with a simple formula. Consequently, the laboratory has to fix the conditions modelled inside in the outside world as well if it wants its products to work. In other words, it has to describe the constellation of the forces which are favourable for both technological means and technological processes.

In another example, Latour describes a similar story in the case of contemporary scientists but focusing more on the question of how things become signs and how ‘local’ becomes ‘universal’. He joined a group of scientists visiting the Amazon Rainforest to observe how a botanical mystery is investigated at the edge of the rainforest. Several small trees that usually grow only in the savannah around the forest had been found a few metres inside the wood. This phenomena instigated a debate on whether this was a sign that the forest was advancing (the tree was a scout) or retreating (the tree was left over by a shrinking forest) (Latour, 1999B; Boulton, Wp.). Latour follows the way of soil samples from their position at the edge of the Amazonian jungle to their eventual resting place in the academic literature (Szabari, 2005, p. 34-37).

In his description, after arriving to the scene, the scientists divided the area into numbered squares with labels on them rendering, or using Latour’s expression, translating

the complex world of the rainforest into a clearer and less messy collection of trees and plants (Szabari, 2005, p. 34). After this, they took samples of the leaves and soil; numbered them so as to link all samples to their particular square respectively. Then the soil samples are placed into a briefcase-sized grid called pedocomparator mimicking the square structure of the area (Hoakster, Wp.). Soil samples from adjacent sites were placed next to each other in the boxes making the pattern of change in soil type visible and transparent. This translation enabled the comparison of samples and the representation of a large area of soil in a small and closed space provided by the pedocomparator.

The 'soil' has certainly undergone specific transformations on its way to the comparator. It is still the same soil but it has been selected and acted upon. The pedocomparator then brings to the fore certain properties of the soil so as to make comparison possible. It is also important to stress that each stage of these translations stands for a rupture between the 'thing' and the 'sign' through step by step modification, transformation and in a way by recreating the matter into an altered, less tangible substance. Translation, therefore, is not a simple switch between different 'vocabularies'. As Latour describes it:

“Translation does not mean a shift from one vocabulary to another, from one French word to one English word, for instance, as if the two languages existed independently. I used translation to mean displacement, drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some degree modifies the original two (Latour, 1999B, p. 179)”.


In line with this, through another translation, that is, through the process of inscription, the soil samples become data and figures in a single diagram representing all that has been found out about the rain forest. Although its connection to the living environment of the Amazon Basin forest/savannah interface could not be easily identified, it is possible to trace back the research process, through tables, grids, discussions and recreate the original context the diagram was drawn from. Hoastaker (Hoakster, Wp.) describes this process as follows:

”When the researchers divide the area into numbered squares it is by the means of the forms made by the science of geometry and arithmetic. When the researchers collect samples of the foliage and the soil, the leaves and the lumps of soil are not just leaves and earth. They have taken on the form given to them by the researchers. They have taken on significance beyond being just leaves or pieces of earth - they have become representatives of some part of the area. They re-present the forest and the lumps of earth and the leaves can again be re-presented in the graphic table and the graphic table can be re-presented by descriptions in texts, etc. (Hoastaker, Wp.)”

On the one hand, this chain of translations reduced the complexity of the reality of rainforest leaving aside all its rich contextuality, locality, particularity and all extraneous information (such as the alkalinity or acidity of the soil). On the other hand, the soil is not only reduced but at the same time received new properties allowing it to better fit in with pre-existing scientific systems (Garraway & Technikon, Wp.). In this fashion, certain properties of the soil are amplified and concretised placing the soil more in the field of science than it was in the forest. Therefore, the process of successive transformation takes away certain properties (reduction) of the soil and at the same time gives properties to it (amplification) (Garraway & Technikon, Wp.). However, these additional properties render the soil more compatible with already existing systems of scientific knowledge. As a consequence, the soil becomes more cosmopolitan than local, more sign than matter.

To sum it up, the pedocomparator made it possible for the scientists to assess the qualities of the soil at a glance and it made possible to produce a graphical representation of the soil in the area. At a later date soil samples in the pedocomparator were moved to a laboratory in Paris for further analysis and the results entered the scientific literature in the form of reports and papers. Once the soil samples have ‘become’ signs, they can be transmitted and reproduced with ease (Latour, 1999B, p. 54), transforming and mobilizing the complex reality of a rainforest to a database which can be investigated and analysed anywhere in the world.

Figure 5. The move from things to signs in Latour's example



Apart from the process through which things were transformed into signs, the local and context-dependent soil samples became universal knowledge, ‘certainty’ although in a local milieu this might not have been the case. One example of this move from uncertain to certain, described by Latour, is when two scientists rubbed the soil in their hands with spit in an attempt to mould it. They did this in order to determine the characteristics of the soil whether it was sandy-clay or clayey sand. “Lacking any kind of gauge, Armand and Rene rely on a back-and-fourth discussion on their judgement of taste, as my father would do when he tasted his Corton wines (Latour, 1999B, p. 63).” So the discussion

went on back and forth whether it is sand with a little clay in it or just the opposite. Once the scientists made the decision they gave a code to the sample. This code no longer pointed to the uncertainty in the process. This code was just a sign at the end with no reference to the process of determination (Boulton, Wp.).

All in all, Latour argues that through the process of mobilisation discussed above the outside world is brought into the laboratory. But in the course of doing this scientists are obliged to engage themselves in a range of often technically demanding labours designed to render the natural world suitable for the ordeals of modern scientific practice (Garraway & Technikon, Wp.). Latour argues that scientists must construct, name and mobilise the worlds they appear merely to observe.

Last but not least, Callon's (Callon, 1999A) example regarding the pure market situation highlights other aspects of laborisation. It does not follow the complex interactions between the outside world and the laboratory but identifies what human and non-human elements are required to insure ideal market conditions. At the end of the case study Callon reflects on the construct of 'homo economicus', that is, on the fact that conditions 'reinforced' by objects and humans determine the identity and behaviour of participants in a given situation.

Consequently, in his case study *Actor-network theory – the market test* Callon focuses his research not on the laws of science or engineering but on the axioms of a social science, to be more precise, on those of economics. According to Callon, the market is not something given but constructed through various processes. But how can we define the market? Callon uses Guesnerie's definition, which perceives the market as a means of coordination where:

- a) the agents pursue their own interests and to this end perform economic calculations which can be seen as an operation of and/or maximization;
- b) the agents generally have divergent interests, which leads them to engage in

c) transactions which resolve the conflict by defining a price (ibid. p. 183)

This type of definition emphasises the significant elements of the neoclassical theory of economics. Above all, however, it underlines the rational attributes of the main actors, that is, the fact that actors make calculations in order to increase profits. In addition, the above definition regards actors as those who do not know each other and emerge from the mutual unknown just for moments and sink back into the unknown after concluding the contract. However, to ensure the markets coordinating role it is insufficient if anonymous, rational actors constitute the world. For rational actors to make rational decisions, they need information on the possible states of the world. Namely,


„...if market co-ordination is to succeed, there have to be not only calculative agents but also agents with information on all the possible states of the world, on the nature of the actions which can be undertaken and on the consequences of these different actions, once they have been undertaken (Callon, 1999A, p. 184).”²⁰

But according to Callon, the market is not a given fact or a natural phenomena but a construction of various means and processes. He bases his argument on a study written by Marie-France Garcia, an anthropologist of economy in order to present the process which constructs the market's mechanism of coordination and its rational actors. According to the study, the table strawberry market was radically changed in the region of Sologne, France in the early 80's. This change led to the construction of a pure market whose attributes fulfilled the conditions described in textbooks. They were as follows: the perfectly qualified product, an easy to follow supply and demand relationship and an arrangement of transactions which made equilibrium price possible.

²⁰ The proponents of the neoclassical theory were also aware of the fact that it is more an exception than a rule for the above conditions to be met, therefore, they produce different answers to the questions of how the actors can make more or less rational decisions if they do not possess sufficient information about the future. It is not possible to give an account of all these answers here as they are not closely linked to the subject of this paper, so I would prefer to go on to Callon's case study, which seeks an answer to the question of what can ensure that the above conditions are met.

Garcia analysed all investments which could provide a framework for the construction of the market. These investments are demonstrated in *Figure 6*. Firstly, material investments were required, says Callon, for example the construction of a warehouse which had room for all the suppliers of the countryside. Due to this development, impersonal transactions replaced those transactions which lacked coordination and were based on the personal relationships of suppliers and distributors. The impersonal transactions were carried out in a warehouse which was built solely for this purpose.

Figure 6. The set up of Solonge's table strawberry market



The suppliers transported their product daily packed in baskets, and exhibited it in batches. Every batch displayed had a corresponding data sheet attached to it which was handed over to the auctioneer immediately. The auctioneer entered the data into the computer and prepared a catalogue for the customers. Next, the suppliers went into the auction hall which was designed in a way which prevented the suppliers and customers from seeing each other but everybody could see the auctioneer and the screen which displayed the prices. The display of strawberries in the warehouse and the catalogue helped the parties to obtain an accurate picture of the supply both in terms of quality and quantity. On top of that, the units in the warehouse were displayed close to each other, which highlighted the differences in quality and quantity between the suppliers. It served as a kind of feedback for the suppliers too, who, in this way, had the opportunity to compare their own products with those of their competitors. Earlier, when purchases were made on the farms of the producers individually, they had no chance to do so.

All these various elements and means contributed to the framing of the transaction which excluded the network of personal contacts and established a framework where each entity was subject to the market forces. It was this framework which made calculation possible, the technique of degressive bidding, the display of transactions on screen, the classification of units of strawberries on the data sheet and knowledge of the domestic market – all those contributed to the calculability of the transactions.

The case study above demonstrates how material elements and processes interact in the construction of the actor on the one hand, and in that of the social world on the other. According to Callon, the issue is not what is the essence of man, in other words, its real identity but rather how interaction between human and non-human elements defines a given identity. As it is, the *homo economicus* is neither a historical construct which is characteristic of a given era, nor the true nature of people but an element of a frame stabilised by material and social elements in order to create a pure market situation.

„This case provides an outstanding example in that it enables us to follow the birth of an organised market. Above all, it is the purest and most perfect example of market organization. The conclusion that can be drawn from it is extremely simple yet fundamental: yes *homo economicus* does exist, but is not an ahistorical reality. It does not describe the hidden nature of the human being. It is the result of a process of configuration, and the history of the strawberry market shows what this framing consists of. Of course it mobilizes material and metrological investments, but we should not forget the essential contribution of economics in *performing* the economy (Callon, 1999A, pp. 191-193).”

Like Pasteur’s facts about the microbes, the last point of the excerpt refers to the fact that economics does not merely describe the operation of the market but plays an active role in its construction. Neither are the laws of economics universal since they are only true in very specific situations and under precisely defined circumstances. In the case study presented by Callon, the process of laboratisation can be found again, in the sense that it ensures the conditions of a social scientific model on reality through material elements in a well-defined enclosed space. Although all three examples convey the same message they emphasise different aspects of laboratisation.

Latour, in the example of the scientists conducting research on Amazon Rainforest, describes how the things (soil samples) are translated into signs (sophisticated data) and eventually into a text in academic literature (Latour, 1999B; Szabari, 2005). Following this example, the very process becomes traceable through which local and context-dependent matter becomes universal immaterial knowledge. In this process, which contains many contingent elements, the rainforest becomes a laboratory of small units of soil with labels on them. Taking samples from them and giving them codes is not just a technically demanding task but also makes things movable, transparent and comparable, that is, becomes the act of turning them into signs, data.

Similarly, the example about Pasteur highlights the fact that *scientific facts are not universal truths* but rather models of the outside world which can be made universal if the hierarchy of forces characteristic at the micro level can be transferred to the macro level. Microbes function as vaccine only under those conditions which were defined by researchers in the

laboratory. Callon states that if we are to create such a system of conditions in the outside world, several objects, design guidelines and specific technology are required. They will provide the framework in which the model is operational. In other words, this framework will fix the previously given conditions.

The Callon example is particularly interesting for another reason too, as it raises the question of identity in connection with the construction of 'homo economicus'. In his opinion, human substance cannot be defined this way as it is the given framework which determines whether the actors' behaviour makes it possible for them to pursue their own interests and gain maximum benefits. Other frameworks suppose other types of behaviour and identity. In one case, microbes caused epidemic, in another case they functioned as vaccine. Under certain conditions, people can behave as 'homo economicus', in other cases they are altruistic and self-sacrificing. Consequently, people, microbes, objects, technologies do not have a stable identity according to this theory, instead, the other elements in the network of interactions will determine their behaviour. In summary, the different aspects of laboratisation are as follows:

1. Modelling social-natural processes (e.g. farms, epidemic)
2. Fixing the balance of forces in the model through various means (technologies, objects, furniture, the interior set-up of buildings)
3. Construction of identity (microbes as vaccine, farmers as 'advocates of science')
4. Turning contingencies and the 'local' into a universal and decontextualised knowledge
5. Translating the results into the social level (making facts 'universal', pasteurisation of France)

The process of the MoM will be analysed along these five characteristics of laboratisation, underlining that the initiative can be regarded as a laboratory, that is, as a pre-constructed micro environment, in which the conditions of deliberation are fixed by the framework.

The models constructed in both the microbe example and the strawberry market example can be traced back to some other level. In the first case, French farms served as a basis for the model, in the second case, however, it was the axioms of economics and a model of the ideal state of the economy. In other words, in the first case laboratory processes were determined by the conditions observed in the world, whereas in the second case it was a theoretical idea about the operation of the economy and the behaviour of the economic actors.

In a sense, the MoM can be said to be a sort of mixture of the two processes. The basis for its model is provided by existing social phenomena and theoretical elements. The way people communicate on an ongoing basis, when they share their experience, plans, fears, in other words, their whole world with each other can be regarded as an existing social process. At the same time the basis of the model also comprises the abstract principles and conditions in the light of which Habermas defines the ideal speech situation.

People discuss and dispute issues which interest and concern them as members of the family at home, or as citizens at a public hearing, or as members of any community, which is obviously a common and everyday phenomenon. In general, these discussions have an explicit and implicit part where partners in a dialogue define what kind of world and environment they want to live in, and what kind of values they are willing to internalise. In addition, they define what kind of possible future states they are worried about. In short, they share their experience, thoughts and opinions.

This communicative act, in which human beings share their world with others, is usually performed in an informal manner without paying particular attention to it or making a special effort. The process aims to model this informal discussion, the discussion of

common issues. However, it is different from the unstructured everyday communication in that it focuses on a specific subject around which these discussions, debates, opinions range.

From a different angle, this process corresponds to Habermas' theory on the ideal speech situation.²¹ The most important attribute of the speech situation is that participants can enter into a communicative relationship without being restricted by power or any other disrupting elements. Anybody who has something to say about the issue can take part in the discussion without any threat of repercussion. Everyone has the right to question other people's views but his/her opinion is also subject to criticism from the others.

According to Habermas, decisions taken in this communicative situation are rational because the situation itself determines that the best arguments will prevail irrespective of the power relations outside the speech situation. It is not the subject of the present paper to judge whether Habermas' idea is justified or not. In the following passage, it will be demonstrated what efforts were made to fix this ideal state with the help of various mechanisms, technologies and objects during the process. Prior to that, however, it should be examined what is happening in a deliberative laboratory or, better to say, what attributes of reality are enlarged and enhanced in this constellation.

It could be seen in Latour's example how Pasteur manipulated time in the laboratory. He subjected the microbes to various experiments, which would have taken a very long time in the reality of farms. Similar processes can be observed in the MoM initiative. Naturally, it does not mean that the organisers made experiments with the citizens subjecting them to various influences. Nevertheless, it is true that they accelerated the time which would have been needed for such a debate to spontaneously develop in social reality.

²¹ It is worth noting that the idea of ideal speech situation, too, can be traced back to everyday, face-to-face, uncoerced communication. However, it is not discussed here.

There is a chance that such a debate could take place in the public sphere over the years.²² There are articles being published about brain research, neuro-degenerative and psychiatric diseases every week. If many people are concerned with this issue over the years, a debate could develop at a social level about possible solutions, directions of development and the values and ethical principles linked to research.

In the MoM all this took place within a short period of time and its intensity was enhanced by the fact that citizens came across a huge number of articles, studies and a great deal of information. After the lectures given to them on the subject, they had the opportunity to ask the experts questions. All the information, which an average citizen could collect only over several years, was available to the participants during this process and they were given the opportunity to have discussions with each other and with the experts.

Just as Pasteur was breeding microbes in a closed isolated environment and made the data on them visible and recordable, in this process personal discussions and debates became recordable and readable. Otherwise, these discussions and debates would have taken place in people's private sphere and in everyday situations in life.

Fixing the framework


Callon's example demonstrated the fact that in order to maintain a certain state in which participants behave in a predetermined way, a large number of objects, technologies, interior design principles have to be deployed. The case was similar in the MoM too. The greatest challenge was to find the constellation of means needed to maintain this type of situation where the habermasian conditions of the ideal speech situation are partly fulfilled.

²² Naturally, it is true only at a national level, since we cannot yet speak about a real public sphere at the European level, so the development of a similar public debate cannot be expected.

Since the organisers utilised several participatory mechanisms during the project and it would be impossible to analyse them all, I have chosen the ‘carousel’ mechanism as one of the most important methods. The carousel was chosen because it can be considered to be one of the most innovative and unique mechanisms in the whole process. In the passage below, first the carousel procedure will be discussed, then the means needed to ensure that a dialogical situation be established on the basis of uncoercive, symmetrical communication.

The carousel technique provided the opportunity of deliberation between national and between international panel members at the same time. The operation of the procedure is illustrated by the following figure:

Figure 7. The set up of the ‘Carousel’ (MoM 2006, p. 20)



There were about 40 citizens participating in the discussion on a particular topic in the carousel session. Members of all the nine country panels, two experts, support staff and observers helped to manage the process. Each carousel session was led by a lead facilitator with three or four support facilitators.

The basic idea underlying the method was to ensure that each citizen could speak in their own language. The session consisted of three stages (MoM, 2006, p. 19-20):

In the *first stage* of the mechanism citizens were sitting in small monolingual table groups. Each group had three to seven participants who all spoke the same language.²³ It did not mean of course that fluent speakers of another language could not take part in the discussion at the table where that language was spoken if they wanted to.

In the *second stage* tables delegated representatives to the central round table to continue the discussion. In different rounds, different members represented their group at the central table. Discussions were interpreted simultaneously into all the eight languages.

The arrangement of the rooms is illustrated by *Figure 7*.. In each carousel there were nine small monolingual tables and a central round table set beforehand which was used only at certain stages of the session. The small tables were arranged in a circle around the central table so that it was easy to shift from group discussions to the discussion taking place at the central table (MoM 2006, p. 20).

The *third* and final *stage* of the process was the plenary session where all the 126 participants were present and were able to express their opinions about the recommendations. Thus, those who could not take part in the discussion of the given theme because they had been discussing another theme in another carousel now had the

²³ By no means does it mean that they were the citizens of the same nation, as the group at the Flemish and French table had Flemish speakers from the Netherlands and French speakers from Belgium as well.

opportunity to become involved in the plenary discussion. Again, simultaneous interpretation was provided so participants could directly follow the discussions (MoM, 2006, p. 20).


At the 2nd European Convention three carousel meetings were run simultaneously involving all the 126 participants (with about 40 people working in each carousel). The basic idea behind the carousel method was to prepare draft recommendations in the six themes they themselves had defined previously.²⁴ Each carousel was assigned two of the six themes as their primary focus. Citizens could indicate before the Convention in which carousel they wanted to take part. Then, they worked in that carousel for the whole length of the Convention.

As one can see, the arrangement of the sessions allowed each member to express his/her views and represent the opinion of his group both at the small national table and at an international level at the central table. The same principle governs the arrangement of the rooms which ensured the transparency of the process for the citizens on the one hand but also facilitated the shift from international to national dialogues and vice-versa during the process.

There were several other means facilitating and framing citizens' dialogues besides the arrangement of the rooms. *Figure 8.* below, completed with additional elements, shows what else was considered important for the situation and what is missing from the above figure used in official records. These 'background elements' will be analysed underneath.

²⁴ The six main themes of the discussion on brain science can be seen above.

Figure 8. 'Carousel' complemented



The facilitators were very important components of the process as they were the conductors of the dialogues. They did not compose the music of the discourse but helped it to be realised, to have the appropriate tempo and prevented certain musical instruments, that is, participants of various nationalities from dominating the joint production. In other words, facilitators were responsible for the time management of each theme and made sure that the dialogue did not turn into monologues unconnected with each other and the central theme.²⁵ Also, they asked questions to guide discussions and from time to time rephrased and summarised the arguments with the help of rapporteurs (see below).

²⁵ The employment of the facilitators was a strategy consciously applied in order to maintain the conditions of the ideal speech situation. (For instance, to prevent lengthy monologues, or digressions,

All this would not have been possible without approximately sixty microphones, the same number of headsets and several hundred meters of cables. Technological transmission also meant that it was not possible for very many people to talk at the same time. Generally, there was one person who was speaking and elaborating on his thoughts while the others were listening to him with headsets on in their own language thanks to the interpreters, which, considering the fact that there were altogether forty people in the same room, was a remarkable performance.

At first sight, interpreters do not seem to have played any important role in the process, apart from translating the participants' utterances word by word and simultaneously. Luckily, I was present as a participant observer for the whole duration of the process, and at the 1st European Convention I worked as a rapporteur at a table where there were Hungarian, Italian and British citizens. Thanks to this arrangement, I had the opportunity to hear both the original Hungarian opinions and views and their English versions. It became quite obvious that interpreters do a lot more than just translate. The interpreter is a special individual who makes a living from his/her language competence, whose stock-in-trade is his clear, easy to understand style of speech.

Habermas' theory on uncoerced communication was heavily criticised because his critiques claimed that from the very first moment the partners start speaking in a communicative space the power relations and the social differences will be perceived. People belonging to different social class will have different accents, different language competences and different styles of argumentation, which are immediately decoded and power structures beyond the communicative space will start operating.

etc.) There are unplanned influences in the process, too, such as the effect of interpretation on the interaction between the citizens (See below).

However, social differences are excluded from the process due to simultaneous interpretation. As it has been mentioned before, the interpreter makes a living from conveying the utterances of the speaker in a clear, articulate, intelligent and coherent way. Thus, the interpreters could not and probably would not convey regional accents or an overly simple mode of expression. They could not convey the incoherency of thoughts either, as they had to wait to see what the speaker in fact wanted to say, thus, what they interpreted was coherent and logical. The interpreters in simultaneous interpretation translated not just words and sentences, but they brought the different language competences to the same level by turning the restricted code into an elaborated code.²⁶ Consequently, differences in language competences disappeared and the power elements always inherent in communication became insignificant.

As a result of technological transmission and simultaneous interpretation, the participants had to wait for what the others wanted to say without interrupting each other. If they had not done that no comprehensible conversation would have been possible. Interpreters would not have been able to interpret the line of thoughts uttered at the same time simultaneously. The process greatly benefited from international communication and the obstacles of technological transmission as they literally forced participants to establish a 'communication oriented towards understanding' in the habermasian sense. All participants waited for their turn to come and to add something to what the others had said. Had it not been the case the whole discussion would have become an incomprehensible noise of monologues without any conclusions or other outcomes.

In the process there was one additional staff member, the so called *rapporteur* who was taking notes of the main arguments and recorded the main points of the discussion.

²⁶ After studying the language usage of students in several schools in London in the 1950's, Bernstein distinguished two main groups (or as he called them 'codes'), the elaborated and the restricted ones. The restricted code uses concrete terms, the meaning is made implicit depending on the context. In contrast, the elaborate code is abstract, explicit, and independent of the context. Bernstein explained the contrast with the difference between the modes of upbringing arising from two family types and social classes. In

These arguments and discussion points were input into the computer so they were immediately displayed on the screen, which all participants in the room could see. It contributed to the fact that the course of the debate and the direction of the arguments were easy to see and follow during the long and often exhausting sessions. Also, it allowed partners to revisit a point mentioned earlier without seriously impeding the course of the session. In summary, the work of the rapporteur and the display on the screen facilitated the transparency of the process. Since later the recommendations were drawn up on the basis of the rapporteurs' notes, the participants were able to check whether the notes in fact expressed their points of view.

The description and presentation of all these components are interesting not only because the background elements which help to maintain undistorted communication are highlighted but also because they make it obvious that the two seemingly contrasting theoretical trends, the habermasian trend and the ANT, obviously overlap in this process. The presentation of the above means emphasises the fact that constructing a situation in which the citizens involved are more or less one another's equals and have the same chance of participating in the discourse is only possible if several means are used.

The habermasian ideas of the ideal speech situation do not and cannot work 'just by themselves', for this a specific constellation of human and non-human elements are required. Some of these elements, such as the human (interpreters, facilitators) and non-human ones (microphones, computers, beamer) did not merely transmit and facilitate communication, but also influenced its direction and process. A more precise explanation could be that their specific constellation allowed certain types of communication to be realised, for instance the struggle for understanding, while it hampered others (for example the practice of interrupting others).

simple terms, the elaborate code is characteristic of the middle classes, while the restricted code belongs to the working class. (Burke 2002)

The support staff and the technical devices did not have a merely auxiliary role, they constructed the framework for the dialogues of the participants, that is the framework which provided the scope for the realisation of the habermasian principles. The analysis above concludes that the discourse between equal parties must be very thoroughly prepared and its framework constructed through a multitude of means. Nevertheless, it is true that the complexity of the procedure is partly due to its international nature, still I would assume that these statements are valid even in a monolingual medium.

The identity of the discourse situation

The example of the strawberry market clearly indicated that the attributes of the individual striving for maximum benefits cannot be regarded as human essence, nor as a historical phenomenon. According to Callon, the *homo economicus* is a member of a network constituted from human and non-human elements, and this constellation inspires a certain type of behaviour. In this aspect, its identity is a construct. If we perceive the Meeting of Minds along these lines, we can ask what characterises the ideal participant envisioned by the organisers of the process. What kind of identity is constructed on the basis of the above mentioned conditions?

At all events, it can be stated that he/she must be an open, freely responding individual who is interested in others' opinion in order to participate in the process in a constructive way. He or she should be interested in new information and acquiring new experience as well as willing to understand others' opinions, experience and thoughts. In summary, the process was designed for committed, politically active citizens who are willing to take part in social discussions and immerse themselves in a given theme so that their participation can be meaningful.

However, this is not all as this whole programme has a distinctive international character which also supposes the kind of personality who is capable of coping with national

differences. The kind of personality who can find his or her way on an international platform, does not have difficulty in establishing contacts with people of other nations and is not afraid of negotiating in an international milieu.

The attributes of a politically active, socially sensitive and international person are further enriched by the fact that the theme of the programme is brain science. On top of the above mentioned attributes, citizens should also be interested in science and technologies, especially in their social, environmental and health effects. The person who is politically active and freely moves in an international milieu and is interested in scientific themes can be called a *post-national scientific citizen* (Habermas, 1997, 2001; Delanty, 1995, 2000; Callon, 1998B; Irwin, 1995, 2001; Barry, 2001; Tambini, 2001). Later chapters in the paper will deal with the concept in greater detail analysing its theoretical, political and social aspects respectively. In the following chapters, the thesis will at the same time touch upon the scientific and transnational character of the citizenship concept and the identity construct closely connected to the MoM project.

Turning contingencies into knowledge

When Mesman (Mol&Mesman, 1996) did fieldwork in a neonatal ward she was faced with difficulties as to how to grasp the essence of the innumerable pieces of information present and how to find the main thread which could lead her through the social, technical and emotional labyrinth called 'hospital'. She decided that instead of trying to follow the actor (Callon, 1986, 1987; Latour 1987) she would follow the food prepared for the babies. This seemingly insignificant move helped her to find the 'thread' and by pursuing it helped her to reveal the hidden social, technical and power structures (Mol & Mesman, 1996). In line with this, in the example about the Amazon Rainforest, Latour followed the lumps of earth and leaves, that is, the samples thereby unfolding the process through which things became signs and uncertainty translated into certainty.

In this section I shall argue that the way through which individual viewpoints are ‘aggregated into’ a final report of the MoM process is full of translations just like in Latour’s example when the soil and earth itself translated into codes, figures and data. These translations were mechanisms which transformed and translated local, context-dependent and individual opinions to a European, collective set of official statements. To be able to disclose these translations, the train of thought of this section attempts to follow the way of ‘samples of opinion’ in the MoM process just as Latour followed the destiny of the soil samples and Mesman followed the trail of baby food.


So this section will trace the way of citizens’ viewpoints and opinions through the process and unfold the sequence of translations by which these fragmented and divided perspectives have become a united European collection of statements. The following description is but an oversimplification of the process but can give the readers a general idea about how the procession and distillation of the ideas took place.

Both organisers and participants knew that by the end of the process there should be something which is a clear and understandable expression of what the citizens think about brain science. But usually the man in the street does not really think about brain science except if she or he or a close relative suffering from a brain injury or has a brain disease. So, first and foremost, the most important task was to provide something about which panel members could form opinions and elaborate their own perspective.

Consequently, the organisers of MoM involved brain scientists, resource persons and stakeholders to give input for the project and identify the main ethical dilemmas, problematic points and threats concerning brain science (Raeymaekers, Rondia & Slob, 2004). Their perspectives and ideas provided inspiration and direction for scientific journalists who wrote a collection of fictional case studies. This ‘introductory material’ was then given to citizens who could read and process it and thereby understand what

stakes are in brain science and research. This was in the preliminary phase of the project so these steps are indicated with grey in *Figure 9*.

Figure 9. The way of citizens' opinion in MoM



When the citizens arrived at the 1. European Convention they were ready to express their ideas about the case studies which they had already been discussing in a national context (see Figure 3.). As it has been described above, the opinions and thoughts of the citizens were translated by interpreters so they could understand each other in a multilingual situation. However, as it has also been indicated above, the interpreters did more than just translate, they also reformulated, processed and many times put the ideas of the citizens into a more coherent structure. Something is lost in translation (accents, traits of social class and incoherent speech) but something was also added (interpreters' own style and language code). The effects of this everyday translation mechanism, now in a literary sense, may seem insignificant for those who work in multilingual environments but the very fact of translation deeply affected the discourse situation between citizens. Moreover, this interpretation was constant in the process so it exerted a profound impact all the way through.

As it has already been shown, the rapporteurs also had special tasks since they were responsible for summarising and going over the main points discussed by the citizens. Using their computers and their communication skills, they also reformulated and logically rearranged the ideas expressed to grasp the essence of the debate. However, it is also true that from time to time they checked if the citizens were in agreement with the summary (in *Figure 9.* this feedback is represented by fragmented arrows). If they did, they sent it through an internal network to the Theme Team. The Theme Team then read through the summarised opinions and attempted to identify regularities and common points in them so as to create categories for voting.

These categories then were projected onto a screen where all the panel members could see them and they could cast their votes for the ones which seemed important to them. So by the end of the 1st European Convention six themes were given the status 'significant' although the number of themes were not fixed by the organisers in advance and therefore there was a contingency in this matter whether the upper limit should be

drawn at six, seven or eight themes. Nevertheless, the six topics, which this paper already introduced above, served as a basis for the further steps of the process both at national and at European levels. Ironically, the opinions expressed by individuals and discussed by groups were translated, processed, aggregated and distilled to such an extent that at the end the outcome resulted in slightly more than vague categories corresponding to the main problematic points articulated in the 'Introductory material'. It also has to be said that the citizens had the right to express their dissatisfaction with the categories as they were projected onto the screen (this feedback is indicated by fragmented arrows) but either because they were content or unsure about the process they did not do that. So at this point of the process it seemed that despite all the different 'translation mechanisms' the citizens felt that their ideas were more or less well articulated and represented by the six themes.

After this stage all the national panels left for their own countries and, using this categorisation, elaborated the national final reports. Of course these steps of the method were also quite significant and contained many important 'translations' but for the sake of simplicity I will not discuss the stages of this particular process. Instead, to cut a long story short, the description continues at the 2nd European Convention where the European panel met again to discuss the themes created and write a collection of European statements on brain science. The role of the interpreters and rapporteurs and the translations they made of the opinions have already been described. However, in the 2nd Convention a new type of group was also formed partly by scientific journalists, partly by citizens in order to write the final report pertinent to the discussions among the panel members. These discussions were structured by the carousel method described above (*Figure 7*).

So, the citizens and the scientific journalists worked together in the writing groups to create a document through joint effort which would be both applicable as a policy document and would represent the ideas of the citizens. It should be noted that the

presence of scientific journalists also represents a translation since they guarded the coherence, structure and eloquence of the citizens' discourse. But again this additional translation in the process did not cause any difficulty or discontent as far as citizens were concerned. The trouble in the 2nd European Convention started when the output of the working group was shown on a screen at a plenary session. It seemed that the translations in the process were just one step too many.

Just as it has been mentioned above, translation, using the term in a Latourian sense, always changes something. Something is always lost but also added in translation. In any case, Latour emphasises that if there are too much changes those who are involved in a 'project' tend to lose faith because they feel that they are not well treated and represented. For Latour it does not make a difference whether these 'participants' are human or nonhuman. In this fashion, Pasteur had to accurately represent both the French farmers and the microbes. If it had not happened, either the French farmers or the microbes would have rebelled against the 'project', or using a latourian expression, against the actor-network.

In the case of MoM, just as in European history, the French started the revolution when one French citizen, who was formerly involved in the writing group, pointed out that the text in the screen was not the same as that which they had written together in a joint session. After that, several other citizens joined the chorus saying that the text had been changed significantly since they had edited and approved it. At the end, it turned out that the text would have to be rewritten and the citizens would not be granted the opportunity to give feedback on the final text just on the main points. It became clear that the scientific journalists were going to work on the final report even after the whole process. This instigated an expression of general dissatisfaction and doubt in the transparency of the whole process.

However, after a long discussion, the citizens decided that they would be willing to finish the process because, they argued, even if the process they had participated in so far was not flawless this could be a first step in the practice of European democracy based on citizens' voices. So at the end, a common European final report was handed to European politicians in the next morning which did not contain reference to contingencies, hurdles or possible doubts about the process on the part of the citizens. The final report was written with clear structure, eloquence and style and possibly could represent a valuable policy input. The 'rest' is left out from this side of the equation.

The lesson to be drawn from the story is that it was a long way leading from individual opinions to a European final report. However, this long way contained many steps where the opinion of the citizens were aggregated, condensed, distilled in order to create from a mass of diverse ideas a manageable discourse and finally a coherent and readable text. Just as scientists mobilised the rainforest in Latour's example, the organisers of the process mobilised the 'minds met' of the participants to get the final results. Just as scientists have to meticulously select, order and transform the soil of the rainforest so as to render it compatible with larger super-systems of science, the diverse opinions and ideas of the participants also have to be translated step by step into a 'semi-official' document. Again, some aspects of these ideas were reduced, some aspects were amplified making the final text into a common European collection of statements.

Nevertheless, there was also a point in the process where the citizens had to stand up for their rights because they felt that they were not represented and treated fairly. Translations thus cannot be done in an endless sequence. As Latour argues, if only one link in the chain of representation is questioned, then the relationship between representation and object, here the relationship between the participants' ideas and the final report, crumbles. Although one of the most important goals of the process was to provide policy input, it seemed that the severe exertion for it resulted in too many steps


of translation and the reduction of the complexity of ideas which harmed the transparency of the process in the eyes of the citizens.

Translating the results into the social level

If the conversion of the outcomes into the social level is considered, it is noticeable that Callon's and Latour's examples markedly differ from each other. In his example Callon referred to the construct of the laws of the market and that of the identity of 'homo economicus' to a very closely confined space: the strawberry market in Sologne. The laws of the market presented by him work only within a pre-defined framework which is sufficient for the process. There is no need to convert the market laws to a further level, as businesses are conducted at this level, in this space, so the 'outcomes' of the process are meaningful only within this framework. This approach can be characteristic of the MoM project as well. If its organisers and designers had only meant the initiative to be a 'social experiment' where citizens had the opportunity to discuss brain science, then the outcomes are not necessarily expected to go beyond the framework of the experiment. In this case, however, the identity construct formed in the process is meaningful and valid only within the framework of the process.

Latour's example suggests a completely different approach. The outcomes of the process begun with the help of the microbes can be translated into the 'macro', that is, into the social level. Due to the spreading of vaccines, it was not only the behaviour of the microbes that had changed but the farms specialising in animal husbandry were changed and finally, the whole of France was 'pasteurised'. In other words, the social structure of the macro-level was also deeply affected and changed by the outcomes of the process. Naturally, what was needed for that was the appropriate change of the outside conditions in accordance with the conditions in the laboratory. Namely, for Pasteur to be able to preserve the identity constructs of both the microbes and the farmers, the outside conditions had to be made 'ideal' for their existence.

Figure 10. MoM project's way across levels



The conclusion drawn from Latour's example are true for the MoM programme as well. So as to make the outcomes of the process and the citizenship construct formed during the process operational, the operation of the macro-level should also be modified. Following the example of pasteurisation of France, European politics and science should be '*deliberated*'. If this does not happen, the project stays at the level of a one-off experiment and the participants do not feel 'European scientific citizens' any more. They return to their everyday life and everything will go on as if nothing had happened

The conversion of outcomes into the social level is the most crucial aspect of the MoM process, as it was an experimental project and it is not at all certain what will be the effect of the outputs. What are those outside conditions that should also be changed at the

macro level in order to have a real impact and preserve the newly-formed identity constructs? I shall reflect on this question in depth in the conclusion.

2.4. Précis

The chapter described a European deliberation process, which is unique in its class. On the one hand, the MoM was so special because it was the first initiative that aspired to create a *public ‘micro-sphere’* in a transnational space, where citizens were able to meet, discuss the issues of a theme they were interested in and they had the opportunity to draw up recommendations for the decision-makers. At a time when the ‘quasi-state’ of the European Union seems to be abstract, non-transparent, unreachable for the ‘quasi-citizen’, all those initiatives that attempt to find a solution to ease the problem of democracy deficit are very important. On the other hand, the process can be regarded as unique in that it offers a theme – the issue of development and regulation of brain science – which is very difficult to comprehend for the man in the street. For the citizens it is not just the establishment of the EU that is non-transparent and uncontrollable, but *the development and operation of science and technologies* as well.

At the same time or perhaps for this very reason, life is more and more permeated by the findings of sciences and new technologies. It might be claimed that we live in a hotbed of incomprehensibly complex technological systems. Therefore, all initiatives are of primary significance that attempt to bridge the gap between the expert and the man in the street and which assume that they still have something to say to each other. Another way to look at it would be that everyone who is expert in a given field would be a lay person in all the others. Therefore, it is necessary to prompt public discussions on sciences and technologies which have considerable social impacts or serious side-effects.

The analysis in the chapter showed how the organisers of the initiative tried “more or less” consciously to set up the communication between citizens in accordance with the

framework of the ideal speech situation. Nevertheless, a large number of human, technical, material and interior arrangement guidelines were utilised. The conclusion of the present analysis is that an ideal speech situation can only be established by jointly utilising material and human elements. The association of these elements will establish the framework which makes communication among participants symmetrical and attempts to realise a construct of identity which can be called post-national scientific citizenship.

The following chapters will give a more detailed description and analysis of this model of citizenship outlining theoretical, policy and citizen perspectives. First, the next chapter will analyse the theoretical space around citizenship in connection with science and Europe. This introduction to the academic discourse in the first place is essential because the models developed are more than just futile ideas of highbrow scientists. These citizenship models based on different models of political thought also deeply influence how policy makers construct the subjects of or at least strive to impose certain social identities on a political community.

Therefore, as a second step, the paper will analyse the policy discourse of citizenship with a focus on the connection between science, Europe and the citizens. The chapter will not only analyse the identity constructions embedded in the texts in question but will also attempt to show connections between the academic and the policy discursive layers.

Finally, the focus will come back to Meeting of Minds to investigate how citizens perceive themselves in terms of their role in the project. It will be possible to trace not only different roles but also different connections and visions of Europe. Since interviews were conducted with both Hungarian and Dutch participants, the question of how participants from different political cultures could find their place in the process will be touched upon.

This way, the analysis of the citizenship discursive layer will complete the collection of samples from discursive layers. This collection attempts to describe all the important perspectives around citizenship, science and Europe. It might be argued that both European policy documents and the MoM project favour a special kind of identity position, namely, post-national citizenship. As it has been indicated above in connection with the ‘translation of results into higher levels’, both the viability and the minimal requirements of such a subject position will be discussed in depth in the conclusion.

3. ACADEMIC DISCURSIVE LAYER ON CITIZENSHIP

As we could see in the previous chapter, the relationship between citizenship and science is intensively discussed nowadays among scholars, politicians and among citizens and scientists themselves. It seems that the boundary between politics and science and technology is getting blurred and this also has some bearing on the role of citizens in this process.

According to Barry (Barry, 2001), we are living in a technological society because both the problems that government and politics must address, and the solutions that we must adopt refer to specific technologies. Science and technology, therefore, at the same time bring new topics to the political arena and serve as a model for politics.²⁷ This aspect of technological society has two further implications.

Firstly, the space of government is changing due to the intersection of technological artefacts, social practices and networks. Traditionally, the space of government has referred to national territory and population. Nowadays, this has been supplemented with a further dimension, that is, the government of technological zones which cannot be defined and demarcated by geographical or territorial boundaries but by the circulation of technical practices and devices.

Secondly, in a society like that the emphasis is on the technical skills, capacities, and knowledge of the individual citizen.²⁸ Moreover, to live in a technological society one

²⁷ For Barry, technological society is one which perceives technical change as a model of a political invention. Here, we should consider not only the importance of evidence-based policies and the prevalent practice of expert advice in various policy areas but also the emergence of techno-scientific expressions in policy context such as networking and inter-activity. In that sense, science and technology serve as models for politics. (Barry 2001)

²⁸ Barry uses the term 'technological' citizenship. However, in the course of this essay I will stick to the question of 'scientific citizenship', yet acknowledging the difference between science and technology like Irwin did:

„...I generally employ 'science' in the broadest sense so as to encompass a whole worldview and a set of institutions within society. At times also, 'science' encompasses areas of knowledge and application which

needs much more than just to be able to make judgements about prices of commodities or decisions about parties and politicians. The citizen has to be informed and updated about the scientific and technological aspects of her life as well.²⁹ To use Barry's own words:

“She has to be knowledgeable about the multiple intersections and connections between her body and pollutants, drugs and technical devices, and the dangers and possibilities such possibilities may open up. (...) Technological innovation forms new artefacts. The government of a technological society implies the formation of new human capacities and attributes (ibid. p. 4).”

The perspective of technological society raises many questions about the role of the citizens. How can they have an impact on decisions which affect their lives? What rights, responsibilities can they assume facing the political and ethical implications of scientific research and those of science-based innovations? What are the relationships between ‘traditional’ citizenship concepts and the emerging characteristics of a ‘scientific citizenship’? And if government more and more includes the government of technological zones what is the level of polity at which citizens can intervene?

The aim of this theoretical section is to show the different levels on which the Meeting of Minds project can be and possibly should be interpreted. I am not going to answer all the above mentioned questions whose complexity is far beyond the scope of this thesis, rather the focus is on the issue of how the Meeting of Minds project is trying to address these questions.

might more properly be referred to as ‘technology’. I am aware of the distinction which can be made between ‘scientific’ and ‘technological’ forms of understanding but have at times used the former as a succinct way to describing both (Irwin, 1995, p. 8).”

²⁹ In a sense, life also becomes more complicated with the technologies which aim to ease the burden of everyday existence. As a stand-up put it in BBC4's Now Show: “...money is getting so complicated. Once upon a time, you buy something and are asked: ‘Will you be paying cash or cheque, sir?’ Now you buy something and its: ‘Will you be paying cash, cheque, direct debit, electronic credit transfer, by post, by phone, at the post office, at the bank, online, online via our website, online via your bank's website, online via something that looks like a website but it's in fact a bloke in Nigeria...’ With a big grin on his face... ‘Will you be using pay-point, cash-point, credit card, debit card, store card, oyster card or I will accept two

However, these questions will serve as guidelines in this section where three different – the liberal, the republican and the deliberative – approaches to citizenship are introduced in relation to scientific citizenship. In my view, the different kinds of scientific citizenship ideal-types reflect the age-old debates over the nature and characteristics of political citizenship.³⁰ Also, these debates determine the theoretical space around European citizenship.

On the other, we can also emphasise the difference between political and scientific citizenship if we consider the fact that the debates over citizenship are often concentrated around problems such as *common good and legitimacy*. These problems traditionally had no condition referred to science or to technology and only recently, that is, for the past thirty years have started to become central to the debates over sciences and scientists.

Before that, no shadow of doubt was cast on the significance of science and technology because they had been considered as the representatives of the master narrative of modernity, that is, progress. Accordingly, there was no question about the fact that science and technology contribute to common good, nor was their legitimacy ever questioned. This privileged position has been challenged along many different lines by environmental, feminist and consumer movements, just to mention the most important ones. The members of these movements were the first ‘scientific citizens’ as they called into question the legitimacy of science and technology and challenged their underlying values. These movements showed that the ‘common good’ produced by science and technology can also raise the ‘common bad’ or that not all members of the society can

goats and your daughter...’ And all this just to buy a latte at Starbucks” (The Now Show. BBC4. 08/12/2006).

³⁰ Before the lengthy discussion, it may be worth mentioning that my aim is not to show that the questions of scientific citizenship could be easily reduced and conflated with the time-worn positions in the debate over the ideal political subject in a polity, that is, over political citizenship. As Barry’s above discussed ideas show the political subject in a technological society must cope with a messy world, which consists of unclear relations between her body, technologies, chemical substances and social structures. This implies new capacities and attributes which were not part of the traditional ideas on citizenship.

partake equally from new developments. So, to sum up the last two passages, the very concept of scientific citizenship designates this new relationship between science, politics and the political subject. However, in my opinion the theoretical discussion in Science and Technology Studies (STS) rests on the positions of different political theories on citizenship.³¹

In line with this, in the following section I would like to highlight three different approaches, the *liberal*, the *republican* and the *deliberative* ones. These can be considered to be dominant accounts in the debate over the meaning of citizenship. These approaches are the models created by Callon in order to analyse the role of lay people in relation to scientific knowledge. These models are called the 'public education', the 'co-production of knowledge, and the 'public debate' model.³²

3.1. Models of citizenship

Citizenship in its most common sense is about group membership, or to put it more bluntly, membership in a very special group of the political community (Delanty, 2000). Most debates about citizenship are concentrated around the issue of the nature of group membership (Isin & Turner, 2002). According to Burchell, there is persistent dichotomy between two rival streams of thought on citizenship: one of them classical or neo-classical and the other early modern or modern (Burchell, 1995). Quoting Turner he writes that with the rise of the market society in early modern Europe the classical 'active' or 'republican' ideal was increasingly replaced by a modern 'passive' or 'liberal' ideal which

³¹ I was not the first to 'suspect' these relationships between political theory and science and technology issues. Laird already wrote an article in which he elaborates the question of citizens' involvement in the issues of science and technology in relation with two political theories, namely, pluralism and direct democracy. In this respect I follow his line of thought although I will discuss three different political approaches and three forms of citizens' involvement respectively. (Laird, 1993)

³² This categorization is in many aspects parallel to Irwin's model on three policy responses: the expert-based (let facts decide), the democratic (let people decide), and the pragmatic (let common sense decide) approach. However, I will not use his ideas directly but on many points I will draw on his book in the following section. (Irwin, 1995, p. 62-80)

weakened the original civic impulse (p. 541). Apart from these two approaches, in the following section I shall discuss a third, the deliberative approach which tries to combine elements of the different traditions.

Firstly, we can identify the tradition of *modern liberal* thought as the dominant form of *citizenship* based on particular relationships between rights and duties related to the market or to the administrative state. Citizenship entails a formal and legally coded status which reduces citizenship to a privatistic and pre-political status. As for scientific citizenship, this account can be closely related to the model which Callon calls 'Public Educational Model'. In this model the citizens do not take part in science and technology in the making but only steering them by expressing their preferences on the market or to the state. These preferences to different scientific or technological achievements are pre-given and the only task for the state or the market is to collect and aggregate them and shape the trends of future developments accordingly. Thus, there is a clear-cut boundary between citizens and specialists without the possibility of real dialogue.

Secondly, the tradition called *republican* grasps *citizenship* not as a formal and static concept but as an active, more substantive dimension of participation in the civic community. In this form, the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings and identities. In the same way, citizenship must be defined as a social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding and losing rights (Isin & Turner 2002). According to this account, the community of citizens is considered to be self-governing because after common discussion they create and impose laws on themselves. This approach is akin to what Callon calls the 'Co-production of Knowledge Model'. In this model, citizens take part in the making of knowledge or in the innovation process and work in a close relationship with specialists. This way, they create their own scientific understanding or technological device for themselves, so the gap between citizens and scientists is getting blurred in this model.

Thirdly, following the work of Habermas, the concept of *deliberative citizenship*³³ is an attempt to reconcile the contradictory elements of these two different approaches. According to his viewpoint, in a complex and plural society it is not possible to go back to the republican ideal of the self-governing community, yet he strives to keep meaningful participation under conditions of the systematic characteristics of modern society. He argues that this is possible via the dispersed networks of public spheres where the opinion- and will-formation of the citizens can take place by discussing common matters with each other. The question is how the results of these deliberative discussions can be channelled into the political system shaping and giving legitimacy to decision-making. Correspondingly, Callon offers a third model, that is, the 'Public Debate Model' in which citizens take part by discussing scientific issues and forming their own opinion in the course of a deliberative process. The gap between citizens and scientists is neither wide as in the 'Public Education' nor dissolved as in the 'Co-production of Knowledge' model. In the 'Public Debate Model' this gap remains but is bridged by these public debates which have the capability of keeping diverse fields of knowledge together.

3.2. The Challenges to National Citizenship

Until now, the debate between the positions outlined above about the right form of citizenship mostly took place at the level of nation-state. However, this debate is getting even more 'knotty' because the traditional, unquestioned relationship between nation-state, nationalism and citizenship is under strain along different lines. The nation-state as the sole source of authority and citizenship are being challenged both from below due to the emergence of plural, multi-cultural societies and above as the emergence of transnational entities such as the EU. Therefore, the blurring boundaries of nation-states

³³ The concept, however, 'deliberative citizenship' cannot be found in the works of Habermas. I created it in order to show the differences between the other two and this approach. In the course of the discussion of the 'deliberative citizenship' I tried, however, to be as faithful to the original ideas of Habermas as I could.

brought citizenship on the intellectual and political agenda in addition to the questions of scientific citizenship (Isin & Turner, 2002).

Among the different challenges to the nation-state – and in close relation to the institution of national citizenship – we can identify, following Tambini (Tambini, 2001), four aspects as the most important and most challenging ones such as *economic globalisation, cultural denationalisation, migration and the emergence of transnational institutions*. These interrelated processes are undermining the traditional position of the nation state. While economic globalisation reduces the state capacities of controlling the national economy to deliver welfare to all nationals and to assist social mobility, the fragmentation of the national culture along ethnic, religious and different life forms make it difficult to sustain monocultural ‘offering’ in the public broadcasting. In addition, labour mobility has also contributed to the increased cultural diversity and complexity as migrants are media literate and able to bring their own culture with them. Moreover, argues Tambini, the existence of transnational institutions and discourses on human rights and legal institutions offer new channels of citizen participation apart from the nation state. European integration is particularly considered to be a process which undermines the national monopoly on rights and practices of citizenship (Tambini, 2001, p. 198-200).

Because of these interrelated phenomena and the fact that societies are forced to manage cultural difference and associated tensions and conflict, there will be necessary significant changes in the processes by which states allocate citizenship and differentiate categories of citizens (Isin & Turner, 2002). Due to the phenomenon of migration, questions that multicultural and settler societies had to answer have now become the questions of states that originally saw themselves homogenous (Sperling, 2002). Moreover, the emergence of transnational institutions such as the EU poses a different question, namely, how the participation of citizens can be ensured at a higher level of polity.³⁴

³⁴ Because the aim of this theoretical part is to show the possibilities of citizen participation in science and technology issues in the in depth discussion below I will focus on this question partly neglecting the

However, these discussions on the devaluation of national citizenship in connection with the blurring boundaries of nation states do not take into account the questions of science and technology. They do not consider either that science and technology have a great role in these processes or that the question of participation at a transnational level is also on the agenda in relation with science and technology issues.

Of course, one can also raise the question of whether scientific citizenship can be other than transnational. Both the production of scientific knowledge or the innovation of artefacts and their effects on their social and natural environment have been and increasingly are trans- and international. However, if we think about the 'Meeting of Minds' project, this raises the following questions: If we cannot draw the line either for the production of scientific knowledge or for the effects of that knowledge why should issues on science and technology be discussed at a European level and not at other levels? What is the reason then behind the decision of the polity level at which these discussions can and should take place?

On the one hand, it is impossible to give a clear answer to this question because it is obvious that new developments of brain science involve scientists and will affect people also outside Europe. On the other hand, we can witness a number of efforts in the EU which aim to create an even and integrated techno-scientific space or 'technological zone' to use Barry's expression (Barry, 2001). In that sense, Europe is currently being invented (Misa & Schot, 2005), a European technological zone is being created and governed by harmonisation, intellectual property rights and (scientific) networking. As Barry puts it:

"Technological zones take varied spatial forms which may both reinforce or cut across and subvert formal political boundaries; they may even create new ones. Their ends are in principle contestable; and due to the importance with which they are invested, they may be contested and reconfigured. They serve both to prevent and to establish sites for

question of diversity and plurality. However, the articles and books on which my argument is based discuss both questions at the same time.

political conflict, and they reinforce and undermine zones of military domination. As we shall see, technological zones are the objects of developing forms of transnational regulation. In what follows I examine a series of remarkable attempts to reconfigure different technological zones: those associated with environmental and health and safety regulation, communication and information technologies, and security and defence. This has been the process of European integration (Barry, 2001).”

However, these phenomena are not discussed in great depth here but it is obvious that the discussions of scientific citizenship also have to take the transnational level into consideration. Because my fieldwork is about a ‘European Citizens’ Deliberation’ I shall focus and restrict the analysis to the dimension of European citizenship in relation with scientific citizenship. So in the following section I will discuss three trends in political thinking and how these trends are connected to the question of scientific citizenship. I will also reflect on the question of how scientific citizenship can be grasped at a European level. Since, in my opinion, the Meeting of Minds project has been launched according to the deliberative citizenship ideal I will examine that topic more thoroughly than the others.

3.3. Liberal Theory and the Consumer Citizen

Liberal citizenship

Basically every kind of liberal theory begins with the individual. Accordingly, the primary value of liberal citizenship is to maximise individual liberty. Because of that, liberal theory focuses on the individual’s relationship with the state on two interrelated dimensions. Firstly, individual liberty and state action tend to be inversely related, that is, increasing the latter would reduce the former. Secondly, a fundamental distinction can be made between activities that affect ‘chiefly’ individuals’ own interests and those that also affect the interests of others. That presupposition implies that the pursuit of one’s own interests that do not affect others is entirely the province of the individual, in other words, the private sphere and should be protected against the state. In the sphere of the public, that

is, where others' interests are affected the state may be justified in regulating the activity (Shuck, 2002).³⁵ However, it is not easy to make a distinction between private and public and it may be renegotiated over and over again in relation with different issues (Gering, 2002).

Furthermore, as I mentioned above, the dominant tradition of citizenship has been this market-base model in which citizenship is related to the emergence of civil-society that is basically privatised and pre-political. In liberal theories the meaning of civil-society refers to the sphere of market exchange where formally equal citizens pursue their interests and which should be protected from state intervention. So, the civic body of citizens is seen under threat from the government which, on the other hand, is also necessary in order to secure the conditions of market exchange (Shuck, 2002).

Subsequently, due to the emergence of welfare systems the emphasis from the market has been shifted to the state. This shift can be clearly seen in T. H Marshall theory of citizenship rights (Marshall, 1992). According to Marshall, we can distinguish different kinds of rights such as civil rights, political rights and social rights. Each of these sets of rights were achievements, respectively, of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century and the twentieth century. In this theory the shift from civil to political and then to social rights represents an evolutionary process which helps to reconcile democracy and its requirement of formal equality with capitalism rendering citizens unequal.

According to Marshall's theory this was a gradual process in which citizenship embraces more and more fully the whole existence of social life (Marshall, 1992). For Marshall, social rights brought to completion the purely formal rights of civic and political citizenship by alleviating the structural inequalities of capitalism on the one hand, and by

³⁵ It may worth mentioning that in the different arenas of political thought the concept 'civil society' as well as the relationship between 'the private and the public sphere' varies. I shall not discuss these differences in depth. However, interesting they may be, it would mean a diversion in the train of thought here.

ensuring a minimal material independence for citizens to practise their civic and political rights, on the other.

However, Marshall's hypothesis about the mitigating effect of social citizenship levelling off differences between different members of the society had not been proven by the second part of the twentieth century. Delanty argues that we can see nowadays that neo-liberal theory pulls back citizenship from state to the market. According to him, the concept of citizen in neo-liberal discourse replaces the citizen with the *consumer* (Delanty, 2000).³⁶

Educational scientific citizenship

From the scientific citizenship perspective, we can see how these concepts linger on and determine the debates on the role of citizens. The liberal account of citizenship is very similar to the role of citizens in the 'Public Educational Model' (PEM) (Callon, 1999B). In this model citizens are totally excluded from the realms of science and technology and their relationship to these spheres is not of political nature in the strictest sense. They are clients of the state apparatus or consumers of the market. If they are not satisfied with the developments of these fields they can only reveal and stress their preferences toward the state or in the market.

So as liberal thought is the dominant trend of citizenship, according to Callon, the PEM is also the simplest and most widespread model. In this model scientific knowledge, which is objective and universal, is considered to be the opposite of lay knowledge characterised by beliefs and superstitions. Accordingly, Hamlett argues that the experts' and the average

³⁶ This process can be seen as the extension of social citizenship into the world of consumption. Citizenship thus loses its equalizing function and becomes a highly privatised matter. In line with this, Warren highlights that neo-liberal theories of democracy argue that the self is defined by preferences that are formed pre-politically and reflects interests. Democracy therefore is primarily a means for aggregating pre-political preferences. Political institutions aggregate preferences without fundamentally changing them.

citizens' concepts are constructed as mirror images (Hamlett, 2003). On the one hand, the public is depicted as apathetic, uninformed or driven by biased information, as illegitimate and undesirable participants in policy-making decisions. On the other hand, expert rationality can assess risks and problematic situations objectively by disclosing objective facts and providing unbiased information. Experts are thus an essential part of policy-making processes as far as science and technology issues are concerned.

Accordingly, a top-down information distribution is needed to dispel mistrust that is due to the illiteracy and ignorance of the public. The only antidote is to intensify educational and informative actions on behalf of the citizens themselves who are prisoners of their own false beliefs. Consequently, there are calls for enhanced and expanded science education, "so that the quality of the public's thinking can be elevated and their impressionable vulnerability to such confusion may be reduced" (ibid: p. 125).

Because of this information deficit (Irwin, 2001) citizens cannot participate directly in scientific and technological innovations but must be represented by the state or by firms. So, the ties between scientists and the public are indirect. Citizen *demands* are mediated by the state, which represents citizens and their will, and of firms, which comply with these demands. Science and technology are thus autonomous but not independent; individuals also take part who, either as citizens or as consumers, delegate the satisfaction of their expectations and demands to intermediaries who are in direct contact with scientists (Callon, 1999B).

New citizenship

These thoughts on liberal and scientific citizenship still stay at the level of the nation-state. However, the role and capacities of the nation-state are also highly contested in

Therefore, politics is an allocative or economic kind of activity, operating in a world of scarce values. (Warren, 1992)

liberal thought. Along these lines of liberal thought we can also identify a recent trend in European citizenship which perceives the political subjects of the European Union as *workers* (Rumford, 2003, p. 29) and as *consumers* (Carlos, 2001, p.197). According to Schnapper, the proponents of this ‘new citizenship’ stress the idea that the participation in a political community is no longer essential but what has become important in the life of the community is economic and social participation. Accordingly, true membership in the community is no longer defined by political participation but by economic activity (Schnapper, 1997). The purely political nature of citizenship has been linked to the time when nationalism and nation-states were established. At those times, that is, in the 19th century the national states and their ‘new’ citizens were freed from the bonds inherited from a feudal society. In a similar manner, states Schnapper, the proponents of “new citizenship” argue that the construction of Europe today means liberating economic actors from the restrictions imposed by national borders. National citizenship thus no longer provides legal status and rights by itself. European institutions today are building a new citizenship which is based on economic and social rights and, in turn, the impact of these rights also affects the political status of the individual (ibid. p. 206). In the light of this position, a new conception of citizenship is being elaborated, which is no longer based on the juridical and political relationship between individuals and the state but is founded instead on the set of social values and practices and guaranteed by EU institutions.

We could see that while discussing liberal political citizenship, scientific citizenship in the ‘Public Educational Model’ and ‘new citizenship’ in relation with the European Union they all share a common ground in *devaluing the political side of citizenship* and offering models for participation which are more akin to a *client or consumer relation*. Accordingly, the most common critical remark on liberalism is that it gives too much attention to privacy and

individual rights and too little to fostering the public virtues that lead people to do their duties as citizens.³⁷

However, it also has to be acknowledged that liberal theory recently has also given much prominence to the strong propensity of individuals to combine into groups to constitute a civil society that is more or less distinct from both individuals and the state (Schuck, 2002, p. 134-136). Consequently, individuals sharing common interests and values coalesce into groups to further their private interests and shape governmental decisions. The ‘pluralist’ idea, however, remains in the framework of market-based understanding of politics conceiving the interaction as a bargaining process between groups.

By the same token, citizens can also take a more active part and organise themselves around issues connected to science and technology to see their preferences fulfilled. In this model it would be possible through collective action by which people can promote their interest more effectively than they could as individuals (Laird, 1993). Therefore, individuals, who already share a broad sense of values and preferences, work together to develop a coherent voice. As we can see, these voluntary groups presuppose a more active type of citizenship but in this model citizens essentially remain ‘consumers’ outside the realm of science and technology in the making. As Hamlett puts it:

“In political science terminology, these are forms of interest aggregation and interest articulation, that is, ways in which individuals who share common points of view can find each other, discuss their common concerns, and organize to influence policy. Contemporary disputes about science and technology – and most other areas of policy conflict – often involve such advocacy groups, each pressing its own position, values and preferences (Hamlett, 2003, p. 121-122).”

³⁷ It means that it may also be that liberal cultures tend to discourage certain forms of political participation. Liberal polities do not merely permit their citizens to retreat into their private pursuits; liberal ideology affirmatively valorises the privatisation of personality, commitment, and activity. Liberal market economies, moreover facilitate the pursuit of wealth and the indulgence of material pleasures. This does not only leave less time for politics but also diminishes the social prestige that such activities enjoy relative to wealth-seeking and consumption.

We can see how these ideas about civil society and voluntary association open a door to political intervention even in the liberal theory which presupposes the self and the preferences of the citizens as pre-given and pre-political. However, the challenges of European integration, in particular, and globalisation, in general also mean difficulty to these groups. Markoff argues that although the European Union shows a strong commitment to democratic values, this body nevertheless poses a challenge to democratisation (Markoff, 1999, p. 21).

“This is because the developments of democratic freedoms and social practices have, since the eighteen century, been accompanied by the activities of social movements that have placed pressure ‘from below’ upon government bodies, making them accountable to the people. As more governmental power shift upwards, above the level of the national state, the capacity of social movements to exercise influence decreases (ibid. p. 21).”

The question of how organised groups of scientific citizens can stress their interests at a transnational level still remained unanswered. Although the concept of ‘civil society’ does appear in various EU documents with high expectations attached to it³⁸, the European civil society is embryonic and is not embraced to the same extent as nationally contained civil societies (Rumford, 2003, p. 33). So the movements of ‘scientific citizens’ are faced with the same challenges as other movements that strive to reinvent democracy and the possibility of shaping policies at a transnational level. So the task to find an answer to the question of ‘how can the shift of power from national to European arenas propel the reorientation of strategies, tactics, organization and identities’(Markoff, 1999, p. 40) is given to these movements.

³⁸ „The development of a European civil society has been identified by the EU as a solution to the problem of democratic deficit and a means through which transnational governance can be secured. The role allotted to civil society is to mediate between the national and the supranational, thereby connecting national society to transnational governance.” (Rumford, 2003, p. 32)

3.4. The Republicanism, Self-government and the Co-production of Knowledge³⁹

Republican citizenship

Dagger argues that the republican theory is based on the premise that in a republic the government of the state or society is a public matter, and people rule themselves. Therefore, there are two essential elements of republicanism which are *publicity* and *self-government* (Dagger, 2002, p. 146).

Publicity generally means that politics as the public's business must be conducted openly, that is, in public. However, the definition of public is as ambiguous as it is in liberal theory. In Dagger's opinion, the public is a sphere of life with its own claims and considerations. What makes something public is that it involves people as members of a community or polity. Despite the unclear borders between private and public all republicans believe that there is something enriching about public life. Public life draws people out and it draws them together in a community. Being involved in public life, that is, practising an active form of citizenship can help hidden capabilities and talents to appear.

Self-government means that if citizens are to be self-governing, they cannot be subject to absolute or arbitrary rule. Citizens therefore must be subject to rule of law, in other words, the government of laws. But what makes republican citizens self-governing is that they have a voice in making these laws. They do not just pursue their own personal interest but as law-makers and at the same time addressees of these laws they take an active part by shaping the life of the community actively. Therefore self-government is marked in the republican theory as a form of freedom. This kind of freedom, however,

³⁹ It is important to note that the expression of 'co-production' in STS generally signifies the co-production of scientific-technological and social elements of our world. Here, however, the concept is used in a narrower sense only referring to a specific kind of knowledge co-produced by both lay-people and specialists. For the general use of the concept see: (Jasanoff, 2004)

requires dependence upon the law so that citizens may be independent of the arbitrary will of others (ibid. p. 147).

In line with these principles, from the republican point of view, citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal dimension. In contrast with liberal thought, republican theorists regard citizenship as an *ethos*: as a way of life which requires commitment to the common good and active participation in public affairs, in other words, it requires civic virtue (ibid. p. 149).

That is not to say that republicans denigrate the legal aspect rather they stress that it is necessary but not sufficient. It requires the supplement of the ethical dimension, arguing that every citizen 'holds an office', that is, they hold a position of public responsibility. This largely neglected ethical dimension means that there are standards which can be built into the concept of citizenship. The republican form of citizenship therefore is not an empty form like the liberal one in which liberal citizens can decide what kind of citizens they want to be when they fill in the legal framework of rights. The republican ideal contains an explicit commitment to standards stressing the public nature of citizenship. These standards can be found in two different principles. The first one is mainly concerned with the ideal-type of good citizen who is a public-spirited person putting the interests of the community ahead of personal interests. The second one refers to civic involvement, that is, citizens should take an active part in public affairs and try to take a well-informed and public-spirited part in the conduct of the public's business, in other words, in politics (ibid. p. 150). The republican standards embedded in the ethical dimension of citizenship thus provide an implicit ideal of what a citizen should be. In contrast, the liberal citizens must decide what kind of citizens they want to be, including the possibility that they will forswear political activity all together (Schuck, 2002, p. 137).

As we can see the republican ideal stresses the importance of participation in politics in which participation is contributing to the publicity of this business and enhances the self-

governing capacity of the political community. Apart from this, argues Dagger, two further dimensions of citizenship must be highlighted here the *integrative* dimension on the one hand, and the *educative* dimension on the other (Dagger, 2002, p. 150).

Dagger states that participation in republican theories is conceived as an *integrative experience* which brings together the multiple role activities of the contemporary person and demands that the separate roles be surveyed from a general point of view. That means that one should simply set aside personal interests to follow the general will one has as a citizen, that is, one has no interests except as a member of the public. To be able to do that we have to have at least some kin of understanding of the personal interests of the people involved. The activity of citizenship is helped by debates and the exchange of views and ideas in order to provide this understanding and it enables the individual to integrate the various roles he or she plays, and it integrates individuals to the community (ibid. pp. 150-151).

The *educational dimension* is focusing on the process of how active citizenship educates people by drawing out abilities that might otherwise remain untapped or unfulfilled. Active citizenship widens individuals' horizons and deepens their sense of how their lives are involved with others', including the lives of people who are unknown to them (Laird, 1993, p. 349). This way participation works to overcome individualism by fostering the individual's sense of himself or herself as a part of, rather than apart from, the public (Dagger, 2002, p. 151). What should be emphasised about these two dimensions is that the autonomy of the people here is not presupposed as conceived in liberal theory as a pre-political capacity and maximised by clear separations of private and public sphere. Rather, they stress that democratic participation has a unique capacity to foster and develop autonomy, a key element of self-governance (Warren, 1992, p. 10-11.)

This account is very much in line with ‘Co-production of Knowledge Model’ developed by Callon (Callon, 1993). In the ‘Public Educational Model’, there was a clear-cut boundary between specialists and citizens who can only influence the developments of science and technology through the state or the market. In contrast, argues Callon, this model “tends to overcome these limits by actively involving lay people in the creation of knowledge concerning them” (ibid. p. 89). In this sense, this model is reminiscent of the self-governing community of the republican thought by depicting a situation in which citizens work in close collaboration with specialists and can investigate problems which are important for them and produce situated knowledge (Haraway, 1999) or devices (Verheul & Vergragt, 1995) for themselves.

Callon acknowledges, however, the differences between diverse fields of knowledge but he argues that these differences can be integrated in this model (Callon, 1999B). The creative tensions between the standardised and universal knowledge on the one hand, and the knowledge that takes into account the complexity of singular local situations on the other, are put into play in a situation which is laden by the authority of scientists. The two forms of knowledge are the common by-product of a *single* process in which the different actors, both specialist and non-specialist, work in close collaboration. Accordingly, there is constant dynamic interaction between lay people and specialists, yet this does not mean, argues Callon, that there is no division of tasks between them (ibid. pp. 89-90). Scientific knowledge production continues to play a dominant role but it is not separated from the citizens like in the ‘Public Educational Model’.

Accordingly, in this case the public does not mean the uninformed and ignorant masses of people but the association of a group of volunteers involved in collective actions. The members of a ‘concerned’ group share a specific kind of identity due to their common fate like human beings struck by the same disease. So for Callon, the exemplary

relationship of this model is between patient and specialist who are striving together to find the cure for a special disease. Because the patients are so important in the process of knowledge production through their collective action they can change their roles from passive participants to active agents, becoming ‘obligatory points of passage’ in the research process. Callon argues that “Being directly involved on a necessary collective basis these activist groups may, in certain circumstances, play a leading role in the production, orientation and evaluation of knowledge” (ibid. p. 91). Under these circumstances, it is possible to talk of collective learning, since the different knowledge is reciprocally enriching throughout the course of its co-production.

In the STS canon there are many case studies related to the ‘Co-production of Knowledge Model’, however, in the following passages only two case studies will be touched upon. The most widespread example is probably the case study of AIDS patients written by Epstein (Epstein, 1995). These patients are reported to have changed the course and procedures of medical research and transformed it in order to reflect their interests, values and life situations. However, Epstein also underlines that there were growing tensions in the movement between “lay-expert” activists who acquired scientific knowledge in order to put across their arguments and the “lay-lay” activists whom the former represented.⁴⁰ Some felt that their fellow activists were ‘going native’ and start to

⁴⁰ At first sight, in this case study we can see the general problem of ‘representation’. There are appointed people, spokespersons and those on behalf of whom they speak. When the spokespersons meet the needs of their job, the gap between them and those whom they represent is widening. So the basic question is whether the spokespersons always truly represent the group on whose behalf they speak. However, in STS and particularly in Actor-Network Theory the situation is a little bit more difficult because both things, both people can be represented, sometimes even by the same person. As Latour puts it: “The spokesperson is someone who speaks for others who, or which, do not speak. For instance a shop steward is a spokesman. If the workers were gathered together and they all speak at the same time there would be a jarring cacophony. No more meaning could be retrieved from the tumult than if they had remained silent. That is why they designate (or are given) a delegate who speaks on their behalf, and in their name. (...) For everything that follows, it is very important not to limit this notion of spokesperson and not to impose any clear distinction between ‘things and ‘people’ in advance. (...) ...in practice, there is not much difference between people and things: they both need someone to talk for them. From the spokesperson’s point of view there is thus no clear distinction to be made between representing people and representing things. In each case the spokesperson literally does the talking for who or what cannot talk” (Latour, 1987, pp. 71-72).

represent the values of science more than the interests of the members of movement (Epstein, 1995).⁴¹

Iles (Iles, 2004) also writes about a co-production process between two chemical plants industry and local people.⁴² In this case, citizens were able to convert the standardised, quantitative information into site-specific information that plants could use for pollution prevention. At the end of the shared work of the specialists and the local people, both plants “reluctantly” decided to reduce the emissions targeted by activists to demonstrate progress and improved relations.

In addition, Callon emphasises that the participation in these collective actions has effects on one’s self (Callon, 1999B). In contrast with the stable and pre-political subject of liberal theory, in this model participation also constructs a new, reconfigured identity which gives access to social recognition. This constructed and negotiated identity, together with the knowledge and techniques compromising it, maintain a completely original relationship with science.⁴³ Therefore, the legitimacy of this common enterprise, through which new knowledge and new identities are jointly created, relies entirely on the ability of the groups concerned to gain recognition for their actions.⁴⁴

This case study thus can also be interpreted from an ANT point of view as a shift of representation from people to the things in the laboratory. According to this perspective, the spokespersons became so immersed in the scientific claims and arguments that they started to represent the ‘things’ which are visualized on the shop floor of the laboratory instead of holding out for their fellow-members of the movement.

⁴¹ Also it might be interesting to read Feenberg’s interpretation on this case study in: (Feenberg, 1999)

⁴² A similar, more theoretical approach in relation with these issues: (Frankenfeld, 1992)

⁴³ See also: (Lee & Roth, 2003)

⁴⁴ Similarly, Ellis and Waterton examine the recent attempts to enrol volunteer naturalists in the United Kingdom into biodiversity action planning which can be based on the exchange of knowledge of nature among the different communities involved (policy makers, naturalists, lay citizens). However, according to the authors, the project was not successful in terms of integrating different knowledge forms because the rich ascetic and ethical relationships between nature and volunteer naturalist were not taken into account from an official point of view. Moreover, these volunteers were not certain how the information gathered by them would be used. However, Ellis and Waterton concluded that: “...it is not necessary for the policy domain to attempt to incorporate all the rich diversity of knowledge/practices amongst the contributing citizenry. It is important, however, that the policy domain find ways of recognising the selective nature of its appropriation of its parts of volunteer identities/knowledge/practices. This is because such recognition

We could see the similarities between the republican ideal of the self-governing community who create their own laws and live according to them and to the ideal of the 'Co-production of Knowledge' in which citizens produce scientific knowledge for themselves. Both accounts emphasise the importance of participation for individual self-development. Moreover both approaches presuppose small, homogenous communities. These communities must be organised around a local site or around a similar life situation like in the case of people who are involved in a medical experiment and who are struck by the same disease. However, the question emerges whether we can perceive our societies as the sum of small, homogenous communities.

Consequently, republican theories are usually criticised on the grounds of complexity and plurality. It can be argued that republican conceptions of citizenships are no longer realistic because they presuppose the existence of small, homogenous communities which can literally come together to discuss the problems at issue and elaborate common solutions which are acceptable for all. This picture is no longer true for societies which are complex, fragmented along different heterogeneous subcultures and, therefore, inherently pluralistic. Therefore, a common critique against republican conceptions is that they pose a threat to an open, pluralistic and egalitarian society. Republican attempts to establish a 'civic public' can be seen as a denial of difference on account of the practical prerequisite that every participant should leave behind his particularity and difference, to adopt a universal standpoint identical to all citizens, the standpoint of the common good or general will (Dagger, 2002, p. 154). Liberal accounts can be seen as a good solution for preserving difference and plurality by aggregating preferences without trying to unify them into a common, singular standpoint.

itself would help to maintain the tenuous balance between subjective identities and the wider senses of belonging and constraint that make up 'citizenship'." (Ellis&Waterton, 2004, p. 103)

In a similar manner, De Wilde (De Wilde, 1997) criticises the advocates of democratisation of science and technology issues. Firstly, he argues that the whole “strong” democracy project is hopeless because it is not clear how a society that is the product of social transformation showing no respect for place can become strongly attached again to local settings. Secondly, he argues that those who believe in the compatibility of democracy, community and technology mix a ‘territorial’ meaning of the community with a ‘relational’ one. However, he continues, conflating relational and territorial meanings of community makes it difficult to shy away from “romantic localism”. Thus, in his opinion, ‘local’ loyalties are more important than others for pro-democrats. However, in his view, democracy in our age, which is not attached to this kind of pastoral meaning, means managing the co-existence of differences and preserving pluralism in a society.

Reconsidered national citizenship

If these republican accounts have been criticised because of their insensitivity to the complexity and plurality of modern societies even at the nation-state level, we can understand that they are ‘out of the game’ when debates are about the ideal form of European citizenship. Nobody argues along classical republican lines of argument because the implementations of its ideals are no longer feasible. This way, the self-governing character of local, small, homogenous communities is remarkable and exemplary but one suspects that these communities will remain exceptions rather than become the general rule.

However scholars, like Schnapper (Schnapper, 1997) and Miller (Miller, 1995), argue against the decoupling of the nation state and citizenship because the relationship between them ensures the participation in a more or less definite political community. Schnapper, for example, stresses the point that citizenship must today remain both a principle of legitimacy and a source of social bonds, because it is the only one to conform

to the characteristics and requirements of modern democratic society. This is only possible if citizenship keeps its national character even if it integrates population otherwise divided by their different ethnic, religious, and cultural origins (Schnapper, 1997, pp. 212-218).

Schnapper also points out that there is actually no European citizenship existing independently of national citizenship. For example, he argues, European elections currently carry a political significance that is primarily national in nature. The creation of a truly European citizenship would imply that a European public realm needs to be established first in which individuals would consider themselves full-fledged citizens. This political arena common to all European citizens would be needed, organised around European stakes, debates and institutions.

Nevertheless, according to Schnapper, this is far from becoming reality and the possibility of realising it in the foreseeable future is questionable. So, although the nation-state and national citizenship does not meet the requirements of the republican ideal of a self-governing community at least to some extent it guarantees the possibility of participation for citizens. Schnapper argues that the civic principle might fade away in the course of the construction of Europe and that the ensuing depolitisation will weaken the political will of Europeans (p. 217). Yet, the question for them is not how to create a new citizenship at a transnational level but how the relationship between nationalism, state and citizenship should be reconstructed to rescue national citizenship (Tambini, 2001, pp. 211-212). This may be true for the 'scientific citizens' who have less means to affect decisions at a transnational level than at the national political arena. However, two points are worth mentioning here.

Firstly, while it may seem that local homogenous communities are exceptions in a pluralised, complex society, the significant part of Feenberg's theoretical work deals with the problem of participation (Feenberg, 1999). He does not question that local

communities have less and less power to affect the development and operation of large technological systems. Yet, he argues that new homogenous communities are emerging in these very technological systems that are able to reformulate and change these systems from the inside. The systematic character of modern technology which makes political action unavailing at a local level, on the flip side of the coin, helps new communities⁴⁵ to organise themselves and protest effectively against the present form of these systems and change them. Accordingly, Feenberg argues that dispersed though these homogenous communities might be, they are still able to muster and allocate political power by using technological systems (Feenberg, 1999). This can represent one way of how the republican ideal can be preserved under the conditions of a complex and diverse transnational society like the EU. It is conceivable that the Internet will become a means of 'self-organisation' and 'self-government' for these communities even across language barriers and national borders of emerging transnational entities such as the EU.

Secondly, Jasanoff and Martello (Jasanoff&Martello, 2004) depict a completely different situation about the dynamics of the local and the transnational. Far from suggesting that local communities are losing political power against transnational institutions or technological systems they show how local communities and locality in general is gaining new power in the transnational arena. This does not mean, however, that locality remains the same in this process. In transnational negotiations, locality itself becomes a discursive token which is used by various actors to put across their points. Moreover, the irony of the process is that while local communities strive for preserving their local culture or their local environment, they have to present their case and stress their interests in transnational arenas.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Feenberg, for example, stresses the important role that the Internet and the mailing lists played in helping people in a similar life position/problem to find each other and organize themselves.

⁴⁶ This was the case in the Zengő debate as well which was about a radar system intended to be installed in a nature reserve area and close to local communities. The local community first commenced local demonstrations, then prompted a national debate and finally the issue was at a transnational level taken up by members of the European Parliament. (Kiraly, 2005)

So, one of these two views stresses that local communities are no longer able to have any effects on or change technological systems; while the other shows how these local communities, by virtue of their being local, are increasingly becoming empowered in transnational negotiations. However they have one thing in common, namely, they both show that local, homogenous communities take a different form under conditions of a technological society. This way, both approaches stress that the republican ideal for ‘scientific citizens’ takes a different form in complex societal constellations. These two accounts express two different forms of how these ‘scientific citizens’ can instigate political action on the basis of the homogenous communities even at the complex level of a diverse transnational society like the EU.

3.5. Complexity and Participation

*Deliberative citizenship*⁴⁷

In the following part I shall discuss how Habermas tried to deal with the tension between the liberal and the republican account.⁴⁸ He suggests that the main problem with the republican account is that it is too idealistic and that it makes the democratic process dependent on the virtues of citizens. It is often said that there is a moral overburdening of the citizen in this theory considering the fact that the members of a political community have to meet time to time to discuss, debate and thereby give legitimacy to decisions and laws which have bearing on them. In line with this, only those decisions can be

⁴⁷ In this section I will also discuss Habermas’ ideas and relate them to the issues of science & technology. However, it is important to mention that Habermas’ *Between Facts and Norms* is about law and based on the assumption that law is anchored in the lifeworld. This implies a special problem since although complexity can be understood as a characteristic of both law and science & technology, the latter represents a totally different logic and understanding of the world and seemingly has neither direct nor indirect relationship with the lifeworld. I shall not reflect on this problem in depth since it is outside the scope of this paper.

⁴⁸ Habermas’ work is very complex and discusses the problems of deliberation and legitimacy on many different levels. However, here I cannot do justice to his internally complex and sophisticated account. I would only restrict myself to show how the theorist tries to solve the problem of participation in a differentiated and complex society. Moreover, because of space limit I would not discuss concepts such as

considered legitimate with which everyone who is affected by it would agree. In contrast, the liberal account interprets the process of politics as mere aggregation of pre-given interests ignoring the question of legitimacy, which cannot be administratively produced but can only emerge discursively from the everyday life contexts of the members of a political community. In this way, Habermas distinguishes between two kind of political power: communicative and administrative. According to his ideas, political processes should be analysed not just from within an action-theoretical but also a systems-theoretical perspective.

On the one hand, the action-theoretical perspective, related to the republican ideal, would consist of the discussion about the role of citizens in influencing the political system via opinion- and will-formation. The communicative power emerges from the public sphere where discussions take place about the issues of everyday life connected to the wider socio-political context.

On the other hand, the system-based perspective, which can be related to the legal liberal account, would show the projects by which legislature, judiciary and administration are dealing with every day. From this perspective we can see the self-propelling nature of political processes in complex societies in which citizens only take part by casting their vote which, in turn, serve as a basis for the aggregation of their preferences reflecting their interests. Therefore, the tension is between the systematic, self-maintaining character of our political-systems, on the one hand, and the question of meaningful participation, on the other (Habermas, 1997).

At the same time, these two contrasting approaches form a part of his theory of procedural democracy with a view to answering the question of how the complexity of

'ideal speak situation' and the 'facticity and normativity of law', concepts which are at the centre of his work and characterise the basis of the following model.

modern societies can be reconciled with participation and the ideal of a self-governing community?

Regh and Bohman (Regh&Bohman, 2002) while introducing Habermas' ideas on procedural democracy, argue that if a theory wants to deal with this complexity, in other words, if it wants to link deliberation and decision-making with the citizenry, it must hold together three terms in a certain tension. The first problem refers to the situation when deliberation relegated so much to representatives that it would be difficult to call the account "democratic". Secondly, the opposite error would be to underestimate complexity and locate deliberation primarily in the public sphere. A third problem would be to overestimate the possibilities of bureaucratic control, thereby undermining popular sovereignty and the public control of decisions. The problems of complexity are best represented by the dilemma of the deliberative approach:

"...either decision-making institutions gain effectiveness at the cost of democratic deliberation, or they retain democracy at the cost effective decision-making. In either case, citizenship, deliberation, and decision-making fail to be linked, so that the public sphere becomes powerless or the power of political institutions become reified (ibid. p. 37)"

To reconcile the different notions of political process, Habermas argues that the democratic process must be connected to the peripheral network of political public sphere in pursuing legitimacy (Habermas, 1996). What does this claim mean? According to his theory, deliberative politics extends beyond the formally organised political system to a vast communication network which is called public sphere. This model of deliberative politics tries to grasp the process of opinion- and will-formation as a "two-track" process in which there is a division of labour between "weak" publics and "strong" publics (Baynes, 2002). The "weak" publics refers to the informally organised public sphere ranging from private association to the mass media located in civil society and the "strong" publics formed by the parliamentary bodies and other formally organised institutions of the political system.

“The constitutionally structured political system is internally differentiated into spheres of administrative and communicative power and remains open to the lifeworld. For institutionalised opinion and will-formation depends on supplies coming from the informal contexts of communication found in the public sphere, in civil society, and in spheres of private life. In other words, the political action system is embedded in lifeworld contexts (Habermas, 1996, p. 352).”

In this division of labour the role of the “weak” publics is not to take over the steering functions of the administrative organs of the “strong” public but to bear the responsibility of identifying and interpreting social problems in a way which is translatable into the language of formally organised political institutions. As Habermas puts it:

“To this extent, the public sphere is a warning system with sensors that, though, unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society. From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes. Besides the ‘signal’ function, there must be an effective thematization. The capacity of the public sphere to solve problems on its own is limited (Habermas, 1996, p. 352).”

The central concept here therefore is problematisation which means that the dispersed networks of the public sphere are able to perceive, discuss and redefine problems in a new way. This is not possible for administrative complexes with their operation logic oriented towards effectiveness due to the fact that these are

“...institutions that decide under time pressure have a weak capacity to detect latent problems (...) And they have little initiative to stage newly emergent problems in a successful and dramatic manner (p. 358).”

The model in which all these different aspects of modern political life could be integrated is called ‘sluice-gate’ which introduces a more fine-grained analysis of this relation between publics with a distinction between “center” and “periphery” which can be identified with the “weak and strong” publics respectively. Processes of communication and decision-making thus lie along a center-periphery axis, they are structured by a system

of “sluices”. The idea of discourse democracy is that for decisions made at the core to be legitimate, they must be steered by communication flows that start at the periphery and pass through the sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures situated at the entrance to the parliamentary complex or to the courts (Habermas, 1996, pp. 354-359).

For the most part, operations in the core area of political system proceed according to routines following established patterns (*ibid.* p. 357). The decisive question in the model is whether the periphery is capable of discovering, identifying and thematising in a way which can disturb and, in turn, change the normal pattern and procedures of operation of institutions in the core (Némedi, 2004). This could happen when perception of problems and problem situations have taken a conflictual turn and controversies in the broader public sphere primarily ignite around the normative aspects of the problems most at issue.

To sum up, Habermas tries to solve the problem of participation by locating popular sovereignty in the diffuse network of public spheres.⁴⁹ The public distribution of information and perspectives could be viewed as harbouring a kind of communicative rationality, but not in the idealised sense that requires complete understanding on the part of each citizen. The complexity of public spheres suggests a plethora of loosely connected and fragmented discourses in which various groups of individuals achieve partial insights into issues through discussion (Regh & Bohmann, 2002, p. 40). This account presents public reason as an emergent property of a diffused network of discourses. The programmatic message of this theory therefore to foster processes of communication and design institutional procedures that at least make it more likely that the political decisions

⁴⁹ For Habermas the preconditions of the emergence of public reason are the ‘ideal speak conditions’ which basically refer to a set of conditions such as unbiased communication, the freedom from coercion, the openness of the debate to all those who are affected and so on. A decision can only be rational if all those who are affected would agree with it under conditions of the ‘ideal speak conditions’. This is the principle of universalization.

These ideal conditions are contrafactual in the sense that they cannot be found in real life, however, according to Habermas they are anchored in language and can be partly found in the lifeworld, to put it more clearly, in the communicative practices of public sphere.

“will be based on reasons that would contrafactually correspond to those emerging from a discourse both open to all and free of coercion” (p. 41).

To link this back with the question of citizenship, it is obvious that Habermas’ main goal is not to introduce a new kind of citizenship⁵⁰ but to understand how the ideal of a self-governing community can be preserved under conditions of complex, differentiated societies. To be able to do this he locates popular sovereignty in the communication flows of the dispersed networks of the public sphere. By doing this, he can address three theoretical problems. Firstly, he does not have to identify a “body” of the citizens who discuss the decisions affecting their life but he can transpose this task to the operation of this ‘subjectless communication’ (Habermas, 1997, p. 58).

“This fully dispersed sovereignty is not even embodied in the heads of the associated members. Rather, if one can still speak of ‘embodiment’ at all, then sovereignty is found in those subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion and will-formation in such a way that their fallible outcomes have the practical reason on their side (p. 58-59).”

Secondly, this way he can also deal with the question of plurality by presupposing different public spheres along the lines of different life circles, subcultures and social situations. The dispersed but connected network of public spheres can deal with the question of participation in fundamentally heterogeneous communities which characterise modern societies.

Thirdly, because he presupposes that public spheres are not organised by the goal-oriented logic but by the communicative logic of mutual understanding, he depicts these spheres as relatively open for everybody who wants to take part in discussions about problematised issues. This way, he also gives an answer to the question of equal

⁵⁰What I mean here is that Habermas’ main focus is not on the attributes and the virtues of individual citizens instead he constructs them as members of a special community, that is, as members of the dispersed network of public spheres. The characteristics of individual citizens can only be re-constructed indirectly from his texts.

participation of citizens because, theoretically, via the networks of public spheres everyone can affect the decision and policy-making in issues which are important for him or her.

Accordingly, Habermas' theory calls for 'deliberative citizens' who participate in these communication networks which partly possess the prerequisites of the unsubverted and unbiased communication situation. Citizens have to take part in the public deliberations to develop active citizenship. In the course of these deliberations different problems can be identified and solutions can be proposed. The outcome of these deliberations are being channelled into the political centre which needs these deliberations to justify its decisions, thereby gaining legitimacy for them. The deliberative citizen can and should, therefore, generate communicative power linked to problematic issues which can counter-balance the self-maintaining character of the administrative power. This way, the centre of his theory is not the actual relationship between citizens and the administration but the relation between public spheres and the administration. So the main question is how institutions which can affectively channel in opinions generated in the public spheres can be established.⁵¹ Using Habermas' own words:

“According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalised deliberative processes with informally developed public opinions (Habermas, 1996, p. 298).”

⁵¹ “According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalised deliberative processes with informally developed public opinions.”

As far as science and technology are concerned, various ‘participatory technology assessment’ projects⁵² are faced with similar problems and dilemmas (Castro & Menéndez, 2003). Nonetheless, Callon (Callon, 1999B) elaborated his third model⁵³ in relation with these initiatives. He calls this model the ‘Public Debate Model’ referring to the dialogical nature of these participatory arrangements. As Hamlett (Hamlett, 1992, p. 122) argues, these processes involve individuals who have diverse values and preferences. These deliberations do not refer to the position of an interest group but rather reflect a reasoned, informed, consensual judgment. The participants are trying to reach a consensus from the initial situation which is dominated by diverse and disparate knowledge, values and preferences (Hamlett, 2003, p. 122). Apart from this, this model also emphasises the educational and psychological effects that the process of deliberation, that is, the participatory activity has on the participants. According to Laird:

“Direct participation theory (...) places a strong emphasis on the effects of participation on those who engage in it. Truly democratic participation changes the outlooks and attitudes of the participants. (...) Interests are not seen as unchanging black boxes; they are affected sometimes profoundly, by the experience of participation. Democratic processes should engender in people longer time horizons and broader scope in thinking about what their interests are. In short, democracy enables people to become fully developed citizens (Laird, 1993, p. 354).”

Furthermore, this model emphasises dialogue and proposes richer relations between lay people and scientists. Callon argues that in this model the public is depicted as a container of specific, particular and concrete knowledge and competencies. When citizens mobilise

(Habermas, 1996, p. 298)

⁵² In the past decades we have seen a growing interest in establishing these kinds of deliberative institutions in relation with science and technology. The general idea behind it was to establish institutions which can help to channel the citizens’ opinions to help the process of decision-making and legislation. The vanguards in this trend were the Danish and Dutch ‘Participatory Technology Assessment’ projects whose models have spread all over Europe by now (EUROPTA, 2000).

⁵³ Originally it was the second model in Callon’s article but because of the line of argument in my essay I changed the order.

these fields of knowledge in the public arenas they can enhance the abstract and inhuman knowledge of the scientists.

While scientific knowledge has a universal value here as well, it is incomplete and restricted because it is constructed under controlled circumstances and the conditions of its validity are restricted to the laboratory. Accordingly, reality is always overflowing laboratory-produced knowledge which cannot absorb the full complexity and richness of the world. In that sense, scientists are also limited by the narrowness of their specialty and are therefore as powerless as the laypersons when addressing ethical, social or economic issues. Since, Callon argues, science is at best incomplete, at worst unrealistic, it is advisable to open forums for discussion and deliberation to allow for a broader perspective to be incorporated (Callon, 1993, pp. 85-86). Deliberation thus can serve as a process which keeps diverse fields of knowledge together and allows for actors to widen their own limited and fallible perspectives by drawing on each other's knowledge, experience and capabilities (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003). To use Irwin's expressions, these political forms might help to steer expert-based science to the direction of a more 'citizen-based science' (Irwin, 1995).

So, these procedures by establishing public arenas for debate tend to muddle the usual boundaries between specialists and non-specialists. Firstly, because deliberation is itself seen as a process for becoming informed and for receiving continuous education and training so as to become 'better citizens' by the very act of participation (Elam & Bertilsson, 2003, p. 242) Secondly, because this viewpoint calls for knowledge which is generated by the comparison of opinions, knowledge and judgements which are mutually enriching instead of knowledge stemming from an allegedly unerring and self-confident science. In this manner, the construction of public forms of discussion might profoundly transform the process of private and public decision-making. They can provide the opportunity for the different stakeholders to express themselves and establish a minimum

right of access to information. The legitimacy of decisions stems essentially from the consultation and open debate led beforehand (Callon, 1999B, p. 89).

We could see that projects of citizens' involvement may or may not draw on the work of Habermas. Yet, there is a link between the general political theory on deliberation and the theory on deliberations about scientific and technology issues. Apart from this, three parallel points are worth mentioning both in connection with the discursive democracy theory of Habermas and the 'Public Debate Model' of Callon.

It seems important to highlight that both models try to deal with the complexity of our societies by keeping the division of labour between (administrative or techno-scientific) specialists and citizens. The question is, therefore, not about how to dissolve the borders between knowledge fields but how to guarantee the dialogue between them and that the citizens' opinions can become part of and affect the decision-making and legislation processes. In short, the problem is how to keep the option for participation in highly complex societies open without reducing the citizens to consumers or clients. From the viewpoint of these models, it is too idealistic to suppose that the complexity of the political system or of science and technology can be reduced and 'tamed' in order to let 'ordinary' citizens take over the decision-making or the knowledge production. However, my point here is not to query the possibility of these ways of practising general or scientific citizenship. Still, in the contemporary world those processes tend to become even more complex and distant from the context of everyday life instead of losing intricacy.

The second point is the self-restricting⁵⁴ character of theories (Baynes, 2002, pp. 18-19). Habermas argues that the democratic practice must respect the boundaries of the political-administrative and economic subsystems that have become relatively free of the

everyday life context and in this sense “autonomous”. He does not mention science and technology but it is more than likely that he also considers them as partly autonomous sub-systems.⁵⁵ So, according to his theory, the goal of radical democracy is not the democratic organisation of these subsystems, but rather a type of indirect steering of them through the mediation of law. The reason for that lies in the fact that the complexity of these subsystems does not allow for direct intervention of those who lack the necessary knowledge for that. Therefore, Habermas argues that:

“Various symptoms of such a cognitive overburdening of deliberative politics lend support to the assumption (...) that discursive opinion- and will-formation governed by democratic procedures lacks the complexity to take in and digest the operatively necessary knowledge. The required steering knowledge no longer seems to penetrating the capillaries of a communication network whose structures are predominantly horizontal, osmotically permeable, and egalitarian (Habermas, 1996, p. 320).”

Citizens in this way can never directly steer processes either in economy or in science or in technology but can only form opinions about the decisions to be made in the political core.

The third problematic point is that while Habermas criticised the moral over-burdening of the citizen in republican theory he himself morally over-burdens the public spheres. These do not only have to provide access for equal participation to all citizens regardless of social classes, gender, race but they should also be undisturbed and unsubverted from the administrative and economic power. Habermas is aware of this shift of weight in the

⁵⁴ Baynes does not use the expression ‘self-restricting’ to refer to the epistemic standpoint of deliberative theories but as an indication that the political arrangements they promote can only have an indirect effect on the economy.

⁵⁵ In his classical essay titled ‘Technology and Science as Ideology’ Habermas defines technology as the underlying logic of the system in contrast with the logic of mutual understanding characterising the lifeworld. This encourages me to presume that science and technology are also partly autonomous subsystems consisted by the system in general.

However, the “real” picture is a little more complicated than this statement in the case of sciences. In one of his early books he distinguishes between the ‘empirical-analytical’, the ‘hermeneutical’ and ‘critical sciences’. According to this distinction only the empirical-analytical sciences could be defined as part of the system because of their close relationship to technology and technological logic. The other two could be more closely related to the lifeworld. See more about this matter: (Habermas, 1971, 1972)

normative framework of his theory but he maintains that public spheres have the potential to meet these high expectations.

“As we have seen, democratic procedures should produce rational outcomes insofar as opinion-formation inside parliamentary bodies remains sensitive to the results of a surrounding informal opinion-formation in autonomous public spheres. No doubt this second assumption of an unsubverted political public sphere is unrealistic; properly understood, however, it is not utopian in the bad sense. It would be realized to the extent that opinion-forming associations developed, catalyzed the growth of autonomous public spheres, and, in virtue of the natural visibility such associations enjoy, changed the spectrum of values, issues, and reasons (Habermas, 1997, p. 60).”

As it has been mentioned above, the main question remains how institutions of deliberation, which help to bridge the gap between citizenry and decision-making, can be established. As for science and technology, there have already been various experiments to understand and improve the processes of citizens' involvement in science and technology issues. However, the phenomenon of European integration means a new challenge for these experiments as well and calls for a more complex and more extended version of these arrangements. This is why we can analyse the project of Meeting of Minds as an exemplary project of this approach. But before coming back to further analyse this project I shall discuss the European, 'extended-version' of deliberative citizenship.

Post-national citizenship

Theorists such as Habermas or Delanty argue that a post-national citizenship has to be fostered. Citizenship thus must retain all its political meaning and translate the values that are common to European democracies as expressed through their commitment to human rights (Schnapper, 1997, pp. 209-210). The situation today, that is, the political construction of Europe and the presence of stable and permanent foreign residents forces us to separate the historical link between nationality – as a community of culture – and citizenship – as political practice. Habermas argues that the realm of patriotism should be

separated from the realm of citizenship, thus dissociating the “nation” (the realm of affectivity) from the “state” (“realm of the law”) (Habermas, 2001). He is in favour of the creation of a “constitutional patriotism” which refers to abstract processes and principles presupposing that national identity could be separated from a civic and political participation based on reason and human rights (Schnapper, 1997, p. 210). In this way, both Habermas and Delanty (Habermas 2001; Delanty, 1995) want to create a form of democratic political organisation that would be protected from national and nationalistic passions.

Schnapper is critical of their theories regarding post-national theory as a pure civic practice. She is strongly sceptical of the assumption that a purely civic society, founded on abstract principles, could have the strength to control passions born from allegiances to ethnic and religious groups. Her question is as follows: “Up to which point can intellectual commitment to abstract principles replace the affective and political mobilisation aroused by the internalisation of the national political and cultural tradition (Schnapper, 1997, pp. 211-212).” However, Delanty gives post-national citizenship a different interpretation:

“Post-national citizenship is not to be understood merely as a formal constitutional right. It also embraces a substantive dimension, which empowers citizens with the right to participation in the democratic polity. In this sense it is fundamentally different from national citizenship, which is purely formal. Purely formal notions of citizenship are dangerous since they leave open the possibility for their contents to be filled with populist ideology. Citizenship should be the ultimate basis of legitimation for institution building, not ambiguous cultural identities. It is important that it be linked to participation in the new political institutions that are being create (Delanty, 1995, p. 163).”

In accordance with these thoughts, the construction of Europe could become the forum for democratic political practices, separate from national feelings and passions. This can only happen if a transnational democratic society creates a “communicational” or intersubjective “space” for itself (Schnapper, 1997, p. 217). This implies that, as we could see at a national level, spaces need to exist at a transnational level where citizens,

politicians, and experts can talk to each other about dealing with the problems of community life and arbitrating conflicts between individuals and groups. While Schnapper argues that these spaces, that is, public spheres can only exist if participants at least share a common language, culture, and values, Delanty stresses that the participation in a common democratic polity itself can create a bond between citizens from many different cultural background.

In this case, the scientific citizen's role at a transnational level is not so different than her role at a national level. She has to be informed about and become engaged in discussions and debates about the role and effects of different scientific achievements and technologies on her personal life. The most striking questions are the same as the above-mentioned problems with post-national citizenship. Can participation in common democratic polity transcend national and ethnic affections? Apart from this, the question of the public spheres is even more important. Can public spheres be invented and established at a transnational level where citizens can discuss issues of science and technology? Barry's words implies that they can:

“Public spheres are not just spaces within which opinions and argument can be expressed concerning matters of public importance. Nor they to be valued for their own sake. They are as Habermas's early work suggests, artefacts of certain, no doubt historical specific forms of practical activity. They can be invented, reinvented and disinvente (Barry, 2001, p. 179).”

The project of 'Meeting of Minds' is important not merely because it is the first Technological Assessment project at a transnational, that is, at a European level. It is also very important because it aims to create a common communicative space where citizens, scientists, policy-experts can meet and discuss issues about brain science. This way the projects overall aim is to establish a European public sphere and, as such, refers to the broader political and institutional context of the EU. More precisely, one can even say that the project refers to one way in which the institutional and political context of the EU can be opened up to the wider public, can become more transparent and hence more

democratic. Nonetheless, it is another matter whether it is beneficial to supplement the self-organising characteristics of public spheres with officially organised institutional arrangements. This goes back to Markoff's question of whether democracy organised from 'above' can truly be democratic (Markoff, 1999). However, coming back from social theory to practical arguments, one has to note that this is a small pilot project, thus its significance and effects are limited. The emphasis, therefore, is not on what this project could achieve but rather how the project can deal with problems which are clearly present in a transnational polity as well.

3.6. Précis

In this part of the thesis I attempted to introduce three different kinds of model of the 'academic layer' of citizenship discourse. The three underlying political theories were those of the liberal, the republican and the deliberative models. As far as citizenship is concerned, the chapter provided the description of three strata of each of these models, namely, that of the political, the scientific and the transnational citizenship. This three by three matrix can be clearly illustrated by the extracting diagram below.

Figure 11. The Matrix of citizenship types and theories

<u>Citizenship types</u>	Liberal Theory	Republican Theory	Deliberative Theory
Political Citizenship	Formal, legal framework	Active, involved political subject	Engaged in public discussions
Scientific Citizenship	Public Education Model	Co-production of Knowledge Model	Public Debate Model
Transnational Citizenship	New-citizenship	Reconsidered national citizenship	Post-national citizenship
Agency	Civil society – Voluntary organisations	Self-governing community of citizens	Diffused network of public spheres

To make the further reading easier and easier to understand there is also a short summing up in a written form below about what has been written hitherto. First of all, the liberal model begins with individual freedom which has to be protected from the state and from the actions of other individuals. Thus, citizenship in this model does not contain strong normative values but it is a formal-legal position or framework which can be filled with various value-sets and lifestyles. This model conceives citizens as clients or consumers whose preferences are mirrored by their choices made at the market or at an election. The main task, therefore, is to collect and aggregate these preferences on the one hand, and to get the citizens informed about the possible options on the other. The 'Public Education Model' discussed by Callon (Callon, 1997) is very similar regarding these aspects and translates them to the spheres of science and technology. This model emphasises the 'information deficit' and the problem of citizens' ignorance, which has to be addressed. Moreover, similar ideas also emerged about the issue of transnational citizenship. 'New citizenship' is considered to be a purely economic relationship between the citizen and the governing body of the actual political territory where he or she lives. In their most extreme forms, liberal theories on transnational citizenship regard citizens as merely taxpayers.

Although these citizenship images are closer to consumers or clients than to a politically engaged actor, the political aspects are not missing altogether from the liberal theory. The lobbying activity of voluntary organisations is not at odds with the pluralist versions of liberal theory. Accordingly, these civil organisations are also considered to be important actors at a transnational political level, although one cannot speak about a transnational civil society yet.

Secondly, the republican tradition grasps citizenship not as a formal and static concept but as an active, more substantive dimension of participation in the civic community. According to this account, the community of citizens is considered to be self-governing because after common discussion they create and impose laws on themselves. This

approach is akin to what Callon (Callon, 1999B) calls the 'Co-production of Knowledge Model'. In this model, citizens take part in the making of knowledge or in the innovation process and work in close relationship with specialists. This way, they create their own scientific understanding or technological device for themselves, so the gap between citizens and scientists is getting narrower in this model.

There is no appropriate translation of these ideas to the transnational level because republican ideas in their traditional meaning can only work in the case of small, homogenous communities. However, proponents of a 'reconsidered national citizenship' argue that the only way to save the republican ideals of an active, engaged citizenship is to maintain the link between nation-states and citizenship.

Thirdly, the deliberative model elaborated by Habermas (Habermas, 1996) attempts to reconcile the contradictory elements of these two different approaches. According to this theory, in a complex and plural society it is not possible to go back to the republican ideal of the self-governing community, yet it is essential to keep meaningful participation under the conditions of the systematic characteristics of modern society. Habermas argues that this is possible via the dispersed networks of public spheres where the opinion- and will-formation of the citizens can take place by discussing common matters among themselves. The question is how the results of these deliberative discussions can be channelled into shaping the political system and giving legitimacy to decision-making. Correspondingly, Callon (Callon, 1999B) offers a third model, that is, the 'Public Debate Model' in which citizens take part by discussing scientific issues and forming their own opinion in the course of a deliberative process. The gap between citizens and scientists in the 'Public Debate Model' is bridged by public debates, which have the capability of keeping diverse fields of knowledge together.

Similarly, post-national citizenship developed by Habermas and Delanty (Habermas, 2001; Delanty, 1995) refers to a political practice independent of national affectivity. This

form of transnational citizenship, therefore, implies abstract processes and principles presupposing that national identity could be separated from a civic and political participation based on reason and human rights. According to this form of citizenship, citizens in a new transnational polity would not be linked by race, language or by a culture but by their involvement and participation in the same political community.

After unravelling the ‘academic layer’ of the citizenship discourse, I will move on to discuss the recent trends in fostering a European (scientific) citizenship by focusing on the ‘official discursive layer’. This chapter will not only analyse the identity constructions embedded in the texts in question but will also attempt to show connections between the academic and the policy discursive layer.

The following chapter will turn back the attention to Meeting of Minds by investigating how citizens understand themselves in terms of their role in the project. By analysing interviews, it will be possible to trace not only different roles but also different connections and visions of Europe. Since both Hungarian and Dutch participants were asked to set forth their ideas, the question of how participants from different political cultures could find their place in the process will be also touched upon.

4. OFFICIAL DISCURSIVE LAYER ON CITIZENSHIP

This section highlights the recent trends in fostering a European citizenship by focusing on different documents. The focus will be on four different but interrelated issues. Firstly, drawing on the articles of Chris Shore there will be a section on the conventional strategies to construct the European citizen. After that, I shall discuss and analyse the ‘White Paper of Governance’, which represents a shift from a legal passive citizenship discourse to a more active citizenship ideal. In this paper citizens are conceived to be the active participants in the process of integration and participation in the political decision-making system at all levels. Participation is considered to be a central question and expected to play an essential role in the future European polity. Thirdly, both the ‘Science, Society and the Citizen in Europe’ and the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ refer to this document and try to translate and employ the main ideas of governance to the specific areas of Science and Technology. I shall discuss these in detail highlighting the recently emerging interest in participatory arrangements. Fourthly, in connection with these recent trends this part of the essay will also reflect on the project of ‘Meeting of Minds’ and how the aims and rhetoric of the organisers draw on the broader political context of the European Union.

4.1. Inventing Europeans

In the early years of integration, the questions of European identity and citizenship were not raised. This can be explained at least by two different factors. Firstly, identity and citizenship have crucial importance in a community which is political in its nature. However, integrating Europe was not intended to be a political integration but gained a political dimension later when the economic and legal integration process had already been set in motion. The political dimension has put identity and citizenship on the agenda when high-ranking bureaucrats and leaders understood that Europe could not be built without the consent of their tenants, the European citizens who only exist in official

documents and as a legal status but not in a lived social reality. Secondly, in relation with this aspect, because the integration was mainly imagined as creating a common economic and legal space, it also seemed logical that after the completion of this project people would see each other as partners who work, trade, live and communicate with each other in this common homogenous space. Therefore, citizenship existed as a legal category, as a citizen worker but not as a political category.

Yet, Chris Shore, in his article titled 'Inventing Homo Europaeus', argues that however impressive legal, economic and institutional advances toward a united Europe may happen to be, EU elites significantly failed to create a 'European people' (Shore, 2001, p. 55). There is no such thing as 'European identity' which could provide a basis for cohesion and solidarity in the emerging European state (p. 55). Along with many other theorists, Shore argues that without a 'European public' as a self-recognising category there is no use speaking about democracy and democratic governance in the EU.

“The EU is thus an embryonic state without a nation; an administration without a government. It aspires to be a democracy, but cannot become one until there exists a self-identifying European people or demos. And democracy without a demos is simply *cratos* (power) masked by *telos* (idealism) (ibid. p. 57).”

However, the interest in the cultural integration of Europe and the questions about the role of the citizens in it is far from new. Shore presents how these problems become the domain of special interest in the '80s when there were many different initiatives to construct the European political subject. Before that these problems were put aside as marginal sides of the integration process. The general belief was that the neo-functionalist strategy⁵⁶ would also help to address the problems of cultural integration and European

⁵⁶ The 'neo-functionalist strategy' expression refers to the 'traditional' approach of the EU's architects and founding fathers. This can be described as a process to create a common legal and economic framework for Europe which can be filled with the social-political content later. Moreover, the traditional architects of Europe also thought that it is enough to create this framework and the social-political integration will naturally occur along the lines that they had prescribed beforehand.

identity. The remedy for these problems would have had to emerge as a functional ‘spillover’ of the integration of the spheres of economics and law.

Nonetheless, argues Shore, during the mid 1980s, EU policy-makers had begun to advocate a more interventionist stance by discussing integration as a cultural issue. The solution which these high officials proposed was a series of public awareness and symbolic initiatives to diffuse greater consciousness of shared values and cultural heritage among Europeans. To sum up, the task was to educate and inform the public about Europe.

Shore elaborates the different initiatives and projects which were intended to fulfil this task. Among these the most important ones were the EU-information policy, the attempt to ‘Europeanise’ national education systems and the identification of ‘women’ as the key target for EU culture building activities. According to Shore, the information policy was intended to present Europe to the public as a good product by using information as a tool for nurturing European consciousness. The ‘Europeanisation’ of the national school curricula was most apparent in the process of constructing and rewriting history from a European perspective. The result was that European identity was portrayed as the end product of an evolutionary process, in other words, as the end product of a progressive ascent through history. Shore also emphasises that despite the fact that most of the initiatives were to create a ‘European Man’ as a new kind of political subjectivity without reference to gender differentiation there was also an important gender dimension to the cultural politics of European integration. This was the ‘Women of Europe Award’ aimed to “honour a woman from each Member State who, in the previous two years, helped to increase European integration among the citizens of the European Union.”⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Shore shows that this Award sometimes moved close to a comedy. For example, the overall Award winner in 1996 was Marit Paulsen a Swedish trade union schooled farmer with ten children who was chosen to represent the archetypal ‘European Women’. „Living in a strongly anti-EU area, we are told that ‘Marit fights the elements of snow and cold and the anti-EU feeling with her burning devotion for the European Union, peace, democracy and the rights of people and animals and the preservation of our beautiful European countryside.’” (Shore, 2001, p. 61)

Shore argues that these initiatives illustrate the way in which culture has become increasingly politicised by EU elites in order to ‘construct’ a new political subject for the already on-going process of European integration. These projects are also indicative of the EU’s characteristically top-down, managerial and instrumental approach to ‘culture-building’ and the assumption that ‘European identity’ can somehow be engineered from above (p. 63). This approach was criticised on many points, yet the most important question was what kind of Europe would emerge along these lines. Both Delanty and Shore foresee the emergence of a ‘Fortress Europe’ based on officially engendered common “heritage” and shared cultural values (Shore, 2001; Delanty, 1995). As Shore and Black puts it:

“Yet in order to foster a sense of ‘European identity’ the Commission and the Parliament must promote the values and the virtues of that ‘common cultural heritage’ which they say all Europeans share (however unaware they may be). (...) The result is a highly selective definition of Europe that is politically biased and potentially racist, where ‘European culture’ is equated with ‘Western Civilization’ (as opposed to ‘African barbarism’ or ‘Oriental despotism’, perhaps) whose distinguishing landmarks are Plato, NATO, science and the rule of law (Shore & Black, 1994, p. 294).”

These projects, however, did not prove to be successful in terms of winning the loyalty and affection of the EU’s would-be citizens. Still, the question of “what might form the political and symbolic basis for such a new pattern of identification” (p. 293) remains unanswered. Nevertheless, in the recent EU documents a new trend is emerging which attempts to find an answer from a different viewpoint. These documents, which I shall discuss below, do not intend to inform people about their allegedly common European heritage and values but to construct citizens of Europe by allowing and encouraging them to participate in a new system of governance called EU.

4.2. Changing Forms of Governance

To move from a more general level to more particular issues let me begin with the ‘White Paper of Governance’ released in 2001 (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). After discussing that, I will move further on to the direction of issues about science and technology, that is, I will introduce the ideas of the ‘Science, society and the citizen of Europe’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2000A) working document and the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ (European Commission, 2002). These documents elaborate and apply the issues of governance in the spheres of science and technology. Interestingly enough, these documents signify a very recent development in political thinking, namely, that the question of governance and participation is raised at a transnational level. The emergence of issues such as participation, legitimacy and governance in connection with these arenas reflects a shift in understanding in the way that politics can be conducted. Apart from this ‘brand new’, emerging aspect of EU governance, it is important to note here that all papers are related to each other and all refer to the democratic deficit of Europe in one way or another. This way, they share aims and have similar means to reach them, therefore often contain similar phrases and rhetoric. My aim thus is not to show that these documents are related, because it is obvious that they are. What could be more interesting here is the introduction of the ideas of governance and in relation with it the presentation of the kind of citizen who would take part in shaping policies, form opinions and contribute to integration him or herself.

The ‘White Paper of Governance’ represents politics as a multi-level process steered⁵⁸ by many different actors. The term governance itself refers to new forms of governing and administering public life based on interaction between traditional political authorities and

⁵⁸ Multi-level process means a dynamic relationship between different levels of the EU’s political organisation. These levels are the local, the regional, the national and the European.

“civil society”: private operators, public bodies and citizen groups (Commission of the European Communities, 2000A).

The paper starts with a general problem, that is, the tension between expectations of the people and the role of the EU. The paper argues that although the EU cannot act as effectively and as conspicuously as nation-states, the people expect it to do so. Therefore, its credibility is at stake since the Union will be judged by its ability to address people's concerns more effectively at European and global level (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). Consequently, the people are concerned with the question of how the EU uses the powers given by the citizens. The 'White Paper of Governance' identifies an answer to this question by opening up policy-making and making it more inclusive and accountable. As the writers of the document put it:

“The Union is changing as well. (...) It will not be judged solely by its ability to remove barriers to trade or to complete an international market; its legitimacy today depends on involvement and participation. This means that the linear model of dispensing policies from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels (ibid. p. 11)”

The document also touches upon the problems of European identity and belonging. Important shifts in the strategies in this field can also be identified and detected. It has been mentioned above that, just like in problematic social situations in relation with science and technology, the harmonious relationship between Europe and its would-be citizens was conceived to be a matter of information distribution and marketing. Information and communication still play an important role in this document, yet it says that providing more information and more effective communication is *just* a pre-condition for generating a sense of belonging to Europe. In order to create this pre-condition, the document argues in favour of a more effective and a more widespread use of info-communication technologies. They should play, the argument continues, an important role in the creation of an inter-active platform for information, feedback and debate. This platform can be a place where citizens can identify themselves as common

citizens of the same democratic polity and foster a sense of belonging by creating a shared responsibility in the future of this community. So the 'White Paper' argues:

“The aim should be to create a trans-national ‘space’ where citizens from different countries can discuss what they perceive as being the important challenge for the Union. This should help policy makers to stay in touch with European public opinion, and could guide them in identifying European projects which mobilise public support (ibid. p. 12).”

Nevertheless, the document also proclaims that the central point of governance cannot be merely at a European level. It calls for strategies and projects which also reach out to citizens through regional and local democracy. Similar to the tensions between local and universal knowledge in debates on issues of science and technology, in the EU context there is also a need to reconcile decisions made at local, regional and European level. In order to do so it is important to take into account local and regional knowledge in coping with the problem of how to create general rules which are adaptable to local conditions. So, besides the transnational space there is also a need for a “systematic dialogue with European and national associations of regional and local government, while respecting national constitutional and administrative arrangements (ibid. p. 13).”

To sum up, future-citizens in the new democratic organisation of Europe would be citizens not merely by virtue of their legal status or because of their participation in the economy but rather because of their participation and involvement in building and maintaining a common political community. The structure of this community, however, would not be centred at a European level but would be based on a multi-level partnership in which national governments involve their regions and cities fully in European policy-making. Accordingly, citizens would be able to argue and further their interest in very different arenas and polity levels depending on the issues, which they want to raise or challenge. There is also an underlying presupposition in this model, namely, that local, regional, national and European loyalties are not in conflict with each other in their nature. Instead, each of them fits within and provides a broader context for the others as far as the European level, respectively. Without this presupposition, which may or may

not be true depending on different contexts, the ‘capillary’ system of power cannot work so smoothly as European high bureaucrats would like to envision.

One more dimension of this new system of governance is worth mentioning and that concerns the role of civil society. In the document of ‘White Paper of Governance’ civil society is considered to be a crucial actor in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people’s needs. In addition, it should also play an important role in getting citizens more actively involved and offering them a structured channel for feedback, criticism and protest. Consequently, the diverse network of NGOs should act as “an early warning system for the direction of political debate (ibid. p. 14).”

What we could see from the above-mentioned arguments is that there were different strategies to construct the subject of Europe which can act and contribute as actors in the process of integration. In the initial situation the emphasis was on providing a legal and economic background in which citizens can recognise themselves as tenants and workers of the same economic space. The strategies discussed by Shore were not intended to change this situation but to supplement the legal and economic aspects with a cultural dimension. The problems with the construction of common European values and cultural heritage in the same manner as creating legal and economic structures are obvious. While the notion of culture in social theories is always referred to as something which is mutually created and maintained by members of a cultural group, this common European culture has been created by European high-ranking officials and distributed in a top-down manner.

The ‘White Paper of Governance’ indicates an important shift in these questions. The creation of the subject of integration is not conceived to be a separate project from the process of the integration itself. Consequently, the citizens are to contribute and participate in a common political space which is continuously constructed by their very involvement. Thus, what is needed here is a “reinforced culture of consultation and

dialogue” (p.16). The common ground for the citizens of Europe is neither an economic-legal framework nor is it something built upon common cultural values but rather, the political participation in a democratic polity by which various issues can be raised, challenged and debated.

In relation with the academic discourses on citizenship two important points are worth mentioning. Firstly, it can be easily seen that the academic debate is not only academic but also political in nature. Looking at the above-discussed strategies of constructing the European subject different underlying theories can be identified. Secondly, while the official discourse cannot be directly explained by the academic theories there are clear connections between them. There is a straightforward relationship between the formal, legal form of the ‘new citizenship’ and the subject of integration in the initial situation of the economic and legal processes. Identifying, constructing and distributing a common European culture with shared values and heritage can also be understood as an awkward initiative to create a homogenous community of the republican ideal at a transnational level. The connection between the ideas of the ‘White Paper of Governance’ and post-national citizenship, which are based on participation in a common political space, is also noticeable. My intention here is twofold. Firstly, it is important to show the shift from a top-down construction of a subject to the construction of a political subject who is involved in policy-shaping. Secondly, it was also essential to illustrate the connection between the new initiatives to reform the system of governance and the ideas of post-national citizenship. In the following section, I shall concentrate on the way in which these ideas appear in the spheres of science and technology at a European level.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ It may be worth mentioning that the ‘White Paper of Governance’ also deals with the questions of science and technology particularly reflecting on the role of experts in policy-making. However, in the section above I did not discuss these aspects of the ‘White Paper’. The reason for that is that these questions also reappear and are discussed in other documents. I am going to discuss these documents in the following section.

4.3. Citizens, Science and Society

In this section I shall discuss two other EU documents, namely, ‘Science, society and the citizens of Europe’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2000A) and ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ (European Commission, 2002). The former discusses issues at a general level and suggests directions for future change while the latter contains proposals and tangible strategies and projects for bridging the gap between science and society. I will discuss both together focusing on the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ which has been released recently, in 2002 by the Commission. So, while the first document is only a working document for generating debate, the second one is trying to convert the results of these debates to actual plans and projects. However, the two documents are common in that both refer to the ‘White Paper of Governance’ sharing its underlying assumptions. The following section will mainly focus on the ‘Action Plan’ while referring time-to-time to the ‘Working document’ as well.

Accordingly, in relation with science and technology and European governance, both documents aim to combine new ways of involving various social actors and the established forms of government and representative democracy. This way, as was the case with the ‘White Paper of Governance’, these documents also represent a shift from established relations and power structures to a more inclusive network of actors as far as decisions about science and technology are concerned. However, it is important to mention that this is a ‘shift’ from one set of goals to another and not a radical ‘change’. My intention here is not to criticise the ‘Action Plan’ for not being radical enough but to show how it is balancing between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ ways of doing politics in the spheres of science and technology.

This can also easily be seen in the foreword of ‘Science and Society Action Plan (European Commission, 2002).⁶⁰ Philippe Busquin who was the Commissioner for Research when the publication was released wrote this foreword. The very first sentence of the document is as follows:

“In a knowledge-based society, democratic governance must ensure that citizens are able to make an informed choice from the options made available to them by responsible scientific and technological progress (European Commission, 2002, p. 3).”

This rhetoric can be quite familiar to us from the ‘Public Education Model’ of Callon which presupposes that citizens can only participate in science and technology as consumers or clients of the state apparatus. So, this sentence alone contains three underlying presuppositions which are more characteristic of the ‘old’ than the new, a more inclusive way of managing the relations between science, technology and society. First of all, there is the expression of ‘informed choice from the options’ which implies that choices can be made easily if there is enough information with reference to the issues at stake. While STS researchers usually emphasise the contingency and the unpredictability of technological developments this sentence depicts them as clear options in a ‘scientific market’ from which consumer-citizens can choose. Secondly, it is not clear whether progress is already ‘responsible’ or planned to be due to the actions which will be made according to this ‘Action Plan’. If the former is true, citizens do not have to worry about the products of scientific and technological development but only choose what is most appropriate to them. So thirdly, there is another underlying assumption irrespective of the fact whether science and technology is responsible⁶¹ at the moment or will become

⁶⁰ The document is at the intersection of three Community debates which are as follows: Firstly, there is the strategic goal set by the EU in Lisbon of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. Secondly, the initiative of a European Research Area, a process set in motion by the European Commission in January 2000 also gives importance to the questions about science and technology and the everyday life of the citizens of Europe. Thirdly, there is the aim to implement the ‘White Paper of Governance’ and contribute to the debate about the future of Europe.

⁶¹ Here, the expression ‘responsible’ can have different meanings. In my opinion, in this context responsible means an ethically sensitive science and technology. Apart from this, ‘responsible’ can also have a more „economic” type of meaning as being responsive and adaptive to sudden changes in a changeable world.

responsible in the future. This assumption shows that the right moment to involve citizens in these developments is when the products of these developments have already been ‘made available to them’ and not before. So, while the main aim of the document is to develop new ways of governing science and technology, in many aspects it reflects the ‘traditional’ understanding of the relations between science, technology and society.

This also characterises the dilemma between expert-based policy-making and disclosing scientific uncertainties to the public. The focal point of this dilemma is how to deal with and communicate uncertainties without undermining the legitimacy of the expert-based decision-making processes? The document offers two ways of dealing with this problem, first of all, by creating structured and open networks of expert bodies instead of ad hoc advisory boards changing constantly. Secondly, the document also argues that the public, more particularly the stakeholders should not be excluded. It is important to empower them to contribute to the debate and to challenge the experts and their advice and to voice alternative views on the topic. The aims of these initiatives are both to instil trust and to deliver policies that are more robust, argues the paper (p. 24-26).

On the other hand, despite the fact that the document reproduces the traditional perspective concerning science, technology and society there is also a clear step away from the information deficit or ‘Public Education Model’ towards a ‘Public Debate Model’. Therefore, the ‘Action Plan’ clearly expresses that the regular flow of information from experts to the public is not in itself enough to enable people to form an opinion on issues about science and technology. However, this opinion-forming activity is considered to be the source of an important policy input for decision-making. As the document puts it:

“If citizens and civil society are to become partners in the debate on science, technology and innovation in general and on the creation of the European Research Area in particular, it is not enough to simply keep them informed. They must also be given the opportunity to express their views in the appropriate bodies.” (p. 17)

So, the need for a true dialogue between science and society has been clearly expressed. What is still a question, though, is which are these ‘appropriate bodies’ and at what level these can be found. In the ‘Action Plan’ there are three different levels at which this dialogue can take place, namely, the local, the regional and the European level.

The Commission document identifies local and regional levels as well suited to the “science and society” dialogue when the issues raised are of direct interest to citizens. These can be issues which have a direct bearing on local and regional level such as environment, health, safety and urban transport. In the form of *Science Shops* to be organised at local, regional and inter-regional levels the document promotes participation by scientists in forums and hearings (pp. 14-15).

This dialogue can also take place at the European level, although new participatory arrangements have to be developed which are able to embrace the complexity of issues about science and technology at a European level. Some member states, the argument goes on, have a long tradition of organising participatory procedures and this experience can be used for elaborating transnational procedures. Participatory procedures at a national level aim to provide a space for scrutiny and informed debate on important issues of public concern, bringing together the policy makers, interest groups and public. In a similar manner, transnational participatory procedures are expected to complement the formal decision-making process, and to help pave the way for sound policies (pp. 17-18).

The expression of participation, however, has not been totally unfamiliar in the EU policy context. Various participatory mechanisms have been used to fine-tune research policy also at the Community level. Ad hoc arrangements are used to enable interested parties to express their views. Yet, the Commission would like to see these experiences widened and deepened to systematically include other sectors of civil society at all stages (p. 18).

In summary, even in the document itself there can be seen a clear shift from a 'Public Education Model', which has regarded citizens as consumers of science and technology, to a 'Public Debate Model', which encourage citizens to form opinions about developments in these spheres. Yet, with this shift important questions emerge such as: what would happen to these opinions after they have been expressed; and how can these voices be effectively channelled into 'appropriate bodies'; and how sensitive these bodies are to external influences and how to make them even more sensitive? The document ignores these questions. Yet, if answers are not found to these problems one suspect that participation procedures on science and technology, instead of a "true dialogue", will foster disillusionment and cynicism, from citizens who cannot see their opinion taken seriously.

4.4. Meeting of Minds. European Citizens 'Under Construction'?

In the sections above a general shift can be perceived from a situation in which citizens lack information appropriate for shaping policies to a situation in which citizens take part as the source of useful and important information. Moreover, after the narrow-minded strategies of the cultural integration of Europe from above or as Shore puts it, "Europe's colonisation of itself" (Shore, 2001, p. 63), there is also a hope that participation can foster a kind of integrity and solidarity among the community of diverse cultures and peoples. Apart from this, it is also worth mentioning that the initiative to involve citizens in issues about science and technology at a transnational level is unique and unprecedented. The 'Meeting of Minds' project is designed to meet this challenge and cope with the problems which can appear in the course of a participatory arrangement at this level.

On the website of the project there is detailed information about the aims, the procedure and the expected effects of this initiative (Meeting of Minds, 2005A). So, it is meant to give *European citizens* a unique opportunity to learn more about the impact of brain

research on their daily lives and society as a whole, to discuss their questions and ideas with leading European researchers, experts and policy-makers. Furthermore, the website indicates that the project also aims to put them in touch with fellow citizens from other European countries and make a personal contribution to a report detailing what the *people of Europe* believe to be possible and desirable in the area of brain science and what they recommend policy-makers and researchers to be aware of for future developments in this field (Meeting of Minds, 2005A). So the overall objective of the Meeting of Minds initiative is to involve *European citizens* in assessing and publicly discussing the issue of brain science with relevant research, policy and ethics experts, various stakeholders as well as representatives of European decision-making organisations, argues the document (Meeting of Minds, 2005A).

What is striking from the first moment when reading the objectives of the project is the use of the expression of ‘European citizens’ and ‘people of Europe’. While the texts on the website use these expressions naturally and with straightforwardness the question remains whether there is a self-recognising category as ‘people of Europe’ or it is just an overall grouping of all the people involved? Apart from the objectives above, one can also assume that this project is in itself expected to generate a kind of identity among people who are involved and to ‘find out’ if there is any kind of meaning of the ‘citizens of Europe’ expression. As one of the main ‘architects’ of the project, Rinie van Est said in an interview⁶²:

“Maybe another important thing is that if you see the European integration not only as an economic project but also as a democratic project, as a social-economic project, then you get the question is there a European citizen? I mean your intent is to find out via these kinds of processes.”

⁶² The interview was conducted with Rinie van Est 29th June 2005. He works at the Ratheneau Institute and mainly takes part in international Technology Assessment (TA) projects. He is a member of the ‘Steering Committee’ and the ‘Methodological Team’ of the project. The Ratheneau Institute is one of the main nodes in the European network of TA organisations as far as this project is concerned.

Nevertheless, the procedure of the project implies one kind of understanding of European citizenship hence it embraces the national and the European level at the same time. There are national groups who discuss the issues of brain science at a national level and then bring these formulated opinions to the European convention where they discuss these issues again with people from different countries and then go back to their own countries to meet up again with their fellow national members two more times. After this they will meet again with people from other countries and discuss these topics and prepare a report which is intended to function as policy advice.

This procedure emphasises the importance of national loyalties at the same time as it attempts to create a self-referential and self-recognising European citizenship which can transcend national affections and bonds. It can be said that the project aims to create a creative tension between these levels and to use this tension to stimulate further debates and the processes of opinion forming from diverse cultural contexts and value bases. This way, it can be said that the project is not meant to neglect the national contexts by creating a common, homogenous European cultural pattern but is designed to use the difference of cultures as a resource. In line with this, Rinie van Est also argued that one of the main goals of the project, besides getting people informed, is to encourage and provide means for these citizens to get into discussions from diverse cultural milieus.

“I think if you look at the method we use, we try to strive for that and people (...) have to inform themselves and get into discussions with other people, even people at different levels, national level, European level, and also with people from different cultures.”

In connection with this, Rinie van Est defined scientific citizenship in a unique way. He emphasises both the novel attributes and duties of scientific citizens and their connection to ‘traditional’ political practices. To the question of what kind of citizen is necessary for this project to work properly he answered as follows:

“We can talk about ‘scientific or technological citizenship’. I think it starts with awareness, being aware that we live in a technological society and that one is aware of the

effects technologies have and also vice versa that you have an idea that how and why these technologies are developed or not.

So, you see, it is all about being informed at a proper level and then of course discussing it with other citizens. If we talk about technological citizenship you talk about citizenship apart from technology, you have added technology to this. If you talk about citizenship it is also about being informed and being a democratic actor in that sense. Living in a democracy is meaning that you have to cope with different values, different views and things. So, it is not only about making up your opinion but also about looking for other people who share that opinion and being engaged or interact with people who have different meaning and also try to understand why they have a different type of meaning.

Well, if that is your definition of technological citizenship it is a kind of enlightened citizen, well-informed citizen.”

From this answer we can identify three interesting points that the interviewee emphasised. First of all, Rinie van Est stresses that citizens have to be ‘aware’ that they living in a technological society in which they have to be conscious not only about narrowly defined politics but also about the effects and the development of technologies. This means something radically new compared to political approaches of citizenship. Secondly, just like the ‘White Paper’, he stressed the importance of making people well-informed to be able to take part in processes like the ‘Meeting of Minds’ but his answer also implies that it is not enough. They have to discuss these acquired pieces of information amongst themselves. They have to find others who agree with them, as well as trying to understand those with whom they disagree. So, thirdly, he also emphasises that this activity is not so different from other political activities in a democratic system. Fourthly, therefore, the scientific citizen is not entirely a new entity but an ordinary citizen who is concerned about the existing or anticipated products of scientific and technological progress. The tag ‘scientific’ is something to be added to the general image of citizenship. So, Rinie van Est emphasised both the novelty of ‘scientific citizenship’ and the continuity of it with political citizenship.

We could see that there is an emphasis on creating a self-recognising category of citizens with different cultural backgrounds while it was also important to maintain this cultural background in the course of the project. The fact that there are three national meetings

besides the two European conventions proves that the organisers value the importance of the national contexts. At the 1st European Convention citizens are expected to see each other as fellows of the same participatory arrangement and accept and argue with each others' arguments as members of the same political community. These dimensions of the project fit within the strategic goals of the 'White Paper of Governance', while it also puts an emphasis on making people well-informed in addition to encouraging them and letting them use this information creatively in public debates.

4.5. Précis

After discussing the 'academic layer' of the citizenship discourse, the centre of attention moved to the recent trends in fostering a European citizenship and in creating channels of feedback from citizens to science. Focusing on the 'official discursive layer' four different but interrelated issues were examined.

Firstly, drawing on the articles of Shore et al. (Shore, 2001; Shore&Black 1994) the paper demonstrated the conventional strategies of constructing the European citizen. The initiatives discussed by Shore are indicative of a top-down, managerial and instrumental approach to 'culture-building' and the assumption that 'European identity' can somehow be engineered from above. These strategies can be related to republican ideas in the sense that high-ranking bureaucrats and leaders intended to 'construct' a common cultural background for a homogenous community.

Secondly, the rhetoric of 'White Paper of Governance' (Commission of European Communities, 2001) represents a shift from a legally passive citizenship discourse to a more active citizenship ideal. In this official paper citizens are conceived to be active participants in the process of integration and participation in the political decision-making system at all levels. Participation is considered to be a central question and expected to play an essential role in the future European polity. As a result, the 'White Paper' calls for

a “reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” (p. 16). Referring back to the academic ideas, one can argue that this rhetoric has a clear relationship to the ideals of post-national citizenship.

Thirdly, both the ‘Science, Society and the Citizen in Europe’ (Commission of European Communities, 2000A) and the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ (European Commission, 2002) refer to the ‘White Paper of Governance’ and try to translate and employ the main ideas of governance in the specific areas of science and technology. They call for participatory arrangements which operate according to the ‘Public Debate Model’ and create a link between parliaments and public. In a similar manner, one can read in the ‘Society and Science Action Plan’ that transnational participatory procedures are expected to complement the formal decision-making process, and to help pave the way for sound policies. Therefore, these kinds of transnational procedures refer to the ideas of post-national citizenship and to the ‘Public Debate Model’ of citizens’ involvement in science and technology at the same time.

Fourthly, in connection with these recent trends the essay also discussed the project of ‘Meeting of Minds’ and analysed how the aims and rhetoric of the organisers draw on the broader political context of the European Union. It is also worth mentioning that this initiative to involve citizens in issues about science and technology at a transnational level is unique and unprecedented. The ‘Meeting of Minds’ project is designed to meet this challenge and cope with the problems which may occur in the course of a participatory arrangement at this level. As the project is partly funded by the European Commission it was not a great surprise to find that there are great similarities between the above-mentioned documents and the rhetoric of the project website. It is obvious, however that the organisers seem to be less confident about the impact of the project compared to what we can read on the website. While, this is a pilot project in many ways, it is also an experiment in the sense that the organisers have to find out during the process who is interested and from whom among policy-makers can they expect support.

As far as the intellectual journey leading here is concerned, this thesis has touched upon several aspects and perspectives of citizenship, science and Europe. The chapter describing the MoM process attempted to show how the organisers of the initiative aimed “more or less” consciously to set up communication between citizens in accordance with the framework of the ideal speech situation. The conclusion of the analysis was that an ideal speech situation can only be established by jointly utilising material and human elements. The association of these elements will establish the framework which makes communication among participants symmetrical and realise a construct of identity which can be called post-national scientific citizenship. This attempt of framing not only the channels of communication but also subject positions and identities raised many questions about citizenship models and policy intentions. By attempting to disclose the theoretic, policy and social environment in which a process like the MoM came forth, the questions raised in the third chapter are answered or at least cleared in a way which allows further investigations.

So, the succeeding chapter on the academic layer analysed the theoretical space around citizenship in connection with science and Europe. The chapter identified certain citizenship models based on different models of political thought, namely, the liberal, the republican and the discursive schools of thought. These models also deeply influence how policy makers construct the subjects of or at least strive to impose certain social identities on a political community.

For that very reason, this chapter analysed the policy discourse of citizenship with a focus on the connection between science, Europe and the citizens. The chapter not only analysed the identity constructions embedded in the texts concerned but also attempted to show connections between the academic and the policy discursive layer.

Following this investigation on the ‘official discursive layer’, the focus will come back to Meeting of Minds to investigate how citizens understand themselves in terms of their role in the project. It will be possible to trace not only different roles and relationships to Europe but the question of how participants from different political cultures could find their place in the process will be also touched upon.

5. CITIZENS' DISCURSIVE LAYER

After discussing and analysing the MoM process, the main goal of this section is to show how the citizens thematise themselves in relation with their role in the process and with Europe. It is important to have this 'bifocal perspective' since the MoM is not only unique in terms of the participation in a complex process but its transnational character is also intriguing.

It may be worth mentioning that this part is closely connected to the second chapter since I conducted the interviews during fieldwork. However, this section also differs from the fieldwork section since the main goal here is not to introduce and 'represent' a complex process but to disclose the main perspectives according to which the participants understand and construct themselves in the project. In view of the methodologies I am going to use here, identity is not a fixed and given entity but variable and changeable in relation to different contexts and languages used. Consequently, the main focus will be not on the question of how to disclose the true identity of the citizens but to map out how they understand and depict themselves in the context of MoM. The interview analysis will be based on the answers of Hungarian and Dutch participants for which interviews have been conducted throughout the first Hungarian national meeting and the first European convention.

As it was not possible to interview all the participants of the project I chose to focus on two national groups: the Dutch and the Hungarian. While the two groups might seem similar in some aspects, there were also differences. Two primary aspects will be considered here. Firstly, while participatory arrangements are more or less familiar in the Dutch cultural context and it is often said that Dutch culture is consensus oriented, while Hungarians come from a different political culture where the whole approach to the process represents something totally new. Secondly, Hungary has only recently joined the EU, while the Netherlands was one of the founding members and a catalyst of the

integration process. Whenever there are significant dissimilarities in thematisation of the same issues between the Hungarian and the Dutch participants, I am going to reflect on them after the analysis.

The questions I used in the interviews partly referred to citizens' role in the process and partly to their views about the relation between national and European citizenship. Therefore, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, which means that I did strive to ask the same questions but to guide the discussions in the direction of the topics interesting for me. I used interviewing because I worked with a small number of people and I was interested not only in what answer they give to a question about their role in the process or their national or European citizenship but also how they argue in its favour and how they justify these answers. Therefore, using a survey, which can be appropriate when one works with a big sample and with relatively simple questions, was ruled out from the beginning. Moreover, in interviews one can reformulate, rephrase questions and clarify meanings, which was very important in the current research. Comparing focus groups and conducting interviews allows for a sharper focus on individual views and opinions. All in all, in my opinion, in this case interviews represented the suitable methodology because I worked with a small sample and my focus was quite specific. Thus, in the course of the interviews I attempted to get answers to the following questions which I used as a checklist during the interviews⁶³:

- How do you evaluate your own part in this project?
- What do you think the organisers expect from you as a citizen?
- In what capacity do you think you are involved in this project, as a Dutch/Hungarian citizen or as a European citizen?

⁶³ The purpose of asking the first two questions was to gain information about the citizens' views on scientific citizenship. Using this exact term, however, would have been confusing, as it is not commonly used in everyday life-contexts. Therefore, I asked sub-questions steering the interviews in the direction of the issue of changing concepts of citizenship in relation to science and technology in general and the Meeting of Minds project in particular. Asking questions about the relationship between European and national citizenship was less problematic in that sense.


- What do you think is the relation between the European and the Dutch/Hungarian citizenship?

When analysing the answers to these questions, I did not attempt to create categories with clear-cut boundaries but my aim was to display the dynamics of different concepts and the variety of discursive thematisation on participation and Europe in the answers. I would call these different concepts discursive repertoires because they were the central points of the answers. In the section below my aim is to show these repertoires through the arguments and justifications used in the answers.

5.1. Survey Results

Before starting my own analysis I shall use Alison Mohr's survey results on the 1st European Convention to give an overview what the European panel thought about the process. The advantage of this is that Mohr could get answers from all the participants and not just from two national teams and it can give an idea why citizens' participated in such a project.⁶⁴ After this short overview, the focus will shift to the Hungarian and Dutch national teams and the quantitative outlook will be changed into a qualitative perspective.

Figure 12.
**What is your primary interest in the
Meeting of Minds initiative?**




So, in the first diagram (*Figure 12.*) we can see that the vast majority of the citizens indicated, writes Mohr, “that the issue of brain science, rather than the process itself, was their primary interest for participating in the ‘Meeting of Minds’ initiative.” However, in the interviews, which will be discussed in depth below, the participants did not make a sharp distinction between these two interests. In the answers, usually those participants

⁶⁴ The questionnaire, the analysis of the answers and the diagrams were made by Alison Mohr who is a researcher at ‘Center for Democracy’ and member of the Steering Committee of the Meeting of Minds project.

who primarily expressed their interest about brain science very often speak about the novelty of and their interest in the process as well.


Figure 13.
What do you perceive to be the key goal-objective
of the Meeting of Minds initiative?



In the second diagram (*Figure 13.*), we can see that the majority of citizens attached primary importance to the goal ‘to encourage communication between citizens, scientific community and policy makers’. This implies that many citizens focused on the long-term effects of the project rather than its direct impact. However, there was also a significant group who considered the contribution ‘to policy-making on brain science issues at the national and European level’ as the key objective. This was the most striking in Denmark, “where there is a history of TA successfully influencing policy, the Danish citizens perceived that the initiative’s key objective was the direct contribution to policy-making.”

It is also worth mentioning that in the interviews many citizens expressed their doubts about the impact they can have on policy making. This sceptical attitude was more like a continuum than a single standpoint. One end of the continuum would be the answer in which the participants conceived the process as a tool for legitimising decisions already made. The other pole would be just a slight doubt expressing one's opinion that she or he cannot really imagine how it could work. This attitude which was present in many interviewees' answers might be caused by the fact that the panel members preferred the long term effects to uncertain short term goals.

Figure 14.
Do you agree that the format of the First National Citizens Meeting has encouraged the development of a national group identity?



As it has been mentioned above, the project does not attempt to transcend the differences of different national contexts but rather to integrate these differences of cultures and value-sets into the process. Therefore, the project contains three national meetings and two European conventions in order to create a dialogue between the two levels. The question above (*Figure 14.*) is in connection with this procedural aspect. As we

can see, most of the citizens strongly agreed or agreed ‘that the format of the First National Citizens Meeting has encouraged the development of a national group identity’.

This strong attachment to national identity is in a way surprising since there was no particular effort on behalf of the organisers to achieve this goal. The focus was more on dialogue between participants from different national and cultural backgrounds and a national groups’ opinion was never opposed to another one’s. Unfortunately, in the questionnaire there was no question about European identity to trace how the participants’ perception changes about themselves as European subjects.

5.2. Roles of Participation

As it has been mentioned above, I asked questions about the role of the citizens and about their European-ness and European citizenship. I was able to record various different arguments related to these issues so I attempted to find regularities in the answers and this way to identify the main discursive repertoires. As far as the role of the citizens is concerned, these repertoires were the *educational*, the *dialogical*, and the *sceptical*.⁶⁵

These repertoires in a certain sense represent the main goals of the process except, as the reader will be able to see, the sceptical repertoire. It is also important to mention that the different repertoires cannot be clearly related to individuals but different types of arguments and justifications can appear in the answers of the same individuals. The analysis below does not try to eliminate this variability and contingency in individual responses but looks for regularities in all the texts together.

⁶⁵ When I use the word *repertoire* in this section I do not only mean expressions or individual attitudes towards participation or European citizenship. It is a more general reference to a discursive order in the answers which can be characterised as a constellation of meanings around a topic. When certain expressions, views and argumentation cropped up in different interviews showing a certain correspondence, I called them ‘repertoires’.

In the '*educational repertoire*' the emphasis was on the educational effects of the project and participation was considered to be a means of education. It also means that the participants who used this repertoire put less emphasis on the actively participating form of citizenship in favour of getting information or acquiring knowledge throughout the process. Actually, one of them, who was optimistic about the project, mentioned that the participation could contribute to the creation of a responsible citizen:

“This is undoubtedly a learning process because one keeps learning all through his life until the very end of his life and if one can get well-known, I don't mean he will receive more money for research, or more contribution, but well, they [people] can see what they pay all that social security for, or if it should cost more money they see the point in it.”

Moreover, this emphasis on the educational effects was also attached to a kind of 'gratification' attitude. That means that those who conceived themselves as participant in an educational project also felt that he or she became one of the members of a very 'exclusive' group. This emphasis on exclusivity shows that the educational repertoire constructs participants as subjects who lack information, who have to be taught and enlightened. Because education is the main element in this repertoire there is a presupposed top-down relationship since the other members in this 'exclusive group' ("highly-qualified people, great professors, politicians") will tell the participants what they should think. This repertoire also presents the participation in the process as something very special and extraordinary. According to their viewpoint, to become one of the national panellists was a prize to be won.

„How important do you think it is that citizens should be involved in discussing a topic like that?

I consider it pretty important, because the man in the street has not had the impression that he is allowed to become involved, so it's *a great honour*, I mean there are highly-qualified people, great professors, politicians [here], and well, I think *few people have the opportunity to get in*. Frankly, I am pleased to have got in, and a bit surprised, too.”

Moreover, among those participants who emphasised the educational effects of the ‘Meeting of Minds’ project, some of them also emphasised their *own* role, literally, in fact. When these participants spoke about their role they used the expressions “my role”, “put my own part into the process”, “my opinion”, “my knowledge”, or to put it more bluntly, it seems that they see this process as a kind of preference aggregation procedure in which everybody puts in what he or she has and it will lead to a common result. This concentration of individual aspects and opinion can be clearly traced in the way the interviewee responded. While the answer was about the importance of involvement in a public discussion in general, the panel member responded by voicing that it is very important and a great honour for him to be involved.

In the ‘*dialogical repertoire*’, the dialogical, open and dynamic manner of the project was stressed. Accordingly, participants conceived themselves as active members of a group, which is meant to think and create and reach a common opinion. Furthermore, participation was perceived as a very important and prestigious activity, which has to be supplemented with gathering and processing information about the issues concerned. Therefore, it seems the relation between acquiring knowledge and the activity of participation was that the former is expected to serve the latter. Getting informed is important in order to ensure the meaningfulness of participation, or in other words, acquiring knowledge is only the means for participation not its ultimate goal. The emphasis thus was on participation.

„I mean I’m not trying to have an opinion on the technical aspect of the issue. It’s more what’s happening around it and what does it mean for us, do we feel that there should be priorities and where are our concerns. I think as long as we focus on those aspects there are no problems. I think we are competent enough. (...) If we feel that we don’t know enough about the certain thing then we get a lot of backup-support of people who can find out. Experts we can consult in the future. I’m not so much worried about the level of knowledge.”

In this answer a totally different kind of relationship can be disclosed than in the ones above connected to the ‘*educational repertoire*’. While there is a clear intention to draw a

boundary between technical and social aspects of the issue, there is also an image of scientist who is not at the forefront of the project but appears as 'backup-support'. This image implies that on the one hand, the knowledge of the participants is enough to form opinion, the scientists are not an exclusive group which the participants can join, but part of the staff who are responsible for helping the work of the citizens. So, what was most striking in the interviews is that the expert appeared in the answers as somebody who at the same time knows more and also less about a particular issue. It has also appeared that they do not perceive themselves as less competent in these issues than scientists. As one of them said:

“I would expect a scientist to want to go further and further at any costs, just to improve his personal work, or his research and I don't think it's necessarily always what the people want. (...) The scientists are more about what we *can* do, the citizens are more about what we *want* to do.”

Moreover, these attitudes were also correlated with the opinions that these kinds of initiatives are very important and participatory events should be held more often. This way, participation was not perceived as a 'prize' or as something extraordinary but as a natural right of the citizen, which has been long neglected. In connection with this, they did not give particular importance to the fact that the project is about a scientific issue. It was also evident from the fact that they mentioned scientists and politicians in a similar manner. I suppose that they did not perceive the project as something very special but as a political process about a scientific issue.

These participants also spoke about their own life context, their own knowledge and their own opinion, which have to be channelled into the deliberation process but the emphasis was not on the individual but on the group. Accordingly, instead of using the words 'I, me, mine' they frequently used 'we, us, our'. As it can be clearly read in the answer of a participant:

“My role in this process in the national team... um, well *we* are talking together of course, tell different meanings, and *we* will try to have at least one opinion on every subjects. So with discussion, with talk about it, with research and so on, *we* are trying to have, well, *our* national opinion on certain items.”

In the ‘*sceptical repertoire*’, citizens expressed their concern about the meaningfulness of the project, at worst interpreting the project as a strategy merely legitimising or advertising already decided policies. In contrast with the educational and the dialogical repertoire, participants who used the sceptical repertoire expressed their concern that their own part as citizens will be ‘lost in translation’.

They spoke about the project as a remarkable form to involve citizens, however, they also expressed their worry that their opinions will not be taken into consideration at the decision-making level. In relation to this, almost all of the participants spoke about scientists and decision-makers “up there”. Accordingly, they admitted that they cannot decide in ‘technical’ questions, which is the job of the specialist, they can only discuss their social aspects. This way, citizens perceived themselves as playing a complementary role to an already set structure.

“It’s quite clear to me that we can only make proposals, ok, it’s sure that they will consider what the fourteen of us say here, as we are the selected ones, but I do not feel its weight in the whole legislation, in the research process in general, I don’t feel that they would attach any importance to what the citizen wants, what common people want. But it would not be at all possible for the *big ‘stupid’ mass* to decide what should be done, so this is why people get specialised to choose what it is that one is best at.”

In connection with this approach, one of the citizens spoke about the project as a marketing strategy on behalf of brain scientists who are seeking research funds. In her view, the project only has a legitimising function, in other words, its main goal is merely to justify a pre-given decision. The participant also expressed her concern that participants would be manipulated to come to this decision in the course of this project.

„They expect me to give some kind of [financial] support, obviously so that they can spend more on brain research, or rather, to secure funds so that research can go in the direction they want, so there will be some *sort of pressure* in this direction. It is in essence a promotional thing to try to convince people that there really is a need for it and that *we should speak on behalf of the public.*”

5.3. Many Europe-s

When participants spoke about their European-ness and their European citizenship they usually justified their arguments not only by describing their own selves but by giving of an image of Europe. It was very interesting to see that almost each citizen connected his or her identity to a particular kind of Europe. In this section I shall describe these different ways to thematise Europe as a distinct entity. Accordingly, five different Europes, five different relationships and five different repertoires could be detected. These were the following repertoires: the political-economic, the cultural-historical, the equal groups of citizens, the unity of continent and the extending circles of loyalty repertoires.

In the *‘political-economic repertoire’* the emphasis was on the image of Europe as the subject of an integration process. In a similar manner, citizens who organised their arguments around this repertoire spoke about their European-ness and European citizenship as being under construction, or in other words, as being part of a process itself. Furthermore, they also spoke about Europe in a similar manner, to use Bauman’s expression, as an ‘unfinished adventure’ (Bauman, 2004). This would-be Europe and would-be European citizenship can be identified in the answer of one of the citizens.

„I haven’t thought about the question in what way I’m involved. Let’s say I’m a European citizen. I believe that sooner or later Europe *will* be united and there *will* be European people, there won’t be different nations and we *will* be able to work together very well. This will be a cool thing. When one *will* say ‘European’ that will be a qualitative attribute.”

It is quite remarkable that in the answer the interviewee uses the word ‘will’ many times expressing that according to his viewpoint Europe is not an existing reality but a potential

which can be realised in the future. In a way, he presupposes a would-be ‘united Europe’ and in relation to it he creates his own identity as European. It should be noted that in this repertoire a very formal and legal relation between Europe and its citizen seems to emerge en. Thus in many answers the interviewees referred to the fact that they are already European in a formal sense but this is empty in itself and that this empty ‘shell’ must be filled with actual content.

In the ‘*cultural-historical repertoire*’ citizens stressed the importance of a common European history and culture which, despite many wars and conflicts, can be traced back to thousands of years. European citizens therefore are the inheritors of the same cultural legacy by virtue of a common European history. Many participants talked about their link to Europe as a historical-traditional connection between their national and European identity and citizenship. One of the citizens even articulated that the whole project has something to do with searching for a cultural background for Europe. Using his own words:

„... there is this aspect in the whole program that *Europe is seeking* – well, not its roots, *but its citizens questions*, preferences in a number of directions.

Do you think it draws on a democratic tradition?

It’s not so much democracy, but it is the fact that there is a debate whether Europe is Christian or not. Thus, it’s evidently [going] back to its own roots. In our case I do not mean the democracy as European root but in terms of culture, and religion can also be part of that to some extent. *There is a need to link Europe’s future to its past.* And I see it in the way how *people are get asked and they bring along their own attitude, their ‘European-ness’* and opinions are added up by all that.”

According to this quotation, although Europe appears as an already existing historical entity which needs to find its own identity, this identity can only be given by its citizens. From the answer we can see that citizens represent Europe’s link between its future and past. As I have indicated above, many citizens connected Europe’s unity to the common historical and cultural values of its citizens. However, this answer is even more interesting

because while assuming that such a cultural-historical background exists it also problematises the content of such a background since only citizens can identify their 'European-ness' and it cannot be constructed from 'above'.

The '*equal group of citizens repertoire*' depicted Europe as a home of various different groups who have an equally important culture. According to this viewpoint, the diversity of Europe has to be maintained and to be a European citizen is concomitant to living together with and respecting this plurality. This very plurality gives Europe a special edge because the differences can create a mutually beneficial relationship between people and nations but only if they trust each other. So, in this repertoire, Europe appeared as an existing reality not as an ongoing project.

"And when we meet cultures that means, than we get richer... that's a richer inside feeling and also feeling rich to communicate with each other, trust each other. Therefore I think we have to leave all borders because they are no borders. There is only communication and a social aspect between people. If you are French or if you are a Dutch, it is not important. I think that all people have to keep their culture. If it had positive elements on it, just keep it, because you can make the other citizens richer. That is in my point of view."

This answer really shows that in this repertoire the emphasis is not on the relationship between Europe and its citizens but on the intercultural links between fellow-citizens. It is not so important to establish a kind of all encompassing unity but to find the ways in which we can learn from our differences. The same kind of view also appeared in the metaphor of Europe as a sports club:

"I think Dutch citizenship is basically one of the groups of citizens in Europe, which have a more or less coherent cultural background. Of course, there have economic interests but especially I think for the Dutch we are very much depending on the rest of Europe. Because we are basically people who are trading, bringing services, so our market is basically Europe and Holland is too small to try to be isolated. So it's a kind of..., like *you are member of a club. The club is Europe* and we are members maybe in one *type of sport*, or how you wanna see, but we *have some things in common, we are all part of the total*."

This 'sport club' metaphor again emphasises the significance of the existing differences between nations. These differences and diversities create a good sports club and a harmoniously functioning transnational community such as the EU. This image highlights that this very diversity is the reason why citizens of different nations can collaborate. Therefore differences should be preserved and not dissolved in a forced unity.

The '*unity of the continent repertoire*' presented Europe as a unity in terms of its inwardly common features in contrast to other continents. According to this perspective, while citizens of different nations are different indeed in Europe they are closer to each other than to somebody from a different continent. So, being a European means that minor differences between fellow-Europeans dwindle in view of the differences between Europeans and people from other continents. So they stressed the *geographic* dimension of their relation to Europe as a *continent*. All in all, this continent aspect appeared in many answers as a means of stressing the inner unity of Europe and its difference to other countries, continents 'outside' Europe. According to one interviewee:

"I feel myself a European. I'm not only Dutch. I feel myself like that. I don't like feeling boundaries. I know the continents. That's OK, because the people over there are totally different but in Europe everybody is from the same thoughts, not the same history, but they are closer than maybe somebody from Japan or somebody from United States or Indo-China. That's different because all of the histories are different and here we have a European history."

This repertoire is quite the opposite of the sports club image since it emphasises a kind of relative closeness of nations and people in contrast with the rest of the world. While the 'equal group of citizens repertoire' stresses the importance of mutual relationships here the emphasis is on drawing borders. This is a very robust discursive strategy to define oneself as undoubtedly European in view of the fact that it refers to the solidity of the continent's geographical borders.

The '*extending circles of loyalty repertoire*' described Europe as a hierarchical political structure which erected a pyramid from local through regional up to the European level. The participants who organised their answers according to this repertoire emphasised that they are European because of their national citizenship.

"There are minor differences here, for example I belong to my family and I live in Kisbattyán. At the same time I am Majoros because I belong to the Majoros family and that is how I can imagine a series of steps higher and higher that there is Hungarian-ness and this Hungarian-ness also belongs to the European Union, if it is enough. That is how I can imagine."

This relationship to Europe can be most bluntly expressed by Risse's phrase 'country first, but Europe too'.⁶⁶ This view can be clearly read from one of the participant's answers since European citizenship is a quality which is a further circle of loyalty based on local, regional and national attachments. Nevertheless, in many answers this was not so eloquently described as in this case but many participants emphasised that they only connect to Europe through their national citizenship and they do not have a double view in terms of their rights and obligations as citizens but they connect to these through the mediation of the nation state.

These kinds of Europe-s and European citizenships are part of a diverse discursive field. One could ask which is the real Europe. Is Europe a political-economic process? Or a common historical and political tradition? Or is it a continent with clear-cut borders or a 'sports club'? Is it a hierarchical organisation in which local, regional, national levels are integrated? In a similar manner, it is also hard to identify which is the appropriate manner to participate in science and technology.

⁶⁶ Statistical analyses based on survey data and social psychological experiments confirm that most people, who strongly identify with their nation state, also feel a sense of belonging to Europe. Analyses from Eurobarometer data and other sources that 'country first, but Europe too' is the dominant outlook in most EU countries and that people do not perceive this as contradictory." (Risse, 2003)

5.4 Post-national Citizens. A model for all?

In this section, I shall examine the issue of whether a common European political subject, sensitive to scientific-technological issues, can be constructed. Firstly, I will introduce Nielsen et al.'s case study about the different interpretations of participation in general and Consensus Conference in particular in different political contexts (Nielsen et al., 2007). They show that in different contexts the organisers 'construct' their participants quite differently. Accordingly, they might answer the question of what is the point of the process of the Consensus Conference quite differently. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether a common model of participants in an international process such as the MoM is appropriate and justified. So, the second part of this section will reflect on the empirical findings of the interviewing in order to examine the question above in more depth.

Participation in different political cultures

The tendency to regard participatory tools as cross-nationally applicable may be closely connected with the widespread assumption that the concept participation incorporates universally agreed meanings and connotations. However, Nielsen et al. argue the term participation is understood, interpreted and employed differently in different nation states. They attempt to explore the underlying perceptions, interpretations and assumptions on the purpose and legitimacy of Consensus Conference, one of the oldest and most widely used participatory techniques ((Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 14-15).

In a case study on Consensus Conferences organised by French, Norwegian and Danish officials, they show that deliberation and participation become infused with different meanings in different contexts. They conducted interviews to map out what the *organisers* of such events think about participation and the role of lay people and experts in different political cultures. In a way, their research project is complementary to the interviews

conducted with MoM participants since, in their case study, lay panelists were not included as interviewees.

Just as the theoretical section of this paper draws heavily on Habermas' model, they also used his 'three paradigms of democracy' as an analytical framework. As it was indicated in the theoretical section, Habermas introduces the liberal and the republican as the main strands of political thought and argues for a third model invoking a proceduralist-deliberative notion of democracy. The authors of the case study use these different conceptions of democracy as a point of departure for their investigation of national interpretations of the participatory Consensus Conference (hereinafter, CC).

According to their argument, the key to their exploration of these differences is the concept of democratic legitimacy. The main questions they asked were at what levels and under what circumstances legitimacy to political decisions emerges. They show that different models of democratic legitimacy prevail in different contexts. Furthermore, they argue that the relationship between legitimacy and participatory arrangements deeply affect how organisers understand the aim and purpose of the process and in relation with this, the roles of the experts and the participants (pp. 15-20).

The reason for this is that under different conceptions of democracy, democratic legitimacy is attained in different ways and through various procedures. This shapes the ideas of when and how decisions are legitimate, which again leads to different perceptions of public participation and deliberation. *Figure 15.* summarises the source of legitimacy in different political cultures alongside the other aspects of Nielsen et al.'s case study.

Figure 15. Cross-National Perspectives of Consensus Conference (CC)

	Danish CC	Norwegian CC	French CC
<i>Political Culture</i>	Deliberative	Republican/Communitarian	Liberal
<i>Source of Legitimacy</i>	correspondence to the ideals of the deliberative procedure; inclusive, transparent and public process; equal chances to make one's voice heard	shared notion of good life; political decision-making should reflect the shared culture, ethics and values of the community	fairness and transparency and trustworthiness of the procedures; equal status of all citizens
<i>Role of Lay People</i>	„the cooperation of people representing different views” – to set aside self-interested point of view	„the voice of the people” – to express everyday knowledge	„les naïfs” – to become semi-experts
<i>Preparation</i>	to acquire <i>social competences</i>		to acquire <i>factual knowledge</i>

As it can be seen in *Figure 15.*, the different political cultures invoke different perceptions of what is legitimate and what is the source of this legitimacy. Firstly, in the liberal-proceduralist concept of democracy characterising the political culture of France is intertwined with the notion of legitimacy in which political equality is the highest value. This political equality, that is, the equal status of all citizens in the polity is secured through the equal right to vote, and thus the highest authority lies with elected representatives carrying out the mandate of the citizenry. Legitimacy is attained through the fairness, transparency, and trustworthiness of the procedures that guard political decision-making.

Secondly, the republican paradigm, especially its communitarian reading, characteristic to Norway, is based on conceptions of political autonomy and equality that can only be realised by a community of citizens with common practices and shared values and traditions. Legitimacy, thus, is attained when political decision-making reflects the shared values, ethics and values of the community.

Thirdly, under the deliberative political model, which is dominant in Denmark, legitimacy depends on the correspondence to the ideals of the deliberative procedure. Therefore, the carrying out of deliberative procedures that are inclusive and transparent, and in which different actors and groups in society are accorded an equal chance to make their voice heard will impart democratic legitimacy to decision-making (Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 20-27).

It is also worth noting that while in Norway (communitarian-republican) and Denmark (deliberative) the process was compatible with the political system and legitimacy, in France (liberal-proceduralist) lay consultation at the parliamentary level interfered with legitimacy and political equality associated with representative democracy. Using Nielsen, Lassen and Sandøe's own words:

“Thus, descriptions of the method's incompatibility with the political system invoke notions of legitimacy associated with the procedural model of democracy: if political decisions gain legitimacy through the workings of fair and transparent procedures, administered by publicly elected representatives, the allowing a small group of randomly selected citizens to take center stage, let alone give advice to decision makers, is deemed inappropriate and, as the interviews suggest, undemocratic. In the light of the French reception of the conference model, the idea that employment of consensus conferences *per se* enhances legitimacy in decision-making can be queried (Nielsen et al., 2007, p. 27).”

As far as the role of lay people is concerned, the authors of the study show that organisers – along these different perspectives of gaining legitimacy – constructed their participants differently.

In the case of France, the contribution of the laypeople was very much viewed in terms of what the layperson was not. The participants possessed neither the knowledge of the expert nor the mandate of the politician. They are often referred to as “les naïfs” and the primary benefit of the conference is that it gives lay people access to state-of-the-art knowledge and research. Their most important role was to acquire the knowledge and

vocabulary of the expert world, that is, to become *semi-experts*. Accordingly, teaching of factual knowledge is stressed over getting social competencies in the French context as the most important aspect of the preparation needed for lay people in order to participate in the conference.

In contrast, in their answers Norwegian and Danish organisers framed the contribution of the laypersons as representing a different set of perspectives and form of knowledge that must be assessed on its own terms. Moreover, in both countries, there was quite a strong emphasis on social competences while preparing lay panelists to the public part of the conference. Despite sharing these aspects, there were also significant differences in the interpretation of lay participation. On the one hand, Norwegian interviewees' spoke of citizens as possessing an "*everyday knowledge*" or "*folk knowledge*" and therefore could provide a "*genuine*" or "*holistic*" perspective. On the other hand, the Danish connected the value of lay people's participation to their ability to *set aside a self-interested point of view* and participate in deliberations over the common good. These different interpretations of what valuable participation is, argue Nielsen et al., correspond to the political culture of each country respectively (Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 28-32).

Participants in an International Project

As it has been mentioned above, the case study of Nielsen et al. is complementary in many ways to the interviews conducted with participants of the MoM process. As it could be read in the 'Official Discourse Layer' there is an official attempt to construct a common identity and model of citizenship for the 'people of Europe'. This model and identity is based not on common values and cultural heritage but on the participation and engagement in a common transnational polity. This participation is intended to be facilitated by international platforms where citizens can meet, either face-to-face or virtually, and discuss the common matters of their political community.

This model presupposes that participation means the same in every political culture across Europe and this model closely related to a deliberative model of citizenship can be easily transferred to and implemented in every European nation. However, as Nielsen et al. showed in their case study, participation can be imbued with very different meanings in different contexts. This also means that the model of post-national citizenship is not at all independent of cultural contexts as the official documents imply. This model is strongly connected to those political cultures where deliberation is a central element of the political culture.

As far as the interviews conducted with the MoM participants are concerned, it is important to highlight how the different repertoires identified divided between Dutch and Hungarian participants.

Figure 16. Difference between the Dutch and the Hungarians

	Hungarian Group	Dutch Group
<i>Political Culture</i>	Liberal-representative (post-socialist version)	Consensus model (<i>Poldermodel</i>)
<i>Role of Lay People</i>	Educational	Dialogical
	Sceptical	
<i>Language use</i>	I, My opinion	We, Common opinion
<i>Relationship with Europe</i>	Ambiguous, Problematic	Straightforward, Uncomplicated
<i>Visions of Europe</i>	‘Economic-Political Project’; ‘Cultural-Historical Unity’; ‘Circles of Loyalty’	‘Geographic Continent’; ‘Cultural Proximity Continent’; ‘Equal Groups-Sports club’

First of all, it is important to mention that Hungary has a liberal-representative political culture with a strong withdrawal into private spheres. The reason for this is that while the socialist era has been over now for fifteen years the previous forty years still have their effects on Hungarian social life. In the last period of socialism in Hungary the Party's goal was to systematically depoliticise public life and to turn people's attention to their own economic enrichment by providing space for small, private enterprises. This was the compromise between the depoliticised public and the permissive political elite of the late period of socialism, which is called 'fridge- or goulash-communism' referring to the emergence of consumer ideals in a socialist context. I believe that is the reason that when Hungarians spoke about their role in the process they never used the expressions like "together", "we", "our" but emphasised phrases like "my opinion", "my goal". However, it is also noticeable that not all civil initiatives are at odds with the Hungarians, yet these usually take the forms of institutionalised or informal resistance to an already existing social or technical system (Király, 2005).

In contrast, the Dutch political system is based on a consensus model called '*poldermodel*' which has quite a different historical background from the Hungarian political system. The Dutch society has been characterised by this consensus model for many centuries. The origin of this striving for consensus is the struggle against water, which goes back to the Middle Ages. At that time farmers, noblemen, cities and all citizens had to work together in order to build dykes to fight against the sea. The only way to do this was to cooperate irrespective of rank and wealth. Today this model means that in the Dutch political system the employers, the unions and the government sit around the table to come to labour agreements. However, traces of this model could be found in the economic sphere, in the educational system and in other spheres of social life as well. Usually, Dutch people attempt to evade radical standpoints and attempt to see the other person's position. This may be the reason why in the answers they often used terms 'we', 'our', 'together' and the 'opinion of the group'.

As far as the role of the participants is concerned, whilst the sceptical repertoire could be detected in both groups the educational discursive node was more characteristic of the Hungarians and the dialogic one could be traced more clearly in the Dutch answers. In my opinion, the explanation for this difference is that in a way the Dutch are ‘playing on a home turf’ because their political culture, education and economy requires from them a certain kind of activity and team work. Above, in Nielsen et al.’s case study one could see that the deliberative model, which is in a way central in the idea of the Consensus Conference model, is only characteristic of the Danish political context. In a similar fashion, the dialogic repertoire, which has its direct connections with the post-national citizen model, is much closer to the Dutch political culture than to the Hungarian.

In contrast, an initiative like the Meeting of Minds was totally new for the Hungarian citizens and they could not really find their own place in it. These kinds of initiatives are not only far from the political culture but education and human relations in the economy are also organised along different lines. Concerning the case study of Consensus Conferences, it could be read that the French organisers put a very strong emphasis on the educational aspect of the process. Similarly, for the Hungarians this aspect of the MoM seemed more tangible as they had had no contact with public deliberations before. Consequently, they downplayed this other aspect in their answers.

As far as the participants’ relationship to Europe is concerned, it is worth mentioning that it seemed from the interviews that Hungarian citizens have an ambiguous relationship to Europe. While they expressed a cultural, historical connection with Europe they also depict Europe as ‘out there’, as ‘they’ and emphasised that Hungarians still have to improve their condition to become truly Europeans. So, this above-mentioned ambivalence stems from the fact that the Hungarians use two different aspects of Europe in their arguments. Firstly, a cultural-historical dimension of Europe which Hungarians also share and secondly an economic-political dimension which is a Europe ‘out there’ and with which Hungary has to fall into line. In that sense, the most appropriate

expression for this relationship comes from one of the participants, which is that Hungarians are “not non-Europeans”. Quoting one of the Hungarian citizens:

„I have never felt *non-European*, so we are getting closer to one another. I have never felt [we are] on opposite sides because I have always approached [the issue] that he belongs here, and I belong here too when we went on holiday to Germany or France. I have never felt inferior *to them*. The fact that we are poorer is a different issue altogether, but that has never made me feel inferior *to them*.”

This interview part clearly shows that among many Hungarian citizens there is still a strong feeling of contrast between us and *them* which signifies the rest of Europe. The fact that the interviewee negates two time inferiority *to them* while the question was about her European identity clearly shows that there is an economic-political inferiority complex among the Hungarian participants.

As for the Dutch citizens, it seems that being Dutch also means being European and this belonging to Europe is an immanent part of the Dutch identity. Furthermore, when they talked about their relationship to Europe they used phrases and expressions which referred to the geographical position of the country as a fact. Consequently, they claimed an immanent unity of Europe which, according to them, can be very clearly seen by contrasting Europe with other continents. Apart from that, some of them also emphasised that Europe is an association of diverse groups of citizens who are equal and this diversity is a valuable thing and it should be maintained. This unproblematic relation is clearly present in one of the Dutch participants answer:

“I mean 100% I’m Dutch, because that’s what I am, I was born there, I was raised there and at the same time my 100% is European, because Holland is a European country. We are in Europe, we are living there.”

The fact that the Hungarians and the Dutch used different kinds of repertoires also indicates that there is a difference in political culture and in their relationship to Europe. This underscores the argument that the model of post-national citizenship is dependent

on political culture and historical developments. This seems even more important if one considers the fact that actual participatory arrangements can be based on this citizenship model. For example, the MoM did not treat participants with different cultural background in a different way. Although different handling may have raised questions about political correctness but it would have been necessary if the aim was to construct a debating subject in an international context, that is, the post-national citizen. As it can be clearly seen in the interviews the Hungarians for example might have needed a different kind of preparation for the process than the Dutch or the Danish.

While I am sure that in the long run a shift in the Hungarian political culture towards a more deliberative and consensus based model would be very beneficial, I shall argue that international participatory projects like MoM cannot simply overlook the difference between participants with diverse backgrounds. This difference might be incorporated in the design of the process either by trying to level it off in the preparatory phase of the project or taking into account its implications in another way.

Furthermore, MoM was based on a post-national citizenship model, a model which has been created to overstep historical and cultural differences. It is important to highlight however, that while there is a constant search for a model on the part of EU officials to construct a citizenship model transcending national aspects, post-national citizenship might not be as irrespective of national contexts as it had been assumed.

5.5. Précis

As far as the role of the citizens is concerned, these discursive repertoires were the educational, the dialogical, and the sceptical repertoires. In the ‘educational repertoire’ the emphasis was on the educational effects of the project and participation is considered to be a means of education. In the ‘dialogical repertoire’, the dialogical, open and dynamic manner of the project was stressed. Accordingly, participants conceived themselves as

active members of a group, which is meant to think and create and reach a common opinion. In the sceptical repertoire, citizens expressed their concern about the meaningfulness of the project, at worst interpreting the project merely as a strategy meant to legitimise or advertise already decided policies. Whilst the sceptical repertoire could be detected in both groups, the educational repertoire was more characteristic of the Hungarians and the dialogic could be more clearly identified in Dutch answers.

When participants spoke about their European-ness and their European citizenship they usually justified their arguments by describing Europe. Five different Europe-s, five different relationships and five different discursive repertoires could be detected respectively. These were the following repertoires: the political-economic, the cultural-historical, the equal groups of citizens, the unity of continent and the extending circles of loyalty repertoires. In the political-economic repertoire the emphasis was on the image of Europe as the subject of an integration process. In a similar manner, citizens who organised their arguments around this repertoire spoke about their European-ness and European citizenship as being under construction, or in other words, as being part of a process itself. In the cultural-historical repertoire citizens stressed the importance of a common European history and culture which despite many wars and conflicts can be traced back to thousands of years. European citizens, therefore, are the inheritors of the same cultural legacy by virtue of a common European history. The equal group of citizens repertoire depicted Europe as a home of various different groups who have equally important culture. According to this viewpoint, the diversity of Europe has to be maintained and to be a European citizen is concomitant to living together with and respecting this plurality. The unity of the continent repertoire presented Europe as a unity in terms of its inwardly common features in contrast to other continents. According to this perspective, while citizens of different nations are different indeed, in Europe they are closer to each other than to somebody from a different continent. So, being a European means that minor differences between fellow-Europeans dwindle compared to differences between Europeans and people from other continents. The extending circles

of loyalty repertoire described Europe as a hierarchical political structure which is erected as a pyramid from local through regional up to the European level. European citizenship, therefore, is a quality which is a wider circle of loyalty based on local, regional and national attachments.

What is most striking in the ‘citizens’ discursive layer’ is the variety of different repertoires in terms of how citizens describe their role and their relationship to Europe, their European citizenship. Although one can identify arguments, symbols, rhetorical elements which may have academic or official origin in their answers, the ways they explain their position cannot be reduced to either of them. It seems that both participation and European-ness is a discursive field which is a container of different practices, meanings and identities.

In the ‘citizens’ discursive layer’ one can also identify this kind of ambiguity towards the future results and possible impact of the project. While the citizens were very much in favour of participation in issues about science and technology in particular and in politics in general, many of them expressed their concern that their opinion will not be taken into consideration. In this section I attempted to identify different discursive repertoires around which Hungarian and Dutch citizens organised their arguments about their role in the project and their relationships to Europe and European citizenship.

The second section of the chapter examined the issue whether common European political subjects, who are sensitive to scientific-technological issues, that is, post-national scientific citizens can be constructed. Firstly, I introduced Nielsen et al.’s case study about the different interpretations of participation in general and Consensus Conference in particular in different political contexts. According to their research, in different contexts the role of the laypersons can be very diverse. They argue that the organisers ‘construct’ their participants quite differently and in line with their ideas of what the benefits of the process of the Consensus Conference are. Consequently, it can be re-considered whether

an unquestioned common model of participants in an international process such as the MoM is appropriate and justified.

A comparison between the Dutch and the Hungarians showed that the model of post-national scientific citizenship is much closer to the Dutch political culture. While the post-national citizenship model is supposed to transcend historical and cultural differences, it is important to highlight that it might not be as irrespective of national contexts as it had been assumed.

It might be said that the analysis of the citizenship discursive layer completed the ‘collection of samples’ from different discursive layers. This sample collection attempted to illustrate all important aspects and perspectives of citizenship, science and Europe. As one could see, both European policy documents and the MoM project favour a special kind of identity position, namely, the post-national citizenship. However, this chapter showed that the subject positions of the citizens’ self-understanding cannot be reduced to this idea alone and the space around the term participation is much broader than this narrow concept. As a conclusion, in the next and final chapter both the viability and the minimal requirements of such a subject position will be discussed in depth.

6. CONCLUSION

In this section, I shall attempt to draw a conclusion from the various issues, problems and policy approaches discussed above. I will briefly sum up the main arguments discussed in this thesis and reconstruct the train of thought. The focus of attention will be again the ‘Meeting of Minds’ project. It will be discussed in the light of the questions the following dilemma raises. The main question about deliberative processes in general, and about MoM in particular, is what impact these projects and their results can have. I will argue that just as Pasteur had to restructure or ‘pasteurise’ the social level in accordance with the conditions of his laboratory, national and European politics should be restructured, that is, should be ‘deliberalised’ as well.

In the first part of this thesis, there was an introduction to and analysis of the MoM project as a *laboratory* where ideal conditions are guaranteed by painstakingly framing the process. It has been argued that one of the underlying ideas of the project was the ‘ideal speech situation’ developed by Habermas. There was a constant and clear effort on behalf of the organisers to maintain a symmetrical and open communication between citizens who were to elaborate recommendations on the possible future applications of brain science. It is claimed that this communicative situation could only be guaranteed by enrolling many other entities than just the citizens alone. These entities were facilitators, the interior design, the microphones, the beamer, the headphones and so on and so forth. Without these ‘additional’ elements such balance in the discourse could not have been achieved. This highlights the fact that ‘ideal speech situation’ is not a discursive state which can just arise spontaneously. It had to be constructed and in the ‘under construction’ period many other elements had to be involved. Afterwards, these elements remained in the background ‘dormant’ providing a frame for the conversations.⁶⁷ I have

⁶⁷ This web of mute entities has been described by Bauman too as silent culture: „Another kind of culture, a silent culture, a culture unaware of being a culture, a culture that keeps the knowledge of being a culture a secret, a culture working anonymously or under an assumed name (...) – such a culture might be a handmaiden, a fuel station and a repair workshop servicing the current web of human interaction called ‘society’.” (Bauman, 2004, Wp. p. 12-13.)

explored and analysed this frame by using Actor-Network-Theory, which emphasises the role of associations of non-human and human elements in establishing social order. Moreover, the chapter also reflected on the challenge the MoM project was faced with, that is, what role the results of this laboratory, this ‘micro-process’ is going to play at a macro level. This challenge will be discussed in some depth below.

In the second part, I explained the different interpretations of the transnational participation of citizens concerned with science and technology. I have identified three main ways which dominate the theoretical, the policy and the public discourse on scientific and European citizenship. These can be connected to three important strands of political thought, namely, the liberal, the republican and the deliberative theories and their models of citizenship, respectively.

One of these models, namely, the deliberative model of citizenship has been more extensively covered in this essay than the others. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, there is a significant shift in the rhetoric of European Commission documents. The documents that have been discussed in the third section call for more accountable and participatory politics on behalf of the Commission. Moreover, one can see that these initiatives do not stop at the borders of narrowly defined politics but demand alternatives through which science and technology can become more accountable and open to citizens. In these documents, involvement and participation are often depicted through a deliberative democratic model in which a debating circle surrounds policy and decision-making. In these documents a clear shift can be seen from a citizenship model which depicts citizens as consumers of science and technology towards a model which encourages citizens to form opinions about developments in these spheres.

It can be stated that, as it is apparent in theoretical discourse, these documents express an intention to establish a post-national citizenship model in the European polity in general, and in the spheres of European science and technology in particular. This model of

citizenship would be based on participation and engagement in a post-national community transcending cultural, linguistic and national borders. As a consequence, a new model for the social integration of the European population would be political involvement in common issues (Giesen & Eder, 2001).⁶⁸ Yet, with this shift important questions emerge such as: what would be the follow up to the opinions elaborated in deliberative processes after they have been expressed; and how can the voices of citizens be effectively channelled into ‘appropriate bodies’; and how sensitive these bodies are to external influences and how to make them even more sensitive? We could see that these documents avoid these questions.

The final part of this paper is again closely connected with the ‘Meeting of Minds’ project which was actually a European deliberation process. In this part there is an attempted to show how citizens perceive their role and their European-ness in relation to the project. We could see that this project can at the same time be interpreted as a *classroom* for acquiring knowledge as the ‘educational repertoire’ suggest, as a *circus* for marketing and the amusement of the folk as the ‘sceptical repertoire’ frames or as an *arena* of thoughts where different views, opinions and interests meet and strive for reaching a consensus as the ‘dialogical repertoire’ assumes. In a similar manner, European-ness can be understood along many more different lines than just in terms of political participation, such as geographic, cultural, economic and political frames.

Moreover, it could also be seen that the post-national citizenship construction is not as ‘cosmopolitan’ and irrespective of national contexts as it had been supposed. While apparently Dutch participants could use this identity position and play according to its rules imposed, Hungarian citizens did have problems understanding and positioning themselves in such a role. While it is certain that the Hungarians could also contribute to the process in a valuable way, cultural differences could be reflected more in the structure

⁶⁸ Science and technology was always a joint international venture, and issues of science usually go beyond national borders. Consequently, the topic of brain science probably also seemed an appropriate area to

of the process because this citizenship might not travel as well between cultures as policy-makers might hope.

Coming back to the main argument, the above-mentioned repertoires are all different kinds of interpretations developed by the participants to understand their role and place in the process. However, while the good intentions of those organisers who built the model of post-national scientific citizen into the project is beyond doubt, it is hard not to agree with those who are sceptical if there are no guarantees for citizens that politicians and scientists will take notice of them. Habermas also emphasised that:

“As we have seen, democratic procedures should produce rational outcomes insofar as opinion-formation inside parliamentary bodies remains sensitive to the results of a surrounding informal opinion-formation in autonomous public spheres (Habermas, 1997, p. 60).”

Yet, if parliamentary bodies remain insensitive to the results of such project as the MoM, one suspects that participation procedures on science and technology, instead of a “true dialogue”, will foster disillusionment and cynicism from citizens who cannot see their opinion taken seriously. On the website of the project we could read that the envisaged effects of participatory technology assessment generally are: (i) to enhance *social learning* among experts, stakeholders and citizens; (ii) to stimulate *public debate*; and (iii) to provide *policy advice* (MoM, 2005A, Wp.). In this sense, ‘Meeting of Minds’ is designed to help develop new forms of social debate and decision-making processes at European cross-national level, as well as creating a network of interested parties and stakeholders by making issues public at a European level. However, these are quite vague and far-reaching goals which are not easily measured or internalised within a short period of time.

Even so, the most problematic point is the question how the results of this public deliberation may shape future policies concerning brain sciences. One way to answer this

realize this shift between citizenship models.

question is what Simon Joss⁶⁹ said at one of the ‘Steering Committee’ meetings.⁷⁰ His answer to a similar question was that the project aims do not focus on ‘government’ but ‘governance’. This means that the main goal is not to have a direct effect on policy-making but to influence all the important actors and stakeholders who are interested in issues about brain science. So, the effect can also be very indirect and one will only be able to directly experience its effect in the long run. In the interview Rinie van Est also emphasised that this is a pilot project and it is not only the citizens who have to learn this new practice but the organisers also have to create a network of interested parties. Moreover, they also have to increase politicians’ and scientists’ awareness of the findings which a deliberative arrangement could provide. This project therefore is an experiment not only in its process and results but also with regard to its impacts on the political and the scientific community.

“It is part for me, it is part of the methodology. That’s communication finding out which politicians, which policy makers are interested. (...)

The classical way in the history of Technology Assessment that is you make a report, which is neutral, and you give it to policy makers and they will use. That doesn’t work, it has never worked but we’ve come to realize that it has never worked.

So we really have to have some kind of communication strategy and I have stressed to make this kind of quest, who is interested, that’s part of the process, meaning that so you have a nice participatory process but nobody’s interested. Ok, nobody is interested but you do a lot to get that interest. That is a clear result for me.”

In the course of the interview, Rinie van Est also emphasised moreover that it is very hard to answer the question whether the climate among the decision makers and scientists is congenial enough to make full use of the results of a public deliberation like the Meeting of Minds. There are no guarantees that the report will have a direct impact on policy making but these initiatives are part of a trial-and-error process. Apart from this,

⁶⁹ Simon Joss is a researcher at the Center for Democracy at the University of Westminster. Together with Alison Mohr, he provides methodological pieces of advice to the project coordinators.

⁷⁰ Meeting of Minds. European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science Project: Steering Committee Meeting. 7-8/ 07/2005 Brussels.

there are substantial efforts on behalf of the project coordinators to exert an effect at different levels and on various actors.

“You cannot give guarantees but you can do everything, you have to mobilize things to get an impact. (...) It is such a complex thing but there are no guarantees. At the same time I mean I can understand quite well that from the point of view of the citizens. That’s why they do it, because they want to have an impact. Because if they don’t have an impact why should they do it? But it is the same with the organisers, if we have the idea that we would not have any impact we wouldn’t do it.”

The website claims that the Meeting of Minds initiative wishes to meet EU calls for greater public involvement in the debate on future research, technological decision-making and governance. This way, argues the writer of the text, Meeting of Minds will also make a significant, tangible contribution to the development of the European governance agenda in the field of research. However, in view of the above-mentioned arguments, the organisers of the project seem less confident when they are directly asked about it. It seems that the project in particular and TA procedures at a European level in general have to be ‘sold’ to policy-makers and scientists also as it had been promoted to citizens. Without this, these kinds of deliberative forms cannot ‘make a concrete, tangible contribution’.

At the end of this journey, I would like to develop an argument that these participatory processes might take steps to, in a Latourian sense, ‘deliberatise’ national and European political spheres if they want to uphold their credibility in the eyes of the citizens. In the first section of this paper we could see that Pasteur had to translate the conditions of his laboratory firstly to the level of farms and secondly to the social level. He was able to reconstruct the very texture of society by turning the farms and the ‘outside world’ into a gigantic laboratory. So the problem to be addressed is how to translate the conditions of a deliberative process into national and EU political levels. From the above mentioned arguments, it seems that even the organisers are not sure how to proceed. However, it is not my intention here to criticise the organisers but to suggest a possible solution to this

problem. If the comparison between Pasteur's case and the MoM is carried further, it can be said the organisers are doing the right thing. Pasteur built a network of interested parties in order to attain his goal. He 'enrolled' farmers and microbes first, politicians and the hygienic movement later. As we could read in the interview with Rinie van Est, the organisers currently have the same goals. They are trying to build up a network of interested parties who would help to attain the goals of the process and this activity is part of the project.

Apart from this, we could also see the question of identity in Callon's example. From the above mentioned arguments, it seems that there is a political intention to realise a shift towards a politically active citizen in a post-national community. Moreover, issues about science and technology also seem to be an adequate 'turf' to experiment with this new type of 'deliberative game' with its own rules and guidelines. However, it is also important to emphasise that the conclusion to be drawn from the case studies in connection with the concept of laboratisation is that, similarly to scientific facts, identity constructs are not easily fixed and maintained.

If the conditions outside the laboratory are not ensured, these identities become hollow and lose their substance. This might prove even truer for those participants who are 'newcomers' in a process related to political cultures based on discussion and deliberation. As Latour and Callon showed, if there are no structures outside the laboratory to enforce certain 'identity' positions, people stop behaving like 'homo economicus' and microbes stop behaving like vaccines. In a similar fashion, it could be achieved that citizens in a very limited and confined space should behave as 'real' post-national scientific citizens do. The challenge is to keep these identity constructs together deploying them as new actors of European integration both in terms of political and scientific-technological integration. So far, it seems that according to documents that this is the 'official' intention. I would assume that this is only possible if citizens who take part in a deliberative process in

particular, and citizenry in general, can not only believe that their opinions are taken into consideration but they can actually follow them up.

My question, however, is not about how the organisers should do their jobs better but how the channelling of public opinion into political centres should happen. To put it more bluntly, what are the *minimum requirements* of deliberative processes which the political culture encompassing them should provide? What might be emphasised here is the expression of ‘minimum requirements’ because there is no place for the elaboration of complex idyllic plans about how the national and the European might be restructured in a more democratic and transparent way. Here, I would rather attempt to find and suggest the very first and by all means necessary step to launch this journey towards these goals.

First of all, the core of the problem seems obvious, given that both these deliberative processes and the citizens participating in them lack any kind of formal power. Yet, is it necessary to give formal power to the public? It is not an easy question to answer since traditional political institutions based on a representative democratic model are short of legitimacy. A straightforward solution would be to establish new political institutions based on direct political participation. However, in a modern society this is not at all obvious since the issues needing to be discussed and the administrative system are far too complex to be directly governed by ordinary citizens. That is why Habermas argues that an ‘in-between’ solution is needed combining the administrative functioning of modern societies and political participation. According to him, the

“...power of public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and debunk bad ones. Of course, these opinions must be given shape in the form of decisions by democratically constituted decision-making bodies. The responsibility for practically consequential decisions must be based in an institution. Discourses do not govern. They generate a communicative power that cannot take the place of administration but can only influence it. This influence is limited to the procurement and withdrawal of legitimation (Habermas, 1992, p. 452).”

In line with this, deliberative processes can represent this ‘in-between’ solution not by giving citizens legislative power but by effectively channelling their opinions into the arenas where the actual decisions are made. But again what does ‘effective channelling in’ actually mean? How can the sensitivity of parliamentary bodies be guaranteed? How can it be achieved that results of deliberative projects are taken on board by politicians?

If it is not intended that deliberative processes should replace political participation from representative democracy in general but is meant to improve its functioning, then I shall argue that it is important that the results and recommendations developed by the citizens should be discussed by the authoritative political body concerned.⁷¹ As we could see from the story of MoM, these authoritative political bodies can be at national level like parliaments and/or international bodies like the European Parliament. Moreover, there can be deliberative methodologies like the scenario workshop or the citizens’ jury, which are more closely connected to the local level. In the case of such processes, authoritative bodies could be local or regional governments. All things considered, no matter on which political level these processes take place, the important thing is that these recommendations are taken seriously by the decision-makers. Furthermore, they should not only be taken seriously but citizens might also be *part of the discussions* about the results of deliberative processes, and/or at the very least could be observers when the results are being discussed.

This solution would mean that these processes transcend their role as mere public experiments and enter the realm of real public discussion about matters which are important for the transnational, national and/or local political communities. It would represent a guarantee that citizens can really follow up the results and make sure that their

⁷¹ I am not discussing here the issues of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ but stick to the issues of political participation. It may be worth mentioning, though, that accountability, stakeholder engagement and responsibility is start to spill-over from a political to an economic context. It is a similar dynamic which is happening now with the area of corporations which is also happening with scientific research. To put it more bluntly, these spheres which were formerly free of ethical deliberations and reflections are in a way

final report does not end up on the shelf somewhere in an empty office. If these conditions are met, these processes could represent real forums of political discussions.

It may be worth mentioning that this solution is not at all foreign to our political culture. There is a way through which ordinary Hungarian citizens can influence the agenda of issues discussed in the Parliament. *National public initiative* can force “the Parliament to place a subject under its jurisdiction” (Hun. Const. 1949, Article 28D). If the strict requirements of this initiative are met the “Parliament shall debate the subject defined by” citizens in advance. This means a possibility of intervention in the course of formal politics by the citizenry.

I would like to argue that this could be a way of dealing with the outcomes of deliberative processes as well. There should be a reliable *formal* guarantee in the processes so that politicians should be obliged to at least discuss these results and take them into consideration. In other words, such processes would not necessarily have direct connection with legislation but such a model would assure that the recommendations expressed by citizens are truly considered by members of parliament.

So, this could be a model for feedback on deliberative processes. Without the guarantee that the political elite at least will have to deal with the questions and problems arising on the interface of the public and the administrative spheres, these processes remain totally meaningless and even ideological since they do not represent real participation. This is the minimum prerequisite of ‘deliberatising’ politics at local, at national and/or at European level.

This idea is utopian and realistic at the same time. Utopian because it would mean that certain areas be opened up for public discussions and politics and policies concerned

repoliticized. Consequently, participation of and responsibility towards citizens and consumers are becoming more and more important in the discourses of these areas.

would be more accountable. If these processes are implemented in a top-down manner like MoM was, it is too idealistic to expect that national or European politics would also accept and establish them not just as public experiments but as real channels of political participation.

As Markoff (Markoff, 1999) emphasises, democratisation, so far, in local and in national arenas has been the result of social movements' constant effort to control and disrupt the plans of those at the top. As a consequence, political power has been shaped to a more accountable form by the activities of movements which represented a pressure from below. Markoff also argues that during "the eighteenth century, social movements reoriented themselves from local power structures to national states but they have been less effective in reorienting themselves yet again to the supracentral level" (Markoff, 1999; p. 21). Considering these historical dimensions of democratisation processes one can say that the self-democratising power from above is an oxymoron in itself.

Considering Markoff's ideas, it could be said that in a way the European and the Hungarian polity share the same problems. Both consist of a set of relatively recently formed political institutions of a political community claiming itself democratic. However, both lack a fairly mature civil society to control their power and force them to use it in a more transparent and accountable way. Lacking this pressure from below they cannot be truly democratic. Accordingly, the need to give a formal status to channels of political participation like deliberative processes can only arise in the civil society. Furthermore, obviously only this sphere can be truly effective in enforcing such a need.

However, I would like to argue that an argument of giving a formal status to channels of deliberation is also realistic in a sense. It is realistic because democratic deficit is an inevitable challenge for the political institutions depending on a representative form of democracy. They have to deal with the problems arising from the fact that traditional channels of opinion and will-formation and expressions have become hollow and cannot

be simply rejuvenated. One can say that there is reason to keep up the hope since the EU has just recently set off several initiatives aiming to deal with democratic deficit, with the gap between European citizen and European institutions and with the lack of engagement of civil society organisations. This also can have a spill-over effect on the national level particularly for new member states where democracy is high but a newly prompted endeavour. So, if these political institutions really want to find remedies for the democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy they might consider establishing and formally accepting ways of participation apart from the representative forms of will-expression. Without such actions, arguments about dealing with these challenges remain pure rhetoric.

All in all, I would like to argue that to really delibertise national and European politics, there should be ways to guarantee that the outcomes of deliberative politics are really taken into account. On the one hand, this need should be enforced from below on behalf of the national and European civil society which both have just started to find evidence of their existence. On the other hand, such need should be identified and recognised by the political elites as well if they want to regain their balance and their credibility in doing politics.

One more important issue needs to be addressed, which is the question of the scientist in this matter. Since the MoM was about brain science and the central concept of this thesis was 'scientific citizenship' the question arises 'how can the scientist be influenced by such deliberative processes'? This is a tricky question since it is easy to localise the political elites whom one wants to address with his or her opinions, concerns and hopes regarding an issue but what about scientists?

One obvious way to influence them is indirect since the most important addressees of a final report of a deliberative process are always the politicians. They are the ones who, in case of sciences and technologies, are supposed to develop the necessary legislative

framework for ethical and fair research and development. One can say that this is just as undemocratic for the scientist as it would be for the citizen not to be involved. Furthermore, the Hungarian Constitution lays down the law:

„Article 70G [Arts, Academia, Teaching, Science]

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect and support the freedom of scientific and artistic expression, the freedom to learn and to teach.

(2) Only scientists are entitled to decide in questions of scientific truth and to determine the scientific value of research. (Hun. Const. 1949; Article 70G)”

Nonetheless, I would argue that the aim is not to violate scientific impartiality but to find the acceptable framework for the ethical conduct of research and the generally acceptable goals of R&D on which the taxpayer’s money is spent. This would also mean a totally new perspective of science and scientific activity as the above quoted excerpt suggests. According to this new perspective, scientists are accountable and responsible to their social environment and their political community and not only to their scientific ideals and close community of experts.

However, I shall emphasise if deliberative processes in the area of science and technology are to succeed they should directly influence the scientific community concerned. The general aim of the processes called Participatory Technology Assessment is not to impose unacceptable rules, regulations and restrictions on the scientific community from the outside but to involve scientists in the discussion and deliberation as well. It may be worth mentioning that it seemed to work in the case of MoM.

Moreover, scientists could also be receptive and sensitive to the results of deliberative processes and modify their behaviour, scientific practices and general goals of research according to public opinion. Ideally, it would not appear to them as something violating their right to the “freedom of scientific expression” but as something informative and orientating. If science means to work towards the public good it also should be open to what the public wants.

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